Lock-and-key security : evaluation of Telnet as an authentication method usually associated with dynamic access control lists application by El Saadany, Riham
UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL 
LOCK-AND-KEY SECURITY 
EVALUATION OF TELNET AS AN AUTHENTICATION METHOD USUALLY 
ASSOCIATED WITH DYNAMIC ACCESS CONTROL LISTS APPLICATION 
THE SIS 
PRESENTED 
AS A PARTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR 
THE MAS TER PROGRAM OF MANAGAMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
BY 
RIHAM ELSAADANY 
MAY 20 13 
UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL 
Service des bibliothèques · 
Ayert/sseaient 
La diffusion da ce mémoire se fait dans le' respect des droits de son auteur, qui a signé 
le formulaire Autorisation de reproduire. et de diffuser un travail de recherche de cycles 
c;up~rfeurs (SDU-522- Rév.01 -2006). Cette autorisation stipule qua <•conformément à 
l' article 11 du Règlement no 8 dea études de cycles supérieurs, [l'auteur] concède à 
l'Université du Québec à Montréal une llc~nce non exclusive d'utilisation et de . 
publication de la totalité ou d'une partie Importante da [son] travail de recherche pour 
des fins pédagogiques et non commerciales. Plus précisément, [l'auteur) autorisa 
l'Université du Québec à Montréal à reproduira, diffuser, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des 
copies da. [son] travail da rechercha à dea fins non commerciales sur quelque support 
que ce soit, y comprlsi'lntamet Catte licence at catte autorisation n'antrainent pas une 
renonciation de [la] part [da l'auteur] à [ses] droits moraux ni à [sas] droits da proprtété 
intellectuelle. Sauf ententé contraire, [l' uteur] conserva la libert de diffuser e de 
commercialiser ou non ce travail dont [il] possède un exemplaire.~ 
UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL 
SÉCURITÉ DE SERRURE ET CLÉ 
ÉVALUATION DU TELNET COMME ÉTANT 
UNE MÉTHODE D'AUTHENTIFICATION SOUVENT ASSOCIÉE À L'APPLICATION 
DES LISTES DE CONTRÔLE D'ACCÈS DYNAMIQUES 
MÉMOIRE 
PRES ENTÉ 
COMME EXIGENCE PARTIELLE 
DE LA MAITRÎSE EN INFORMATIQUE DE GESTION 
PAR 
RIHAM ELSAADANY 
MAI 201 3 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I'd like to thank Mr. Guy Begin, my research director who helped me with every reference, 
encouraged me when it seemed endless and guided me during my journey writing this 
research while being in a different country. I really appreciate all his great help and generous 
support. 
I would like to thank Mr. Cloutier, the director of the Management Information Systems 
master program, who made this work possible to happen, allowing me to continue my 
studies and giving me the chance to earn my degree after many years away from school. 
My thanks also go for Mrs. Côté, the secretary of the Management Information Systems 
mas ter pro gram, who facilitated and coordinated a lot of the paper work for me. Without her 
great help, such a research would 've been impossible. 
And last, but definitely not !east, I would like to thank my loving husband that supported me 
all the way, in every mean, so that I can achieve my goal , no matter how hard sorne days 
used to be. And, of course, many cute thanks for my three kids that tolerated a mom with 
less time to cuddle, however with a loving heart and mind, that never stop thinking about 
them ... ali the time. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF FIGURES .. ... .... ... .. .. .. .. ...... .... .... ...... .. .... ...... .... .. ......... ............. ...... .. .... .... ............ xi 
TABLE OF TABLES .......... .. ..... .... ................... ... ... ............ .. .... .. .................... ... ... ....... .. .. ... XIII 
LIST OF TERMINOLOGIES/ACRONYMS ... .......... ... ... .... ... ... ... ...................... .. ...... ....... ... xv 
WRITING AND TECHNICAL CONVENTIONS ... ..... ... ..... .... .... ... ............ .. ... ..... ............ xvii 
COMMAND SYNT AX CONVENTIONS ..... .... .. ....... .. ... .. .... ... .... ... ........ .. .... .. .... .... ... .. ...... xix 
RÉSUMÉ ..... ... ... ... ... .... ... ......... ... .. .... .. ..... ... .. ..... .. .. ....... ... .... ..... ... .. ........ ...... ....... ....... .... ..... XXI 
ABSTRACT ... ...... ......... ....... .. ... ...... .... ..... .......... .... ... ........ ...... ..... .. ... .. .. ...... ... ... ..... ........... XXIII 
INTRODUCTION ...... .... ... .... .... ... ....... ....... .. ....... .... ... ..... ......... ..... .... ... ...... ................. .. .. ........ 1 
CHAPTERI 
NETWORK SECURITY .......... ...... ... ..................... .... .. ....... .. .. ... ... ....... ..... ... .. .... ..... ..... .. ... ... ... 5 
1.1 The network architecture reference mode! ...... .......... .. ....... ............................ ........... ........ 5 
1. 1.1 The Open System Interconnection (OSI) mode! developed by the international 
Organization for Standard ization (ISO) .. .... ........... ..... .... ......... .... .... .. ... .... ... ........ ... 6 
1.1 .2 The TCP/IP mode! .. ...... ... ............. .... .. ... .. ........ .... ........ .... ...... .. .... ... .... ...... ... ... ... ... .. 10 
1.2 The importance of network security ............. ... ..... ... ....... .... ..... .. .. .... ... .. .. ... ... .... ... .. .. ... ..... 12 
1.2.1. The Internet and the World Wide Web ... ......... ... .. ... ..... .. ........ .. ....... .. .. .. ... ... .... .. ... 12 
1.2.2. The benefits of network security ........................................................................... 14 
1.2. 3. The threats to organizations' networks ....................... .. ...................... ..... ..... ... ..... 15 
1.2.4. Security actions taken by the organizations to protect their networks .............. .. .. 20 
1.3 The location of the authentication process on the OSI madel ........ .. ....................... ... ... .. 23 
CHAPTERII 
ACCESS CONTROL LISTS (ACLS) .. ..... .. .. ......... ...... ............ ... .. .......... ... .......... .. ... .......... .. 27 
2.1 What are ACLs? ..................................... ........................... .......... ..................................... 27 
2.2 IP ACLs filtering process ....................... ............................... ......... .. ............................... 31 
2.3 How to configure an IP ACL? ....... .. .. .. ............. ................. .. ................................ .. .......... 32 
2.4 IP ACLs categories .... ....... .... .......... ............................. .. ................. .................. .. ... ....... ... 33 
viii 
2.4.1 Standard ACLs ....... .... .. ...... .. .. ....... ...... ... ... .. ....... .. .......... ........ ... .... ... ... ... ...... ......... ... .... . 33 
2.4.2 Extended ACLs ............... .. ................. .. .. ... .......... ... ........ .. ............ .... .. ....... ..... ... .... . 38 
2.4.3 Named ACLs ........ ........ ..... ..... ... ...... .. ... .. .... ... ... ... .. .. ........ .. .. ..... ... ....... .. .................. 46 
2.4.4 Numbered ACLs .............. ... ........ .. ... ..... .. .... ....... .. ..... .. ............... ........ ..... ... ..... ....... . 48 
2.4.5 Reflexive ACLs ........ .. .............................. ... ............................ ... .. .. ..... ................... 51 
2.4 .6 Time-based ACLs ....... .. ..... ..... .. ......... ... ... ... .. ....... ... .. .. .. ............... .. .......... .. .. ..... ...... 52 
CHAPTERIII 
DYNAMIC ACLS ... ....... .. .. ....... ...... .. ...... .. ... ......... ....... .... .. ..... ....... ....... .. ........ ..... .. ... .. ... ....... 55 
3.1 Dynamic ACLs pm-pose ..................... .. ......... .... .. ...................... .. ...... ........ .. ... .. .. ... ........... 55 
3.2 Dynamic ACLs usage ............ .. ... .. .. ...... .. .. ........ .. .... .. ................... .. .. .. .................. ..... .. ..... 59 
3.3 Dynamic ACLs mechanism ...... .. ........ .. ........ .. ........ .... .. .. .............. .. .. .. .. .... .... .. .. .. ..... .. ...... 59 
3.4 Dynamic ACLs configuration (using local authentication) .. ............ .. .... ..... .. .. .. .... ...... .... 66 
3 .5 Example ofDynamic ACLs using local authentication .. .. .. .. ...... ... .. ......... .. ...... .. ... ..... .... . 71 
3.6 Dynamic ACLs authentication .. ...... .... .. .. ..... .... ... ............... .. .. ................ ... .... .. ..... .......... .. 77 
3.7 Dynamic ACLs and authentication servers .. .............. .. .............. .......... ... ..... .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .... 79 
3.7.1 Authentication Server overview ...... .. ...... ........ .................. .. .. .. .. .. .. .................. .. ..... 79 
3.7.2 Dynamic ACLs need versus Authentication Servers ........ .... .. .... ............. ...... ... ..... 81 
3.8 Dynamic ACLs configuration (using Authentication Servers) .. .. .. .......... .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 82 
3.9 Example ofDynamic ACLs using Authentication Servers .. .. .. .......... ... ......... .... .. .. ...... .. . 84 
CHAPTERIV 
USER AUTHENTICA Tl ON ..... .. .......... .. ... ........................ ... .. .. .. .... .. .... ... .... ......................... 91 
4.1 The user authentication and the AAA paradigm .. .. .......... ....... ............ .. ............... .. .......... 91 
4.2 Authentication Server (AS) .............. .. ............. ..... .. .... ..... ... ...... .. ... ... .... .. .. .... ......... .. ... ...... 95 
4 .3 Approaches that are sometimes associated with the authentication process .. .. .. .......... ... 97 
4.3 .1 Challenge/Response ....... ................... ... ... ...... ..... .. .. ... .. .. .. ... .. .. ...... ...... .. .. ............ .... 98 
4.3 .2 One Time Password (OTP) ............ .... ............ .... .. .... .. .... .... .... ............ ... .... .. ..... .... 101 
4.3.3 Point-to-Point connections (PPP) ............................... .. ............ ...... ...... ............... 102 
4.3.4 Password Authentication Protocol (PAP) ............................................................ 103 
4.3.5 Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) ...................... .. ...... .. ..... 104 
4.3.6 Proxy Server .. ..... .. ........ .. .. ....... .... ... .. ............................... ... ... .... ............ .... ..... ..... . 106 
4.4 AAA authentication servers/protocols .. ...... .. .............................. .. ... ... ..... ...... .. ...... ........ 108 
4.4.1 Remote Authentication Dial In User Server- RADIUS: ...... .. ............... .............. 108 
ix 
4.4.2 DIAMETER .. .......... ... .. ... .... ... ......... ..... ....................................................... ..... .... 112 
4.4.3 Terminal Access Control Access-Control System Plus (TACACS+) ................. 114 
4.4.4 Kerberos ...... ............. .. .. ... ... ........ ....... ....... .. .. ... .. ... ... ... .. .. .... ... ........ ........ ... ... .... ... .. 121 
4.5 Creating recovery peers for the authentication server ............... ..... .... .. ......... .. .............. 128 
4.5 .1 The difference between Exec access and Privileged access ................................. 128 
4.5 .2 Method lists ....... .... .. ... .. .. ... ... .. ........................ ........ .. ........ .... .. ... .. .......... ...... .. ... .. .. 130 
4.5.3 Peer recovery mechanism ..... ................................. ......................... .............. ........ 131 
4.5.4 Peer recovery implementation and configuration .. .. ......... .. ................................. 135 
CHAPTER V 
AUTHENTICATION AND DYNAMIC ACLS .. .. ...... .. ........ .. ........ .. .. .. .. .. ..... .. ..... .. ........ .. . 149 
5.1 Dynamic ACLs and choosing an authentication method ....... ............... .. ............. .......... 150 
5.2 Dynamic ACLs mechanism using Telnet.. ............. .. .. .. ... ... ............. .. .............. ....... ... ... . 152 
5.3 Problem of the research .... .... .. ... .. ........................ ........ .. ... ............ .. .. .. ....... .. ........... .. .. ... 153 
5.4 Telnet as a VTY connection .. ..... .... ...... .. .... .. ................................................................. 154 
5.4.1 Telnet vulnerability ....... .... ...... .. .. .... ........... .. .. ... ............ .. ......................... .. ...... .... 155 
5.4.2 Overcoming Telnet's drawbacks .. .... ......... .. .. .... .. ...... .. .. .. ... .. ... .. .... .. ............. .... .... 156 
5.4.3 SSH as a Telnet substitute ...... .. ......................... .. ... .. .... ..... .. ............ .. ............... .... 159 
5.5 Telnet as an authentication method ....... .. ......... .. .. .. ........ .. .. .. .. .. .... .. ........................ .. ...... 161 
5.6 Dynamic ACLs authentication methods ...... ...... .. .. ... ............ ....... .... ... ... ....... .... ....... .. .. .. 162 
5.6.1 Telnet as a user authentication method ...... .. ............ ... .. .. ..................................... 162 
5.6.2 The local database as a user authentication method .. ....... .. .. ... ..... ... .. ........ ........... 163 
5.6.3 The AAA authentication servers as a user authentication method ............ ......... .. 165 
5.7 Dynamic ACLs security aspects and the scalabili ty issue .. ......................... .. .. .... .... .. .. .. 173 
5.7.1 The Auth-proxy as a solution for the dynamic ACLs ' scalability issues .... .. ... .... 174 
5.7.2 The Rotary command as another solution for the dynamic acis ' scalability 
issues ... ... .... ...... ............ .. .. ..... .... .. ... .. ... ... .... .. .. ............. .... ... ................... ......... .. .... 181 
5.8 Dynamic ACLs combining different authentication method for recovery purposes ..... 183 
5.9 Comparison of AAA servers ....... ..... .... .............. .. ... ................... ...... .. ..... .... .... . .. .... .. .. .. .. 189 
5.9.1 RADIUS versus TACACS+ ............... .... .. ....... .......... .. .. ... .... ... ....... .... ... ............... 189 
5.9 .2 RADIUS versus DIAMETER .. .... .... .. ..... ...... .. .. .. ..... .. .............. .. ............ .. .. .. ........ 192 
5.9.3 KERBEROS .. ........ ....... ... .. .. .. .. ... ... ..... . .. ... ..................... .. ............................. ... .. .. . 194 
5.10 Sorne authentication suggestions based upon the comparison ......... .. .. .. ..................... 196 
x 
5.11 Dynamic ACLs drawbacks ....... .......... ..... ... ..... .... ...... .... ... ... .. .......... ............ ........ .... .. .. 203 
5.12 Recommendations .. ..... ...... ... .. .. ....... ... ..... ....... ...... ..... .. ... .... ... ........ ... .......... ..... ...... ....... 206 
CONCLUSION ......... ...... ............. ..... ..... ..... .................... .. ......... ....... .... ... ... ... .... ... .... .... ..... .. 211 
APPENDIX A 
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO OVERCOME TELNET SECURITY ISSUES .......... 215 
A.l Telnet extensions ............... .. .... ...... .. ..................... .............. .. ............................ .... ...... .. 215 
A.2 VPNs ... ... ............. .. .... ....... ...... .... ..... .... ..... .............. ............ .. ... ... .. .. .. ......... ..... ...... ...... ... 217 
A.3 WEB VPN ....... ..... ..... .... .... ... .. ... ...... ... ............. .. .... ...... ... .............. .............. ........ .......... . 220 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ... ... .... .......... .. .. ... ...... ......... ................ ........................... ....... ..... ... ............ 223 
TABLE OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
l.l The OSI mode! and data encapsulation .......... ... .. ... ... ...... .. ....... ... .. .. ....... .. ....... .. ........ .... 8 
1.2 The TCP/IP mode! and data encapsulation ......... ....... .. .... ....... ......... ......... ......... .... ...... Il 
2.1 The NAS and the inner network security .. ... ............ ..... ... .... ...... ...... ....... .... .. ... ..... ....... 27 
2.2 Standard ACL configured on interface EO ....... ... ........ .. ... .. .. ............................ ....... ... .. 35 
2.3 Standard ACL configuration code on interface EO ........... ..... ........ ....................... ....... 36 
2.4 Extended ACL configured on interface S 1 .................................................................. 41 
2.5 Extended ACL configuration code on interface S 1 ........................ ..... ............ .. ... .. .. ... 42 
3.1 Dynamic ACLs mechanism Processes ........ .. .............. .... ........... .... .. .... .......... .......... .... 63 
3.2 Dynamic ACLs configuration using local authentication ............................................ 71 
3.3 Dynamic ACLs configuration including the Dynamic entry ........ .. ................ .. .. ...... ... 7 6 
3.4 The Authentication server (AS) and the Dynamic ACLs User Authentication 
process .. .. ......................... ................................................. ....... .......................... .... .... .. 80 
3.5 The TACACS+ server and the Dynamic ACL's User authentication process ............ 84 
4.1 The relationship between the NAS and the security servers through the AAA 
paradigm .............................. ...... ........... ... .................. ..... ............ ........... ....................... 94 
4.2 The Authentication server (AS) and the user authentication process .......... .. ... .. .. ... .... 96 
4.3 The Challenge Response flow .... ..... ... .. .. .. .......... .. ......... .. ... ... ..... ..... ........ ......... .... .. ..... 99 
4.4 The Kerberos Authentication Process ........................................................................ 125 
4.5 The Authentication server (AS)'s peer recovery ................... ........... ...... ... ............ .. .. 133 
4.6 Peer recovery syntax code ...... .................. ........ .. ......................... ............ ... ... .. ...... .... 136 
4.7 Privi lege access authentication method list- Syntax code .................. ... ...... ...... .... ... 139 
4.8 Example ofNAS configuration using authentication method lists .. ........... ... .......... .. 142 
5.1 The Telnet connection ..... ..... .. .. ......... .. ..... ............. .... ................ ........... ............ .... .. .... 154 
5.2 The Telnet configuration using "access class" .............. .... ... ..... ................ ....... ... ...... 157 
5.3 The Authentication server (AS)'s peer recovery .. ... ....... ........... .... ... .. ... ..... .. .... .... ..... 169 
5.4 Auth-proxy and Dynamic ACLs ...... ... ..... .. ..... ........ ..... ..... .... .... ....... .. ...... ... ....... ... .. ... 175 
6.1 VPN implementation between the NAS and the user's router ... .. ......... ... .... .. .. ......... 217 
xii 
6.2 Web VPN implementation ........ ............ ..... ...... .. .... .. ... ... ... ... .... .... .... ....... ....... ....... .... . 220 
TABLE OF TABLES 
Table Page 
2.1 Extended ACLs operators ............... .............. ....... ....... .. ... ...... .... ..... ... .. .... .... ...... .... ....... 38 
2.2 TCP and UDP port numbers .......... ... .. ........ .... .. ............. ................ ................. ... .. ... ...... 39 
4 .1 The AAA authentication methods for user Exec access (line login) ... .......... ... .. ...... .. 138 
5.1 Suggestions of authentication technologies .. ...... ....... ......... ...... ................ .. ..... ... .... .... 197 

AAA 
ACLs 
ARA 
ARAP 
AS 
CHAP 
CLI 
DNSSRV 
IP 
MD5 
NAPTR 
NAS 
NASI 
OSI mode! 
OTP 
PAP 
ppp 
RADIUS 
RAM 
RFC 
RSA 
LIST OF TERMINOLOGIES/ ACRONYMS 
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting 
Access Control li sts 
AppleTalk Remote Access 
Appletalk Remote Access Protocol 
Authentication Server 
Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol 
Command Line Interface 
Domain Name Server Service 
Internet Protocol 
Message Digest algorithm for generating hash passwords 
Name Authority Pointer 
Network Access Server 
Novel Asynchronous Service interface 
Open System Interconnection network architecture madel 
One ime Password 
Password Authentication Protocol 
Point-ta-Point connection 
Remote Authentication Dia! In User Server 
Random Access Memory 
Request for Comments 
Rivest, Shamir, Adleman public Key cryptography algorithm 
xvi 
SLIP 
SMS 
SSE 
SSH 
TACACS+ 
TCP 
TCP/IP mode! 
TFTP 
TLS 
TTY 
UDP 
VPN 
VSA 
VTY 
Seriai Line Internet Protocol 
Short Message Service 
Silicon Switching Engine 
Secure Shell 
Terminal Access Control Access Control System Plus 
Transport Control Protocol 
Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol network architecture 
mode! 
Trivial File Transfer Protocol 
Transport Layer Security 
Teletype printer 
User Datagram Protocol 
Virtual Private Networks 
V endor Specifie Attribute 
Virtual Terminal Line 
WRITING AND TECHNICAL CONVENTIONS 
• The term "He" will be used within the study, m order to refer to the human being 
regardless of his gender (male or female). 
The network topologies stated within this study are assumed to refer to operating 
networks with no connectivity issues throughout ali the layers of the OSI mode! 
architecture; since connectivity probabilities and troubleshooting is out of the scope of 
this study. 
• Ail intemetworked deviees described in the document are assumed to be Cisco deviees 
(Juniper and other vendor deviees are out of the scope of this study), even though the 
interoperability subject related to different authentication methods/devices will be 
covered by the study. 
• The Cisco Intemetwork Operating System (lOS release 12.3(1) and up) is assumed to be 
weil installed and operating upon ali the intemetworked deviees described in the study 
including routers and switches. Thus al! the configuration codes stated within the study 
will only work weil with Cisco lOS, excluding other vendors' operating systems. 
• Ali intemetworked deviees described in the document are assumed to be weil configured 
according to best practice guidelines, as weil as according to the topology 
interconnectivity needs ( default configuration necessary adjustments are out of the sc ope 
of this study). 
• The tem1 " user" is used to refer to the person who uses a service or a program. 
• The term "client" is used to refer to the deviee or the pro gram needing a service. 
• The term "server" is used to refer to the program or the deviee providing a service for a 
client. 
• The term "Service" is used to refer to sorne actions to be performed by a server pro gram. 
• The term "credentials" is used to refer to the user ' s login information used to authenticate 
the user. 
• The term "topology" is used to refer to a given network architectural design. 
xviii 
COMMAND SYNT AX CONVENTIONS 
• Bold indicates commands and keywords to be literally entered in the configuration. 
• Italie indicates arguments or variables that should be substituted by an actual value. 
• Vertica l bars([) separate alternative exclusive elements. 
• Square brackets ([ ]) indicate options. 
• Braces ( { } ) indicate a required choice to be made out of a list of elements. 
• Braces within brackets ([ { } ]) indicate a required choice to be made out of a list of 
elements, within an optional element. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Dans les systèmes sans réseaux de communications ou bien les organisations juste 
avec intranet, les différentes machines et ressources sont souvent totalement isolées, ou bien 
accédées juste via l' intranet de l' entreprise ; elles sont donc utilisées par les usagers éprouvés 
et autorisés par l'organisation. Les ressources de l'organisation de nos jours qui sont en 
réseau, tout en étant interconnectées par 1 'Internet, sont autrement toujours sujettes aux 
attaques réseautiques venant d 'un nombre illimité d ' usagers. Ainsi, dans les environnements 
informatiques en temps partagé, le système d 'exploitation, aussi que d 'autres mécanismes de 
sécurité, protègent les ressources bien que les usagers l'un de 1 'autre. Une telle protection de 
sécurité prend lieu par l' établissement de quelques règles d 'accès pour les différents types 
d ' utilisateurs. Afin de classifier les utilisateurs et les faire correspondre à leurs règles d 'accès 
selon leurs droits d 'accès, l'utilisateur doit s'identifier au processus de sécurité dès sa 
connexion aux ressources de l'organisation, ce processus est appelé: l 'authentification de 
l'utilisateur. L'authentification de l'utilisateur est une pierre angulaire pour la sécurité 
réseautique de toutes les organisations, ainsi, c 'est un des sujets principaux analysés par cette 
étude. Ce sujet va être élaboré en plus de détails dans chapitre IV, titré L 'authentification de 
1 'utilisateur. 
Comme le besoin des utilisateurs pour accéder via le Web aux ressources internes 1 
de différentes organisations a dernièrement émergé (afin d'accéder aux serveurs internes de 
leurs lieux de travail ou bien ceux des organisations offrant des différents services web), le 
besoin d ' autoriser les utilisateurs a aussi augmenté (afin de sécuriser un tel accès à distance). 
Cela va nous amener à analyser l'usage des listes de contrôle d ' accès dynamiques. Les listes 
de contrôle d 'accès dynamiques sont des essentiels moyens de sécurité qui permettent à 
l' utilisateur d ' accéder en sécurité aux ressources internes d 'une organisation, tout en 
connectant à distance. Les listes de contrôle d'accès dynamiques dépendent complètement 
de 1 'authentification de l'utilisateur comme étant une garantie de sécurité de 1 'identité de 
l' utilisateur. Les li stes de contrôle d ' accès dynamiques vont être décrites en détail dans 
chapitre II, titré Les listes de contrôle d 'accès. 
D'après Odom (Odom, 2009), Telnet est le protocole d 'émulation de terminal 
standard de la couche d'application dans le TCP/IP empilage. Telnet est utilisé pour la 
connexion à distance au terminal, permettant les utilisateurs d' accéder aux systèmes distants 
et d 'utiliser les ressources comme si elles étaient connectées à un système local. Telnet est 
défini dans RFC 854 et sera analysé en détail dans chapitre III comme étant une méthode 
d 'authentification utilisée dans la configuration des listes de contrôle d' accès dynamiques. 
Les listes de contrôle d'accès dynamiques utilisent souvent Telnet comme une 
méthode d ' authentification des utilisateurs. Cependant, Telnet est caractérisé par un nombre 
1 Les ressources internes sont situées sur le réseau d' une organisation. Ce réseau est supposé d 'être 
solidement protégé contre les menaces de sécurité, incluant les accès non-autorisés. 
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de désavantages de sécurité, ce qui ne peut pas garantir une authentification d'utilisateurs 
complément sécurisée. Ainsi, l'utilisation de Telnet pour établir le processus de 
l'authentification de l'utilisateur des listes de contrôle d ' accès dynamiques est toujours 
sujette à exposer les ressources internes de l' organisation à plusieurs menaces et brèches de 
sécurité. À cause de ces raisons, notre étude a eu lieu afin d'évaluer Telnet comme étant une 
méthode d'authentification, à élaborer ses avantages et ses inconvénients et à suggérer des 
méthodes d 'authentification alternatives qui peuvent être utilisées dans la configuration des 
listes de contrôle d'accès dynamiques, afin d'authentifier les utilisateurs à distance. Ainsi, 
dans chapitre 5, Telnet sera analysé comme étant une méthode d'authentification comparée à 
d'autres méthodes d'authentification utilisées dans la configuration des listes de contrôle 
d'accès dynamiques, comme les serveurs d'authentification, incluant TACACS+, RADIUS, 
DIAMETER et Kerberos. 
L' étude inclut un nombre important de codes de configuration qui sont 
spécifiquement développés afin d'appuyer les concepts de sécurité analysés et afin de 
présenter des directives pour guider les concepteurs des réseaux à faire de bons choix de 
sécurité, garantissant aux utilisateurs une connexion à distance plus sécurisée. 
Mots-clés: 
AAA server comparison, Access Control Lists, Authentication method lists, Authentication 
server, DIAMETER, Dynamic ACLs Authentication, KERBEROS , Network architecture, 
Network Security, OSI mode!, Proxy servers , RADIUS, SSH, Standard ACLs, TACACS+, 
TCP/IP mode!, Telnet, VPN. 
ABSTRACT 
ln non-network systems or in intranet organizations, different machines and 
resources are either totally isolated, or only reached through the enterprise Intranet, therefore 
they ' re used by the allowed trusted users of the organization. Interconnected organization 
resources, which are nowadays resources connected through the Internet, on the other hand, 
are always prone to network attacks from an unlimited number of users. Thus, in time-
sharing computing environment, the operating system, as weil as other security mechanisms, 
protect resources and users from one another. Such security protection takes place by setting 
sorne access ru les to different kinds of us ers. In order to classify the us ers and to match them 
to their right of access rules, the user has to identify himself to the security process once the 
he logs into the organization resources, this process is called: the user authentication. 
User Authentication is a comerstone in any organization's network security; thus it 
is one of our main subjects analyzed in this study. This subject will be elaborated in more 
details in Chapter 4, titled User Authentication. 
As the need lately emerged for the users to access the inner resources2 of different 
organizations through the web ( either to ac cess the inner servers of the ir work places or 
those of other organizations providing services), the need for user authorization also rose (in 
order to secure such a remote access). This will bring us to analyze the use of Dynamic 
Access Control Lists (ACLs). Dynamic ACLs are essential security means that allow a user 
to securely access an organization's inner resources while being remotely logged in. 
Dynamic ACLs depend completely on the user authentication as a security guarantee of the 
identity of the user. Dynamic ACLs will be described in details in Chapter 2, titled Access 
Control Lists . 
According to Odom (Odom, 2009), Telnet is the standard terminal-emulation 
application layer protocol in the TCP/IP protocol stack. Telnet is used for remote terminal 
connection, enabling users to log in to remote systems and use resources as if they were 
connected to a local system. Telnet is defined in RFC 854 and will be elaborated in details in 
Chapter 3 as an authentication method used within Dynamic ACLs configuration. 
Dynamic ACLs usually use Telnet as a method for remote user authentication. 
However Telnet is characterized by number of security disadvantages that don 't guarantee a 
fully secure user authentication, and thus, the use of Telnet for the user authentication 
process ofDynamic ACLs is always prone to expose organizations ' inner resources to many 
security risks and breaches. Due to these reasons, our study has taken place to evaluate 
Telnet as authentication method, to elaborate its pros and cons, and to suggest other 
2 lnner resources refer to the resources located on an organization network. Such a network is 
supposed to be securely guarded against security risks, including unauthorized access. 
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alternative authentication methods that can be used within the Dynamic ACLs configuration, 
in order to authenticate remote users. Thus, in Chapter 5 Telnet will be elaborated as an 
authentication method and compared to other authentication methods used within Dynamic 
ACLs configuration, such as authentication servers, including TACACS+, RADIUS, 
DIAMETER and Kerberos. 
The study includes an important number of configuration codes that were 
specifically designed to support the security concepts analyzed and to provide guidelines for 
network decision makers to make better security choices that guarantee secure user remote 
ac cess 
KEYWORDS: 
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INTRODUCTION 
The research focuses on the user authentication step, which is the first step necessary 
to trigger the Dynamic ACLs filtering process and which involves the use of Telnet. So the 
research is to highlight the deficiencies of Telnet as an authentication method used within 
connections established by remote user deviees , and filtered by one or more Dynamic 
Access controllist(s), the so called Lock-and-Key security. As Telnet authentication is 
not considered a secure authentication by itself, the research interprets the details of such an 
authentication process while revealing ali tbe security risks involved during such a 
connection. 
The study focuses on detailing the remote user IP connections m particular, 
analyzing the details behind the functionality of Dynamic Access Control lists, as weil as 
developing related configuration codes that show the use of the different authentication 
methods with Dynamic Access Controllists, along with elabora te explanations. The study 
will also focus on those authentication methods used within dynamic ACLs as alternatives to 
Telnet, as weil as how they compare to Telnet as an authentication method, according to 
sorne comparison criteria, as a helping step on the road to overcome sorne of the Telnet 
authentication drawbacks and to facilitate the choice of different authentication methods 
used within dynamic ACLs according to different application contexts. 
Throughout the study, the research approach proceeds by conducting an in-depth 
analysis of the re lated literature as weil as the production of a number of thoroughly 
developed configuration codes that are specifically designed in order to support the concepts 
analyzed, on one band, and to investigate the details behind their operation in different 
security context, on the other hand. Such analysis, code developing and tracing aim at the 
deduction of a number of suggested recomrnendations and best practice tips that the study 
will provide as valuable outcomes resulting from such a thorough research work. 
Since the research deals exclusively with the security context, which IS a very 
sensitive, secretive issue for any organization, it was impossible to gather practical data or 
configuration codes from any organization in order to support our study; this is why our 
research doesn ' t include practical data gathering, as could be expected from this type of 
research. 
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Also since the study ' s context is in the networking field, which is known for its 
dynamic nature that doesn't allow a downtime for testing, it was impossible to practically 
implement the codes that we have developed throughout the study on an actual working 
network, in arder to verify their proper operation. Given the very high cost of building a 
whole new network from scratch only to help verify our configuration codes, that option was 
not available for us. These are the reasons why there were no means for the research to 
include pràctical experimentation through the results of which, a number of 
recommendations could have been developed. Also the same reasons lead to the fact that the 
configuration codes provided by the study, though thoroughly developed to support the 
concepts introduced and carefully designed according to the provided literature, were not 
implemented before on a real working network. Thus we recommend to anyone embracing 
our configuration codes to verify the codes in a real networking environment, before 
implementing them into an operating network in arder to avoid unnecessary network 
complications. 
The main objective of this study is to evaluate, analyze and critique Telnet as an 
authentication method, Dynamic ACLs as an access filtering concept as weil as comparing 
the ir use benefits ( combined together) to the use of other security approaches like pro x y 
servers and authentication servers, namely RADIUS, TA CA CS+ and Kerberos . The study 
aims at providing a list of recommendations that will help guide for the decision maker to 
make better choices about the most appropriate security approaches that will guarantee his 
network secure user remote access. 
Specifically, the goal of the study is to reflect on the remote access security subject, 
focusing particularly on the importance of the authentication process within Dynamic Access 
Controllists (ACLs) as an authentication means for remote users using IP-connections, and 
questioning the security reliability of Telnet as an authentication method combined with 
Dynamic ACLs . Also the research will investigate the use of altemate methods for 
authenticating the remote hasts attempting to access an organization' s network through 
Dynamic ACLs, methods such as Secure Shell (SSH) and AAA servers including 
TA CA CS+, Kerberos, RADIUS, and DIAMETER, during the Dynamic ACLs filtering 
process. Besicles, the research study will explain the drawbacks of Dynamic ACLs as a 
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security technology, introducing sorne alternative technologies and solutions m arder to 
overcome these drawbacks. 
The research contribution emphasizes the importance of the authentication process 
within Dynamic ACLs filtering , while focusing on Telnet as an authentication method 
usually used within that context, demonstrating its drawbacks and the security risks they 
represent as weil as searching alternate authentication methods for Dynamic ACLs 
configuration that would overcome such drawbacks. The study includes different developed 
configuration codes, explanations and comparisons between the different authentication 
methods while emphasizing their benefits and, application as weil as security limitation. 
Thus the study should be a helpful guideline for different organizations, as weil as research 
groups, allowing them to easily compare as weil as choose a suitable authentication method 
or combination of methods, according to their security policies and business needs, while 
configuring their border routers with dynamic ACLs for user IP access. 
Thus, the research will caver the following subjects: 
• In Chapter 1, we start this research by an in-depth explanation of the fundamental 
layers of network architecture, which are essential for any set of networked wires 
and equipment to establish a successful connectivity. We introduce both models: the 
OSI network architecture mode! and the TCP/IP network architecture mode!, 
describing ali corresponding layers and specifying our layer of interest, the one 
where the authentication process takes place. 
Then we introduce the meaning behind the ward "security" as a concept that protects 
every organization' s network connected to the Internet, interpreting the different 
types of Internet threats and the different types of security solutions that puts end to 
such threats . 
• In Chapter 2, the study explains in details the different types of ACLs, how they 
work, and their different application contexts, along with a number of configuration 
codes and examples that are specifically developed during the research in arder to 
further support such an explanation. 
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• In Chapter 3, the study presents Dynamic ACLs mechanisms in details, along with 
sorne carefully designed configuration codes and examples demonstrating the 
authentication methods that are frequently used in combination with Dynamic ACLs 
implementations, and how they work. 
• In Chapter 4, the study will present the most popular authentication methods used 
with remote user connections as weil as their application within a peer recovery 
approach, along with a number of illustrating figures and configuration codes that 
are specifically developed during the research in order to facilitate the explanation 
and analysis of the different concepts introduced. 
• In Chapter 5, the study will examme and analyze the differences between the 
authentication methods considered, their cons and pros compared to Telnet, on one 
hand, and in regards to their efficiency when used within dynamic ACLs, on the 
other band. Again, accompanied with the different concepts analyzed and critiqued, 
there exist a number of developed codes, specifically designed to support the 
analysis within the chapter. 
CHAPTERI 
NETWORK SECURITY 
Dynamic ACLs, the main subject of the study, are considered as a security solution 
to protect the resources on the organization' s network/premises, thus the subject of network 
security is one of the core subjects in our study, as this introducing this subject will help the 
reader understand the impmtance to Dynamic ACLs as a security solution. 
However, creating a secure connection to the organization's resources reqmres the 
connectivity establishment of such a connection, since the security can be considered as a 
further step to take place once ali the network deviees are correctly connected and up and 
running. 
Therefore, before we start our study introducing details about Network Security, 
Dynamic ACLs, and User Authentication methods, let's first talk about the different layers 
of a network architecture that would allow any sort of communication to take place. 
The network architecture will help us understand the detailed steps taking place 
during the user authentication process and will help us better understand them and relate 
them to each other. 
The architecture will also help us compare different user authentication processes and relate 
them to their corresponding network layers , so that we can better understand their 
advantages and their drawbacks; and so we can substitute sorne of them in correspondence 
with their order and their position in the architecture. 
1.1 The network architecture reference mode! 
Over the years, many companies/organizations have created different their 
networking protocols and standards. However an open, vendor independent standardization, 
is a better mode! to show the networking architecture. There exist two open reference 
standards, which are : 
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• The Open System lnterconnection (OSI) mode!; 
• The TCP/IP mode! 
1.1.1 The open system interconnection (OSI) mode! developed by the international 
organization for standardization (ISO) 
The OSI mode! classifies ail the protocols needed to establish a network connection 
into seven layers, according to the respective order of the processes taking place during a 
connection. 
Each layer' s input is basically the output of the layer below it; and each layer process 
initialization depends on the processes success and the completion at the lower layer. 
Therefore if at one point, the processes supposed to take place at a certain layer fail or 
become unable to get to completion, there is no way for the upper layers to get any 
connecti vity. 
The OSI model layers are introduced as follows (starting at the very first layer where the 
network connectivity should take place): 
1- Layer 1: The Physical Layer: 
This layer refers to the standards of the physical characteristics of the transmission 
mediums, the rules conceming bit transmission and the rules conceming the 
transmission activation. This layer also refers to the definition of the physical 
electrical, optical connectors, pins, cables, voltage levels , electrical current, 
encoding or light modulation. 
2- Layer 2: The Data Link Layer: 
This layer refers to the rules permitting to a certain deviee to send data over a 
medium at a specifie time and the rules defining the right format of the data 
transmitted (into frames) . This layer provides means to recognize transmission 
errors as weil. 
3- Layer 3: The Network Layer: 
This layer refers to the logical addressing of network deviees to help 
communication over the network; the rou ting of network packets through the use of 
routing protocols that help find all possible routes to send a packet to its 
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destination; and the path determination process that helps network deviees related 
to this layer (typically routers) to find the best way (route) sending a packet to its 
ultimate destination. 
4- Layer 4: The Transport Layer: 
This layer refers to the services related to the delivery of data to the destination, 
including flow control, error recovery, connection establishment and termination 
and data segmentation into smaller portions to facilitate transmission. 
5- Layer 5: The Session Layer: 
This layer refers to the management of the bi-directional flows between the two 
endpoints of the communication. Thus, this layer refers to the ru! es conceming how 
the connection sessions start, end, and are controlled; so that the upper layer, which 
is the presentation layer, has a transparent view of one continuons stream of data, 
even if it has been transmitted over many sessions. 
6- Layer 6: The Presentation Layer: 
This layer refers to the negotiation of the data formats (ASCII, ABCDIC, Binary, 
etc.); and data encryption. 
7- Layer 7: The Application Layer: 
This layer is mainly considered as an interface between the local applications and 
the communication software that would allow these local applications to 
communicate with other applications outside the local computer. Also at this layer, 
are defined the processes for user authentication. 
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Figure 1.1 The OSI mode! and data encapsulatwn 
As explained by Odom (Odom, 2009), in figure 1-1, every layer' s data unit has a 
different name specifie to the layer it belongs to . Also, every data unit coming from an upper 
layer, gets encapsulated into a header belonging to the next lower layer until it reaches the 
lowest layer (the Physicallayer) where the data get encapsulated into a header and trailer for 
transmission. 
Each layer provides a certain service to the next/upper layer. For example the Data 
Link layer helps the Network layer (the upper layer) transmit the Network layer packet using 
a layer-2 protocol. This process takes place without the Network layer protocol (layer 3 
3 Ethernet, as a header and a traiter, is demonstrated in table 1 as an example of a layer 2 protocol ; 
other alternatives can be used like HDLC, PPP, Frame Relay, etc. 
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protocol, the IP protocol in this case) having to know the details about this transmission 
process. 
Also, from the Data link layer point of view, what cornes between the Ethemet 
header and trai ter, which is basically the network layer packet, is only considered as simple 
data. Thus the Data link layer doesn't need to care about the details related to this data 
portion that corresponds to the network layer packet; as the Data Link layer has only to care 
about the transmission pro cess of this Data portion. 
The way the different layers of the network architecture work together emphasizes 
the importance of the encapsulation process that hides unnecessary details for each layer in 
the data payload, so that the layer can focus on its main job, only dealing with a given set of 
data. This breaks down the job related to the bigger goal of data transmission into small tasks 
that will be better perforrned when clearly defined, and assigned to each layer. 
This break down helps to accomplish the tasks in a timely manner, white precisely 
helping to identify the reasons why a certain transmission might not take place, relating that 
issue to a specifie layer malfunctions or alterations. lt also helps monitor the errors occurring 
at each layer, and sometimes help for quality assurance. 
The network architecture mode! helps classify layer protocols according to network 
link establishment needs and rules . And since each layer has its own set of protocols that 
corresponds to the tasks to be done within, the architecture provides a wide variety of 
alternative protocols choice , from which the best protocol can be chosen, for each layer, as 
it suits specifie network design goals, scalability preference and performance perspectives. 
Thus the network architecture mode!, along with its layer protocols helps the network design 
process to meet its intended design goals. 
Now that we introduced the network hierarchy of the OSI mode!, in the next section, we 
introduce the TCP/IP mode!, which is quite similar in concepts with the OSI mode!. 
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1.1.2 The TCP/IP madel 
This network architecture madel has been developed by networking volunteers 
(Odom, 2009). 
For the purpose of this study, we present the TCP/IP mode! and its different layers as a 
means of reference to help us understand the different steps of the user authentication 
process. 
The TCP/IP mode! comprises a large number of networking protocols, which are 
documented in documents called Request for Comments (RFC). Deviees that follow the 
implementation of the TCP/IP RFCs' protocols can easily connect to each other. 
The TCP/IP mode! classifies networking protocols into four layers . We will 
illustrate them starting from lower to upper layers. 
• Network Access layer: defines protocols defining data delivery over the physical media 
(electrical, optical) and rules for frames formats, using mediums for transmissions and 
transmission errors . It also requires the definition of the physical connectors, cables, 
vo ltage levels, and protocols for delivering data a ver W AN s. Examples of protocols are 
Ethemet 802.3, HDLC, PPP, Frame Relay, RJ-45 , ElA/TIA-232, V.35 and MAC 
protocols. Deviees used on this layer are LAN hubs, repeaters, Switches, Wireless 
Access Points, cable modem, DSL modem. 
• 
• 
Internet layer: defines protocols providing logical addresses, routing and path 
determination. Examples of protocols are IP, IPX and SPX. Deviees used on this layer 
are routers and multilayer switches. 
Transport Layer: defines protocols providing connection establishment and terrnination, 
flow control, error recovery and data segmentation for transmission. Examples of 
protocols are TCP, UDP, IPX and SPX. 
• Application layer: defines protocols providing interfacing between the network and the 
different software application, authentication, data forrnatting organization and 
encryption and transaction flow management. Examples of protocols are Telnet, HTTP, 
FTP, SMTP, POP3 , VoiP and SNMP. Deviees used on this layer are firewalls and 
intrusion detection systems. 
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Figure 1.2 The TCP/IP mode] and data encapsulatJon 
As shown in figure 1-2, and as in the OSI mode! , every layer's data unit has a 
different name specifie to the layer it belongs to . Also, every data unit coming from an upper 
layer gets encapsulated into a header belonging to the next layer until it reaches the lowest 
layer (the Network Access layer) where the data get encapsulated into a header and trailer 
for transmission. 
Again, the encapsulation process is us d in th TCP/IP mod 1 for biding unnec ssary 
detai ls from each layer as it provides a specifie service to the next/upper layer. 
Now that we introduced the network hierarchy through the TCP/IP model, we can 
proceed to the next main points of this chapter, which are the network security and the 
authentication process. While explaining the authentication process, we will refer to the 
TCP/IP mode! in many ways, so that we can have a better understanding of this process and 
how it works. 
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In the next section, we introduce the importance of network security and the types of 
threats an organization might face during its regular operation time. We will also introduce 
sorne security solutions that can help mitigate such threats. 
1.2 The importance of network security 
A couple of decades ago, few organizations around the world were permanently 
connected to the Internet, if even connected at ali, as the Internet wasn ' t as popular and 
profitable as it is nowadays. These organizations were safe against illegal access attacks , as 
they were only using their inner networks with no exposure to outside security threats . 
Nowadays, as the internet has turned to be an essential asset for many businesses 
and organizations, and a very important social and business communication means, ali 
organizations become interconnected through the internet, and consequently, their inner 
resources become exposed to greater security threats. 
In order to better understand security, let 's geta general idea about the internet and 
how people and organizations can connect online, as it follows in the following section. 
1.2.1. The Internet and the World Wide Web 
According to W3 (W3 - WWW, 2009), the Internet is a global system of 
interconnected computer networks that interchange data by packet switching using the 
standardized Internet Protocol Suite (TCP/IP). Thus, the Internet is defined by the TPC/IP 
standards. The Web, on the other hand, as defined by W3 (W3 - WWW, 2009), is as follows: 
"The World Wide Web (WWW, or simply Web) is an information space in which the items 
of interest, referred to as resources, are identified by global identifiers called Uniform 
Resource Identifiers (URI). " 
As exactly cited by W3 (w3.org - WWW), "The World Wide Web (known as 
"WWW', "Web" or "W3") is the universe of network-accessible information, the 
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embodiment of human knowledge. The Web has a body of software, and a set of protocols 
and conventions. Through the use hypertext and multimedia techniques, the web is easy for 
anyone to roam, browse, and contribute to. The World Wide Web began as a networked 
information project at CERN, where Tim Berners-Lee, now Director of the World Wide 
Web Consortium [W3C], developed a vision of the project." 
Th us , the Web is defined by other specifications. The first three specifications for 
Web technologies defined by Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), Hyper-Text Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP), and Hyper-Text Markup Language (HTML) (W3C). 
A more specifie explanation of the difference between the Internet and the Web is 
presented by the definition on W ebopedia website (Webopedia - Web versus Internet, 20 Il); 
stating that the Internet is the network of networks, upon which any connected 
computer/deviee can communicate with its peer(s) as long as they are both connected to the 
Internet. Information are transmitted over the internet via languages known as protocols. 
Thus the Internet is an infrastmcture that allows access to the Web service and to other 
services, like the mail services, of a distant organization. (Internet Society, 20 12). 
On the WWW, organizations providing information or services have web set-vers 
that are interconnected among themselves, as weil as among an endless number of remote 
hosts th at access these servers to meet the users ' needs. The se servers deliver different 
services and infonnation, for example, a web server provides web services and stores the 
web pages of an organization, a file server stores files for an organization, and an email 
set-ver manages the emails within an organization. 
In order to better explain the interaction between two Internet-connected deviees, 
let's consider the case of a user/host connecting to an organization's Web server to get some 
information. The organization's web servers store the web pages that include the information 
needed by the web hosts. When a web host needs to access the organization web server, he 
acts as a web client and thus a number of application layer processes must take place: 
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• The web client has to use sorne software to enable him to connect to the 
organization's web server and thus, display the web pages; that software is 
the host 's web browser. 
• The connection takes place when the web client is able to specify the web 
server, the web page and the network protocol to get the information from 
the page. 
• In order to specify the server, the host needs to get its IP address, either 
through the use of Domain Name System (DNS) or through static 
configuration of that IP address. 
• Each web page stored on the organization server consists of severa! files that 
will be sent by the web server to the host and through the use of Hypertext 
HTTP. 
In order for the hosts to meet their needs for servtces, they still have to access the 
organization's web servers through this same set of steps. Performing these steps demands 
the existence of network connectivity. However, transferring sensitive data, including 
financial information, has to go through electronic commerce applications (e-commerce), 
where data needs to be secured through the use of a certain security technique, such as 
Transport-Layer Security (TLS) application-layer feature, instead of regular unsecure HTTP. 
1.2.2. The benefits of network security 
The network security techniques and features provide sorne essential benefits for any 
network connection. These benefits are as fo llows: 
• Availability: of the network resources needed either in order to establish the 
connection, or in order to obtain the service and information needed through 
the connection. 
• Authenticity: of the remote user/deviee accessing the network, so that there 
would be a certainty that the remote user is exactly who he claims to be. 
• 
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Integrity: of the information contents being transferred over the connection, 
so that there would be a certainty that there was no replay/modification for 
these information. 
• Confidentiality: of the information being transferred over the connection so 
that there would be a certainty that they were not revealed to non intended 
parties. 
(Odom, 2009) 
Now that we introduced the network security benefits , lets ' highlight sorne of the network 
security common threats. 
1.2.3. The threats to organizations' networks 
Years ago, security attacks were commonly performed by nerdy students who 
needed to prove that they could break into an organization's network. Nowadays, malicious 
attacks don't need savvy knowledge, as spying tools are abundantly available and free for 
any persan to perforrn any range of attacks he dreams about. This doesn ' t mean that newly 
reported attacks don't show a high-end degree of sophistication and subtlety. 
This leads us to the conclusion that every single day, with every single new persan 
and organization connecting to the Web, adds up to the vulnerabilities of ali Web 
connection . This is true, e pecially ifwe consider that today the motive behind the attacks is 
much beyond a persona! challenge, as it might be a criminal attack, a financial steal, a 
national espionage or even a destructive or terrorist attack against public services or 
government networks. 
Security attacks can be perforrned from the inside of an organization, as weil, 
through the unauthorized access of one of the organization's staff member to the mner 
network. This persan could have the same exact motivations as an outsider attacker, as 
mentioned above. This would even increase the vulnerabilities of any organization's 
network, as weil as its needs to apply rigid network security strategies to limit such attacks. 
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According to Odom (Odom, 2009), security attack types can be classified into the following 
categories: 
l. Attacks compromising the availability of the network resources: like the 
Deniai of Service (DoS) attack; its main purpose is to disable the 
hosts/data/software/network connections/network communication. 
DOS includes : 
Crashers: attacks causing hosts failure or network connection failure 
Destroyers: attacks causing damage to hasts, data and software. 
Flooders: attacks flooding connections with a great amount of packets 
creating an unsustainable leve! of traffic for the network to make any 
connection useless . 
2. Attacks compromising the confidentiality of the transfened data: like the 
access attack; its purpose is to steal confidential data. 
3. Attacks compromising the authentication of the remote host: it takes place 
when hosts fake their identity for malicious purposes, such as collecting 
information about network resources in arder to start another attack type. 
Attacks can be performed using a wide range of tools that allow an attacker to defeat 
access policies. These tools can be classified as follows: 
• Viruses , which are malicious programs that infect other programs, in arder to 
cause problems or steal information. Protecting computers usually involves 
using an anti-virus program that recognizes the characteristics of known 
viruses so that the computer can avo id them amongst received packets, as 
weil as within the file system during an anti-virus periodic scan. These anti-
viruses have to be updated continuously with newer releases to enable a 
computer to cope with an ever-evolving virus population. 
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Scanners, spy on the computers to get information about the network services 
and the operating system it uses, by sending connection requests to different 
applications, with different UDP and TCP port numbers. The spying action of 
a scanner is to gather information, which would usually help the attacker to 
reach his end purpose of damaging the software or the hardware. 
Spyware, which tracks the user activities performed on the computer and 
sends this information along with sensitive and private data to an attacker via 
the Internet. 
Worm, which is a program duplicating itself independently on the internet 
and propagating on organizations' networks, usually with the purpose of 
paralyzing the network traffic, and usually leading it to a DoS attack. 
Keystroke Jogger, which is a program that captures user credentials, by 
tracking the user keystrokes, especially when the user accesses a secure web 
site or enters sensitive data. Such keystrokes are recorded and reported by 
this program to the attacker, who will be able to exploit the stolen credentials. 
Phishing, which is a special case of Scamming, is about faking up a web site 
and making it appear exactly like a legitimate one, usually a financial 
company or bank. The attacker then sends this faulty web site, usually in an 
email , to the user and asks him to enter sorne sensitive information like his 
social security number and passwords. Unaware, the user might be tricked, 
giving the attacker the chance to steal his real accounts. 
(Odom, 2009) 
In arder to face such threats, an organization connected to the Internet, should apply 
many security protection mechanisms, including hardware and software, in arder to allow 
the organization to defend its inner resources. The best-known mechanism is the 
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establishment of firewalls on the organization's perimeter/boundary to the outside world of 
Internet. 
However, securing the organization perimeter isn't considered a full-proof guarantee 
since security attacks might come from the inside of the organization, as weil as from the 
outside. Sorne examples of such a variety of attacks could be as follows: 
• Access from the Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN): As the wireless 
signais might leave the physical building of the organization, an outsider 
attacker might capture these packets and get access to the organization inner 
network to perform malicious attacks. 
• Infected laptop: As the user accesses the Web through an unsecure 
connection, typically from his home, the laptop might get infected by a virus, 
or another malware. Later, that user might return to the organization's 
building and, unaware of his laptop infection, he might bring that laptop to 
connect to the organization's network. This virus infection might get to the 
organization's network, and thus other PCs and deviees all over the network, 
especially if not scanned with the daily anti-virus software scan, might get 
infected as weil. 
• 
• 
Disgruntled employee: A user planning to move for another position m 
another organization might want to steal the whole database of the company, 
or perhaps sensitive data on a Flash card or an MP3 player, very discretely to 
carry outside the organization's building. This stolen information might be 
used later for even bigger crimes. 
Rogue Dynamic Host Configuration (DHCP) Protocol servers and rogue 
routers for IPv4 and IPv6: As inner routers and switches learn their IP 
addresses, and other connectivity information like Domain Name System 
(DNS) Servers from their Default gateways, which are their DHCP 
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servers/routers , attackers might setup rogue servers/routers to appear as if 
they were legitimate ones, then the other network deviees will communicate 
information to these rogue servers, allowing them to control the network, 
and to allow the attacker to manipulate his malicious plans. "In effect, this 
becomes a type of " man-in-the-middle"; the attacker is wedged into the path 
and the client doesn ' t rea !ize it." (Hucaby, 201 0) 
• Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing: ARP works when a host needs 
to know the layer 2 address (MAC address) of another host whose IP address 
is known. As the attacker might craft a MAC address that appears as a 
legitimate one, the legitimate hasts on the network might trust that MAC 
address and start sending traffic to the rogue host. 
So the attacker's host will be right in the packets path of the legitimate 
network, which allows it to intercept legitimate packets and their contents. 
"This attack is known as ARP poisoning or ARP spoofing, and is considered 
to be a type of man-in-the-middle attack." (Hucaby, 2010) 
• Spoofed IP addresses: Hasts on an inner legitimate network are supposed to 
use the IP addresses assigned to them, in ali sorts of traffic. Attackers, 
however, can spoof sorne IP address and use them within the organization 's 
inner network. This spoofing might take place through borrowing sorne IP 
address of legitimate network hasts, or by using IP addresses at random. 
When the rogue host sends traffic to the legitimate host, the legitimate host 
will not find the destination to send back the traffic to since that destination 
would be represented by that rogue IP address that was the original source 
of the traffic . Thus no traffic will be retumed to the rogue originator, who 
can then easily start network attacks (like DoS attack) . 
• Unauthorized users connecting through an authorized connection: As an 
authorized user connects to the network, he might use a weak authentication 
method like telnet through its authorized connection. Such authentication 
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might result into another unauthorized user being able to sneak into the 
connection, spying and stealing the authorize user ' s credentials. These 
credentials will enable this attacker to connect through the same authorized 
connection into the organization network and perform further harm. 
Actually, this kind of attack is the foct1s of the study, as we will see later in 
the upcoming chapters. 
The previous attacks are on! y a few examples of ways people can connect maliciously into 
an organization network. Fortunately, there are many ways organizations can take action in 
order to avoid these attacks as much as possible. This will lead us to the upcoming section 
elaborating security in general. 
1.2.4. Security actions taken by the organizations to protect their networks 
Security is considered one of the most important issues when building the network · 
topology of any organization, especially since security mechanisms, including software and 
hardware have to be continuously evolving and updated in order to increase their 
ability/performance to cope with the ever evolving malicious techniques appearing al! over 
the internet. 
Let's first define the term "network security" , starting with a couple of definitions 
from Wikipedia (Wikipedia- Network Security, 20 12): 
• " In the field of networking, the area of network security consists of the 
provisions and polic ies adopted by the network administrator to prevent and 
monitor unauthorized access, misuse, modification, or deniai of the 
computer network and network-accessible resources ." 
"Network security involves the authorization of access to data in a network, 
which is controlled by the network administrator." 
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Most organizations use a comprehensive security plan in order to react to the 
different types of threats mentioned above. "Anti-x" is the name of a wide range of security 
tools that can save the enterprise inner network the damage, time, money and effort facing 
such attacks. These tools include the following: 
• Anti-virus: scans network traffic preventing the transmission of known vi ms 
based on vims signatures. 
• Anti-spyware: scans network traffic preventing the transmission of spyware 
programs. 
• Anti-spam: scans emails before they reach the user, deleting or segregating 
junk emails. 
• 
• 
• 
Anti-phishing: looks for rogue URLs sent in messages, preventing phishing 
attacks from reaching the user. 
URL filtering: filters Web sites URLs preventing web us ers from connecting 
to inappropriate sites. 
E-mail filtering: acts as an anti-spam tool and filters emails that include 
offensive materials. 
(Odom, 2009) 
Besides these security tools, the most common security protection mechanism an 
organization uses, as mentioned above, is firewalls installed at the perimeter of the 
organizations network, hence on the boundary between the organization's inner network and 
the internet. Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) can act as firewalls , or in combination 
with other security roles, to help protect the inner network of an organization. 
Intmsion Detection Systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) are other 
types of security tools that help organizations keep their networks safe and intrusion free. 
IDS are security functions that are situated on monitoring ports, and that passively compare 
network traffic patterns to a list of well-known attack signatures and characteristics. IDS 
may also rate each threat and report it to other security deviees, like firewalls and routers, 
which would help such deviees mitigate such attacks. 
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Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) , which are security functions sitting m the 
packet' s path, act almost exactly as IDS, rate the threats and react to them, however unlike 
IDS, IPS actively save the network by actively filtering the offensive traffic. 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunneling refers to the process of securing the traffic 
between two deviees while crossing the Internet. This process includes packets encryption 
and encapsulation, as weil as endpoints (users) authentication. VPNs will be further 
explained in appendix A. 
Cisco has introduced a whole range of integrated security mechanisms represented 
in one security mode! called "Security in Depth". This security mode! includes tools that can 
work in harmony with other security features found in routers, switches and other deviees ali 
around the network, by automatically reacting to network problems and attacks. This mode! 
is sometimes referred to as a "Self-defending network" . (Odom, 2009) 
One example of such automatic tools is the Network Admission Control (NAC), 
which enforces the organization ' s network infrastructure to make sure ali deviees attempting 
to gain access to the organization network are complying with its security policy. NAC 
detects the moment when a deviee/host starts a connection into the organization Local Area 
Network (LAN); it recognizes the user, his deviees and his network roles; it evaluates if his 
deviee is compliant with the organization security policy; and prevents that connection to the 
LAN unless the host's antivirus definition is updated, its full antivirus scan is performed and 
the user authentication is checked (by entering a user name and password) . In other words, 
the host gets blocked by the NAC, in case his connecting deviee is not compliant with the 
organization security policy. In this case, sorne alternatives are offered to that user such as 
getting connected through a guest access link, to the organization network. NAC audits and 
reports the connected deviees on the network as weil (Cisco- Cisco NAC Appliance). 
Now that we explained the network security establishment as weil as the types of 
security threats an organization faces along with sorne of their mitigation solutions, let 's 
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introduce the authentication process4 that a user goes through m order to access the 
organization's inner resources. 
1.3 The location of the authentication process on the OSI mode! 
The authentication process takes part of the security process in general, and its main 
role is to identify whether the user attempting to access the network is who he claims to be. 
Thus the authentication is very important for an organization as it gives it means to specify 
whether a given user can be allowed to access its inner resources, or denied that access. 
Now, let's try to locate the user authentication process on the layers of the OSI 
model. Achwlly the user authentication process takes place at the seventh, and last, layer of 
the OSI mode!, namely the Application layer (Odom, 2009), which is the layer that 
interfaces with the user when he begins an attempt to start a connection session into the 
organization's network deviees . Usually these deviees are firewalls that separate the 
organization's inner network from the open unsecure Internet. Upon these firewalls, the 
dynamic ACLs as well as other ACLs and security solutions will be configured in order to 
take action filtering the illegitimate users traffic whenever it cornes in. 
Other authentication processes different from the user authentication, might take 
place at different layers, or might not take place at all, as it is the case with host-based 
authentication which is about authenticating the remote deviee (host) rather than the user 
(using 802.1X user authen ication). This authentication encompasses an Open SSH feature 
that, when enabled on an untrusted deviee, allows that deviee to be accessible by the user 
without having to enter his credentials. Thus, though the authentication doesn ' t take place 
once the user accesses the deviee, it is set in advance through the layer 7-0pen SSH 
(Computer Emergency Response Team, 2011). 
Another example where the authentication takes place on a different layer is the 
MAC-based authentication5, which is about authenticating the layer 2-source MAC address 
4 The authentication process will be explained in details in chapter 4, entitled "User authentication". 
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of the rem ote deviee rather than the user. That is an example of an authentication that takes 
place at layer 2, since that is the layer corresponding to the MAC addresses (Allied Telesyn-
How to configure MAC-based port authentication, 2005). 
We will also notice that the encryption, which is a process that usually takes place as 
part of the authentication process, takes place at the six th layer of the OSI mode!, namely the 
presentation layer (Odom, 2009), which is responsible for setting the different coding of the 
transmitted data. This happens in case of using a layer 7 application to communicate with a 
remote deviee in the form of same layer connection. However, in other cases, the encryption 
process can take place at layer 2 or 3 depending on the corresponding layer of the used 
connection protocol. For example PAP and CHAP encryptions6 take place at layer 2 since 
the corresponding connection protocol is the layer 2 Point-to-Point protocol. 
Since the study's main focus is the authentication process that takes place during the 
use of Dynamic ACLs as a security solution, the application layer will be the layer of interest 
for our research. Dynamic ACLs depend on Telnet as a connection method, as we will 
ex plain in chapter 3. And sin ce Te ln et is an application that takes place at layer-7, the 
application layer (Odom, 2009), then ali our research will be about the application layer. 
Though we will introduce sorne encryption concepts as weil as other Transport layer 
concepts as needed throughout the study, it is important to pinpoint to the reader that the 
application layer is the layer of interest for the research study. 
In general, chapter 1 can be considered as the necessary base upon which further 
analysis is built during the whole research. The chapter studies in details the main concepts 
of network architecture, connectivity, security and authentication. This detailed study is 
based upon a thorough analysis of the theoretical information obtained through the number 
5 MAC address-based authentication is not considered as secure authentication method due to the ease 
of its mitigation using a MAC address sniffer, which faci lita tes MAC Address spoofing (Superuser). 
The MAC Address spoofing will be addressed in chapter 5, entitled " Authentication and Dynamic 
ACLs". 
6 PAP and CHAP encryptions will be explained m details m Chapter 4, entitl ed "User 
Authentication". 
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of references that was used. The analysis actually provides concise pieces of information that 
will serve the reader to understand further concepts that will be introduced, critiqued and 
analyzed in the following chapters. 
In details, the chapter starts by an in-depth explanation of the network architecture 
models (OSI and TCP/IP mode!) , then it follows by introducing the importance of network 
security as an aspect that affects the interconnected networks, its benefits for any network as 
well as the threats it can eliminate. Finally, the chapter ends with information that link the 
authentication process, which is the main focus of our study, to the network architecture 
mode! , in order to help the user identify the network layers of interest for our study. 
Ail in aU, the chapter helps lead the reader to understand more detailed concepts as 
the ones introduced in the following chapter, concepts about security ACLs that the 
organization can implement on its firewalls to ensure illegitimate access mitigation, their 
mechanism, different types and different implementation needs. 
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CHAPTER Il 
ACCESS CONTROL LISTS (ACLS) 
2.1 What are ACLs? 
In order to explain the concept of ACLs, let's first consider the example of an 
organization's network that needs to communicate with the outer world, in order to share 
information and to perform e-commerce. Such a network needs to be well secured against all 
sorts of outer threats described in chapter 1. 
Internet A user accessing 
the organization's 
inner resources 
Figure 2.1 The NAS and the inner network security 
In order to avoid such threats, the organization has to plan/design its network 
defense techniques adequate! y. Severa! defense techniques were introduced in chapter 1, 
however the most commonly applied security design includes a Network Access Server 
(NAS), which is a router situated at the border of the organization network, and is acting as 
the main gateway to communicate with outer networks, as shown by figure 2-1. NAS is 
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typicaily more than just a terminal server7, as it may support protocol based access services, 
such as Point-to-Point (PPP), Apple talk Remote Access Protocol (ARAP), and others. 
The Network Access Server (NAS) is a border router/firewail , whose Command 
Line Interface (CU) can be accessed through user Exec access mode, or Privileged access 
mode. The Exec access mode ailows remote users to use the router as a connection means to 
the organization's network. The Privileged access mode ailows remote users to use the 
router for administration purposes. The Privileged access mode can only be reached after 
successfuily Jogging into the Exec access mode. The router modes as weil as the detailed 
processes related to their access will be described in details in chapter 4. 
The NAS is usually configured using tools like Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), 
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), as weil as other tools like Access Control Lists (ACLs), 
to help protect the inner network. Such tools will prevent inbound unwanted/unauthorized IP 
packets from entering the inner network usually by discarding them, while permitting 
network access to authorized IP packets. Inbound packets are specified to go towards the 
inner network, therefore, they're said to have the direction (in). 
These tools also protect the network by allowing outbound packets to reach sorne 
specified destinations, while preventing them from reaching other unsafe destinations. Those 
packets are specified to go towards the outside world, therefore, they're said to be outbound, 
going (out) of the tnner network. 
ACLs are considered one of the security means that, when configured on a network 
deviee, can help that deviee to filter the IP packets it sends or receives according to security 
decisions made by the network engineer. Such security criteria and decisions will be 
included in the ACL as defined by the engineer. 8 Since the most commonly applied security 
7 Terminal servers usually provide the remote users with a character mode front end and allow the 
user to Te lnet or rlogin to another host on the network. 
8 Throughout this study, we will refer to these conditions using the words "conditions", "statements" 
or "rules". 
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design refers to the application of ACLs on Network Access Server (NAS), we will explain 
the ACLs accordingly for the rest of our study. 
Thus ACLs can be explained as a group of rules and conditions, dictated by the 
network engineer, configured on a border router/firewall (NAS) that puts these rules into 
action once the corresponding conditions are fulfilled. 
"The goal of these filters is to prevent unwanted traffic in the network-whether 
preventing hackers from penetrating the network or just preventing employees from using 
systems they shouldn ' t. IP access lists can also be used to filter routing updates, to match 
packets for prioritization, to match packets for VPN tunneling as weil as to match packets 
for implementing Quality of Service (QoS) features. ACLs can also be used as part of 
configuring Network Address Translation (NAT), (Odom, 2009)." 
"ACLs might also be used for filtering non-IP protocols such as AppleTalk or IPX." ( (Cisco 
- Auth Proxy, 2007) 
In other words, Access Control Lists (ACLs) are bodies of network configuration 
commands applied usually on an organization boundary deviee (such as a firewall, Cisco 
Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA), Network Access Server (NAS) or a Default Gateway). 
The benefits of ACLs can be summarized in the following points : 
Using ACLs can eliminate sorne traffic , which can mcrease network 
performance. 
• Us ing ACLs helps restrict the delivery of routing updates, which allows 
flow control for network traffic. 
• 
• 
Using ACLs contrais the type of traffic sent or received by the hosting 
deviee upon which they're configured. 
Using ACLs contrais the areas that a client can access, within a typical 
client-server environment. 
(Orbit Computer Solutions, 20 12) 
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The ACL mechanism proceeds in two steps : 
1. Matching: it means to watch the IP traffic and to look for certain criteria 
about that IP traffic ; once that traffic matches these criteria, specified in the 
statements of the ACL's body, a match is made and execution proceeds to 
step two. 
2. Action: it means the action specified in the ACL takes place. This action is 
either to stop the traffic , thus the IP packets will be discarded; or to allow 
that traffic, and thus these IP packets will be able to continue their way 
towards their destination. 
Actually the router on which the ACL is configured will act like a guard for the 
inner network of the organization, as it will decide about petmitting each packet to go 
through or to get dropped, by matching the information, included inside the packets headers, 
with the conditions in the body of the A CL. This filtering is thus made at the network layer 
of the TCP/IP mode! described in the pre-introduction chapter of this study. 
While configuring an ACL, the engineer has to make sorne important decisions: 
after specifying the network resources or portions that should be protected, as well as the 
unsecure packet's threats that should be stopped (filtered) by the ACL, the engineer has to 
determine the characteristics of the packets that should be filtered, whether they are 
incoming packets or outgoing ones. He also needs to determine where the ACL should be 
enforced, that is, at which specifie interface on a specifie NAS/router/boundary deviee the 
ACLs should be applied. 
Actually, IP packets can be filtered by the ACLs as they enter the NAS interface, 
thus before routing can be made by the router. This is called inbound packet fi ltering. IP 
packets can also be filtered by the ACLs as they exit the N AS interface, and that is ca lied 
outbound packet filtering. Since both processes: the routing process and the IP packet 
fi ltering take place at the network layer (layer 3) of the TCP/IP mode!, there is no difference 
in the arder they occur, for the organization ' s inner network, architecture wise (whether the 
rou ting take place first of the filtering takes place first) . However, performance and security 
wise, the arder of these two processes, might be of a certain importance and significance for 
31 
the inner network they are meant to serve. This order is different according to the type of 
ACLs implemented on the NAS router, as we will see in the following sections. 
2.2 IP ACLs filtering process 
The syntax of ACL's filtering mies is as follows: 
• 
• 
• 
If the IP packets are to be stopped/ filtered by the ACLs, th en the W ord "Deny" 
must be used in the configuration, which implies denying access by these filters. 
Likewise, if the IP packets are to be allowed access by the ACLs, then the Word 
"Permit" must be used in the configuration. 
The filtering logic, which includes ali the conditions that should be matched with 
each IP packet in the passing traffic, is configured using statements making the body 
of the ACL. 
An implicit "deny ali traffic" mie is enforced after ali the specified mies, which 
means access is denied for any IP packet not conforming to the conditions listed in 
the body of ACL. For best security practices, it's highly recommended to explicitly 
configure one last statement, to the same effect, as it will give an accurate indication 
of the number of ACLs violations that have taken place during IP traffic, to the 
network Administrator/Engineer. 
The ACLs work as follows: 
1. The first condition, situated in the first statement in the body of the ACL, is 
compared against the packet's characteristics in the network traffic; 
2. When a match is found, the action configured in the ACL takes place, either 
permitting or denying traffic . 
3. If no match is found, step 1 and 2 are repeated for checking a match with the 
fo llowing conditions until a match is found. 
4. If after going through ali the conditions, still no match is found, then the 
traffic will be denied (Odom, 2009). 
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2.3 How to configure an IP ACL? 
Before we consider the ACL's configuration topic, let's explain an important detail 
about the ACL's filtering process: The filtering process specified by the ACL depends on 
wildcard masks. The wildcard mask defi nes the range of the IP addresses of network traffic, 
that will go through the examination and filtering process. Ali other traffic will be 
automatically denied without examination. Thus, within the ACL's configuration, both the 
network traffic , as weil as the range of this traffic to be examined, will be identified by a 
network IP address as weil as a wildcard mask that identify the packets of interest, 
respectively. So, in order to match ali hosts in a certain subnet9, ali we have to do is to invert 
this subnet mask and ali the traffic that will be eligible for filtering will represent ail hosts 
within that subnet; any other host outside the subnet will be denied access without going 
through the filtering process. For example, in order to match ali hosts of a subnet with a 
subnet mask 255.255 .240.0, the wild card mask that should be configured in the ACL would 
be 0.0.15.255 . 
Thus, this simple process takes place by specifying the address octets to be filtered. 
A bit value of 1 means a "don't Care" bit, while a bit value of 0 means an "exact match" bit. 
Thus, in the previous example, the first two octets are ail "exact match" bits and the last 
octet is ali "don 't care" bits. In order to match a specifie host IP address, the wildcard mask 
of 0.0.0.0 can be used, referring to the fact that ali four octets are "exact match" bits (Odom, 
2009). 
Using the same concept of wi ldcard masks, only certain hosts or certain subnets can 
be allowed access , while others that belong to the same network, might be denied access. A 
full explanation of the wild card mechanism is not the focal point of our study, so we will 
not go into more details about this subject. 
9 Subnet is a smaller part of a bigger network. 
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2.4 IP ACLs categories 
In order to better understand the configuration of IP ACLs, let's first state the 
different types/categories of ACLs, as the configuration depends on each type functions and 
features. 
2.4.1 Standard ACLs 
);>A Standard ACL uses a simple logic, as it matches only the source IP address of the 
traffic to be filtered. Standard ACLs can be configured to match the whole packet 
source IP address or only a part of it, as mentioned earlier. 
);> Each standard ACL is associated with a number. Standard IP ACLs numbers range 
from 1 to 99 and fro m 1300 to 1999. AU ACLs statements associated with the same 
number are considered within the same ACL, and they will be processed in the order 
they are stated within the ACL's configuration. 
);>Ali statements (having the same number) will be listed within the ACL, and will be 
executed by the Network Operating System, in the same order as they were placed 
within the ACL configuration. The statements are matched sequentially, using first 
match logic. Thus once a match is made for a certain IP packet, the search is over 
and no more subsequent Standard ACL's commands are to be matched. 
);> All conditions or fields stated on one ACL statement must match a packet in order 
for that packet to be considered a match for that statement. 
);> When an ACL is globally 10 configured on a deviee , all the statements associated 
with this ACL (having the same number) start with the "access-list" commands. 
However, when the ACL is configured on a specifie deviee interface, the associated 
statements will be first globally configured on the deviee starting with "access-list" 
10 Globa lly configured ACLs are configured on a deviee global configuration, versus a deviee 
specified interface . Usually the deviee is a Router or a layer 3 Switch. 
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commands , as weil as configured on the interface starting with the "ip access-group" 
interface subcommand while referring to its global configuration once using the 
ACL number 
~The position of the ACL on a specifie router interface has to be carefully chosen, 
since the ACL's security performance differs according to its position regarding the 
source IP address to be filtered, or the Destination IP address to be protected. That's 
why the planning of the location of the Standard ACLs by choosing a specifie inner 
router ' s interface to configure the Standard ACL is important. 
Briefly, standard ACLs should always be enforced near the packet's destination, 
which is the specifie network resource to be reached. Configured otherwise, the 
Standard ACL might discard the allowed packets unintentionally. 
~Once the best interface location is determined, the standard ACL can be enabled on 
the interface using the "ip access-group" command. 
~Sin ce a Standard ACL only examines Source IP addresses, the direction specified in 
the ACL has to be mentioned in the interface subcommand configuration. 
Specifying the direction of the IP packets examining process permits the matching 
of the IP packets as they go in the direction that the Standard ACL is examining. The 
direction is either "in" or "out". Globally configured ACLs statements don't have to 
include a direction keyword. 
~The generic syntax of a Standard ACL configuration command is as follows (Odom, 
2009): 
Access-list standard-ACL-number {denylpermit} source-IF-
address Source- Wildcard 
If the source of the IP traffic to be examined and matched is only one IP address, 
rather than a whole network or subnet, then the wildcard can be omitted from the 
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Standard ACL's configuration, and the word "host" can be written before the 
"source-IP-address" po11ion, within the ACL's configuration. 
Example 2-1 
Example of standard ACL 
In this example, we start by illustrating a network topology, fo llowed by 
defining the security needs, and the configuration-code of the standard ACL that wi ll 
he1p meet such needs. Then, we follow with the explanation of the configuration 
code, and fina lly, with the explanation of the process behind the code to help the 
reader better grasp the concept behind the way how standard ACLs work. 
ACL 
Internet 172.16.3.10 
Figure 2.2 Standard ACL configured on interface EO 
Consider the network topology illustrated in figure 2.2. The organization 
needs to prevent IP packets coming from the source IP address 172.16.3.10 from 
accessing its network, while allowing access to the IP packets coming from any 
other source. 
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The configuration will be as illustrated in figure 2.3 : 
1 Interface Ethernet 0 
-------1 1 
ip access-group 1 : out :~, r---------~ 
1 lA 
2 ~----------------~ 1 ------~ Access-list 1 deny: 172.16.3.10 : : 0.0 .0.0 : 
,_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,..., '- - - - - - - - - - - - .._!. 
1 2A 
r-----------------------------------~ -+ 28 
l,__ __ _._ 3A 
---+ 38 
Figure 2.3 Standard ACL configuration code on interface EO 
The configuration code of figure 2-3 can be explained as follows: 
• The statement in part 1 of the figure is not part of the ACL itself. This statement 
specifies that the access list is applied to the router's interface. The ACL is applied 
to the Ethemet interface (EO) (rather than the seriai interface Sl), which is the 
interface closer to the inner resource to be protected. That resource is, then, 
considered a destination since the traffic to be examined flows towards the inner 
network. 
This traffic is flowing out of interface (EO), towards the inner network, hence the 
configuration ward "out" in part lA. So the Standard ACL will examine the traffic 
as it goes out of the router's EO interface, on their way onto the Ethernet link to 
reach the organization's inner resources. 
• Part 2 of the figure is where the standard ACL itself is defined, globally on this 
router, rather than applying it exclusively on a specifie interface. Any packets 
------------ - - ----
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coming from the source IP address 172.16.3 .10, mentioned in part 2A of the 
figure, will be stopped and discarded by the ACL. The wildcard mask 0.0.0.0, 
mentioned in part 2B of the figure , means ali octets matter in this match, which 
means performing an exact match for that exact source IP address . 
• The last command, in part 3 of the figure , is to allow access for any other source 
IP addresses. The wildcard mask 255.255.255.255, in part 3B of the figure, means 
ali octets are to be considered as "don't care" bits for any match to be performed 
by this Standard A CL. The IP address 0.0.0.0, in part 3A of the figure , refers to 
any IP address on the internet, as long as it is different from the denied IP address 
mentioned in part 2 of the figure . 
After we have analyzed the standard ACLs ' configuration code, let's explain the process that 
takes place behind it. 
The standard ACL' s body here as we saw in part 1, starts with applying the ACL to a 
router ' s interface so that the filtering process takes effect, since configuring the ACL 
statements global! y on the router doesn 't start the filtering process. Next, the ACL 
statements global configuration includes two conditions (mentioned in part 2 and part 3 of 
the figure). When performing the matching for the outgoing IP packets, the first condition is 
tested first, if no match is found, the second condition is tested. If still no match is found, an 
implicit deny ali is applied to discard any traffic that doesn ' t match any of the sequential 
conditions in the Standard ACL. 
Now that we introduced the Standard ACLs mechanisms, it will be eas1er to 
understand the Extended ACLs mechanisms, upon which Dynamic ACLs are built. Thus a 
thorough understanding ofthese ACLs will help us to reach our goal of this study. 
38 
2.4.2 Extended ACLs 
Why do we need Extended ACLs ? 
Standard ACL can deny one host from accessing an inner server 1 while 
denying the others. However, this standard ACL cannot deny access to server 1 's 
from that host, while allowing that same host access to another inner server 2. 
In order to do that, an extended ACL is needed to allow the organization's 
network engineer to have control over both the source addresses that would like to 
access the organization's network, on one hand, and the destination IP addresses that 
correspond to the network inner resources , on the other hand. 
How do extended ACLs work? 
);> Extended ACLs use more sophisticated logic than standard ACLs, as the filtering 
process includes, not only matching the source IP addresses, but also matching the 
destination IP addresses, along with source and destination port numbers. The 
protocol used for transmission is matched as well, so that extended ACLs can 
match IP or ICMP protocols (layer 3 protocols), as well as TCP or UDP protocols 
(layer 4 protocols) (Odom, 2009) . 
);>The port number matching use basic operations like in table 2-1 : 
The operator What it means 
neq Not equal to 
lt Less than 
gt Greater than 
range Range of port numbers 
Table 2.1 Extended ACLs operators 
---------------- - --------------------------------------------------------------
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)>Sorne port numbers are weil known to re present certain applications they connect 
to, and they must be used when connecting to these applications. Other port 
numbers are not assigned to any app lications, however their range of numbers 
corresponds to special range or type of applications. Table 2-2 presents sorne 
applications according to their transport layer protocol (Layer 4 in both OSI and 
TCP/IP architecture), as well as the standard port numbers for these applications. 
TCP Port TCP Application UDP UDP Application 
Nu rn ber Port Number 
20 FTP Data 53 DNS 
21 FTP Control 67,68 DHCP 
22 SSH 69 TFTP 
23 Telnet 161 SNMP 
25 SMTP 16,384 - RTP-VoiP 
32,767 and Video 
53 DNS 
80 HTTP 
110 POP3 
443 SSL 
Table 2.2 TCP and UDP pmi numbers 
)> Extended IP ACLs numbers range from 100 to 199 and from 2000 to 2699. Ail 
ACLs commands associated with a given number are considered part of the same 
A CL. 
)> Unlike Standard IP ACLs, it is recommended that the location of the interface 
upon which the Extended ACLs are configured, should be as close as possible to 
the packet's source, which is the deviee sending the IP packets to be denied or 
permitted to reach a specifie network resource. Placing the extended ACL near the 
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packets source allows the discarding of unwanted packets as soon as they access 
the NAS router interface facing the unsecure internet, which permits the NAS to 
eliminate routing within the organization inner network, in order to save sorne 
bandwidth (Odom, 2009) (Proprofs , 20 12). 
~The generic syntax of extended ACL' s configuration commands is a little different 
than that of standard IP ACLs ', notably because the extended ACLs can match 
many different fields in the header of the IP packet. Since the possibilities of mix 
and match of such fields are considerable, there is no specifie generic syntax for 
the extended ACLs configuration that can summarize ail possible combinations of 
theses fields. Thus many versions of extended ACLs syntax exist to reflect such 
variety of possible combinations. 
Sorne of the most popular generic syntax associated with extended ACLs are as 
follows: 
~A global command for extended access lists: 
Access-list extende d-ACL-number {denylpermit} protocol 
source- IP- addre ss Sourc e - Wildcard dest i n a t i on- I P-address 
destina t ion - Wildcard [log llog-input] (Odom, 2009) 
~ Another version of Extended ACL command, with TCP-specific parameters: 
Access-list extended-ACL-n umber {denylpermit} {tcp l udp} 
source- IP- address Source - Wildcard [opera t or [port] ] 
destination-IP- address destination - Wildcard [operator 
[port]] [ established] [log] (Odom, 2009) 
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Example 2-2 
Example of an Extended ACL 
In this example, we start by illustrating a network topology, followed by 
defining the security needs, and the configuration-code of the extended ACL that 
will help meet such needs. Then, we follow with the explanation of the configuration 
code, the analysis of the process behind the code and fina lly, and finally the 
reflection upon a number of case scenarios that will help the reader grasp the 
concept behind the working mechanism of extended ACLs. Dynamic ACLs, which 
are the main focus of this research study, depend fundamentally on Extended ACLs 
usage. 
ACL 
Figure 2.4 Extended ACL configured on interface S 1 172.16.1.100 
In this example, and as illustrated by figure 2-4, the organization needs to prevent 
packets having source IP address 172.16.3 .10 from reaching the FTP servers, which 
are located on subnet 172.16.1.0, whi1e allowing access to packets coming from any 
other source. At the same time, the organization needs to prevent packets from host 
172.16.2.1 0 to rea ch inn er server 2, the web server at IP address 172.16.1.1 00, while 
allowing access to packets coming from any other source. 
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The configuration will be as illustrated in figure 2-5: 
1 
Interface Serial 51 
-------, 
ip access-group 101 1 0 1 
: ~n ~~~----~ 
1_----- _1 
._____ _ __. {lA) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------1 
2 Access-list 101 deny tep 172.16.3.10 0.0.0.0 172.16.1.0 1 
3 
0.0.0.255 eq ftp 
Access-list 101 deny tep 
172.16.1.100 eq www 
{ 113) 
1 
172.16.2.10 0.0.0.0 host : 
(2 13) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------1 
Figure 2.5 Extended ACL configuration code on interface S 1 
The configuration code, shown in figure 2-5, can be explained as follows : 
};;> In part 1 of the figure , we can notice that this configuration corresponds to 
applying the access list to the router's interface. The ACL is applied to seriai 
interface (S 1 ), which is the interface cl oser to the insecure Internet, and 
therefore the source of the packets to be matched by the A CL. 
The direction of the packets to be examined is specified on the interface using 
the configuration word "in", in part l A of the figure . So the extended ACL wi ll 
match the packets as they go into this router's interface. 
};;> Part 2 of the configuration corresponds to defining the Standard ACL itself, 
globally on this router, rather than applying it exclusively on a specifie interface. 
The first command, in part 2A of the figure , corresponds to specifying host 
172.16.3.10 (using mask 0.0.0.0, to specify that exact IP address), to be denied 
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access to any FTP server located on the organization's inner network with IP 
addresses anywhere from 172.16.1.0 to 172.16.1.255 . The command ends with 
"eq ftp" to specify that the connection to the inner network hosts has to be 
established in order to ob tain a Web service. 
The second command, mentioned in part 2B of the figure , corresponds to 
specifying host 172.16.2. 1 0 (using mask 0.0.0.0, to specify that exact IP 
address), to be denied access to the HTTP server 172.16.1.100 located on the 
organization 's inner network. 
>- Part 3 of the configuration inc1udes the last globally configured comma nd in this 
Extended ACL, which is to allow full network access to any other IP packet that 
doesn't match either of the two ACL statements above. 
Now that we examined the extended ACLs' configuration code, let's explain the 
process that takes place behind it. 
o Like in Standard IP ACLs, all matching for the ACL commands' conditions follows 
the sequential order of these commands. If no match is found, an implicit "deny ali" is 
applied to discard any traffic that doesn ' t match any of the sequentia1 conditions in the 
extended ACL. 
o The extended ACL's processing starts with application of the ACL to a router ' s 
interface so that the filtering process takes effect. We can also notice that the ACL 
global configuration statements include three conditions (mentioned in part 2 and part 
3 of the figure) . 
o The conditions are matched in a sequential order: Any packets entering the router's 
interface will be first checked against the conditions in the first command/statement of 
part 2A in the figure. If a match is made with all the conditions stated in that 
command, the packet is considered as a match, and no ac cess to the FTP servers' 
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network will be allowed for that packet, and the packet will be discarded by the 
interface, as weil. 
• If no match is found, then the same packet is checked against the conditions in the 
second ACL statement, in part 2B of the figure. If a match is found, then the 
packet will be stopped and discarded by the interface. 
• If no match is found , then the packet is to be checked against the last condition 
statement, in part 3 of the figure , which allows access to any other packets co ming 
from the internet. 
In this example, if the last command line that permits al! other packets is omitted, then al! 
incoming packets will be denied, because of the implicit "deny ail", which is a general 
feature in ail kinds of ACLs. 
In order to better understand this logic let' s consider the following scenarios: 
);> Let' s assume that traffic arrives from host 172.16.3.1 0 and is destined to any of the 
FTP servers' IP addresses within the inner network IP address range. The packets of 
this traffic will match the first condition statement (in part 2A of the figure), and will 
be immediate! y discarded at S 1 seria1 interface. 
);> Let 's assume that traffic amves from host 172.16.2.10 having the HTTP server 
172.16.1.1 00 as a destination. The packets of this traffic will first be tested against the 
first condition statement (in part 2A of the figure), no match will be found. Then these 
packets will be tested against the second condition statement (in part 2B of the figure) , 
and this time a match will be found. So the packets will be discarded at S 1 seriai 
interface. 
);> Let's assume that traffic arrives from a third host of the Internet, with IP address 
172.16.4.1 O. Then the packets of this traffic will first be tested against the first 
condition (in part 2A of the figure) , no match wi ll be found. Th en these packets will be 
tested against the second condition (in part 2B of the figure) , no match will be found 
as weil. So the packets will be tested against the last condition (in part 3 of the figure) , 
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where a match will be found, and since the condition is to permit access for these 
packets, they will not be discarded at S 1 seriai NAS interface. 
);;> Let's assume that traffïc arnves from host 172.16.4.1 0, while part 3 of the 
configuration is omitted, then the packets of this traffic will first be tested against the 
first and second condition statements (in parts 2A, and 2B of the figure), consecutively 
as mentioned in the previous case scenario; and since no match wi ll be found in both 
cases, and no more condition statements will be the re to test against, in the body of the 
ACL, these packets will be discarded at interface sl, according to the implicit deny all 
condition statement that characterizes all types of ACLs. 
Now that we introduced the extended ACLs mechanisms along with sorne case 
scenarios, it will be easier to understand the mechanism of Dynamic ACLs, which are the 
main subject of the study. In the next section we introduce more types of ACLs since a 
thorough understanding of these ACLs will lead us for a better understanding of Dynamic 
ACLs mechanisms, and thus willlead us to reach the goal of this study. 
46 
2.4.3 Named ACLs 
};> Named ACLs function as Standard and Extended ACLs for matching the IP packets. 
The only difference is that Named ACLs allow the use of names instead of numbers 
for designating each ACL. Named ACLs are easier to remember and to identify, 
especially if meaningful nam es are used. 
};> In Named ACLs, individual commands lines may be deleted without having to 
deJete the whole ACL with its command lines altogether. This feature provides 
flexibility in editing /changing the ACLs code, including the modification of the 
fi ltering conditions. 
Deleting a whole ACL is a considerable amount of work for the network engineer. 
Indeed, in order to delete a certain ACL, it must be disabled from all the router 
interfaces where it has been configured first ; then the ACL has to be deleted. And 
finally, only in case when a configuration change needs to take place in the old 
ACL, a new ACL has to be reconfigured and enabled on the desired interfaces . 
};> The IP packet' s fields to be matched using a named standard IP ACL are the same as 
those of a standard IP ACL. Likewise, the IP packet's fields to be matched using a 
named extended IP ACL are the same as the fields to be matched with a extended IP 
A CL. 
};> The Named ACLs ' configuration syntax is very similar to the Standard and 
Extended ACLs ' syntax. We conclude this section by giving a couple of quick 
examples to show the Named ACLs capability to delete single command lines. 
47 
Example 2-3 
Example ofNamed ACLs 
~ In this example, which is the same as the one on Extended ACLs, we will show how 
a single command of an extended Named ACL can be deleted without changing the 
configuration of the rest of the Named ACL. If you remember example 2-2 
illustrated by figure 2-3, it states that the organization needs to stop any packet from 
source IP address 172.16.3.1 0 to rea ch the FTP servers located on subnet 172.16.1.0, 
and to allow access coming from any other source. The organization also wants to 
stop packets coming from source IP address 172.16.2.10 to reach another inner 
server 2 (a web server), at 172.16.1.1 00, while allowing the server's access from any 
other source. 
The configuration will be as fo llows : 
ip access-1ist extended riham 
deny tep 172.16.3.10 0.0.0.0 172.16.1.0 0.0 . 0.255 eq ftp 
deny tep 172.16.2.10 0.0.0.0 host 172.16.1.100 eq www 
permit ip any any 
Interface Seria1 0 
ip access-group riham in 
Y ou can re fer to the explanations about this example in the section entitled 
"Example of Extended ACL" as these are the very same commands copied in an 
extended Named ACL which we called "riham". This Extended Named ACL was 
then applied to the interface as in the previous examples. 
Now suppose we changed our mind about denying host 172.16.2.10 access to the 
web server. We can change the ACL by deleting only the command line that enacts 
this deniai, without interfering with the operation of the ACL or its performance. 
This can be done as follows: 
ip access-1ist extended riham 
no deny tep 172.16.2.10 0.0.0.0 host 172.16.1.100 eq www 
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2.4.4 Numbered ACLs 
);> Both Standard and Extended ACLs can also be edited using sequential numbers, 
which is a feature that allows assigning a number to each ACL and to each 
command line as well. Then, in case one tine needs to be deteted, referring to the 
tine by its number is enough to detete the whole tine white keeping the rest of the 
ACL intact. This is much simpler than having to delete a whole ACL, as described 
above (Odom, 2009). 
);> Another feature allowed in Numbered ACLs, is the flexibility to add new command 
statement(s) to the already existing ACL's statements, without having to go through 
the long process of disabling the ACL off the interface, deleting it, reconfiguring a 
new ACL inctuding the new statements added, then enabting that new ACL on the 
desired interface. Numbered ACLs facilitate the manipulation of the ACL statements 
by providing the possibility of adding new statements, deleting an existing statement 
or changing it; while keeping the ACL defined and enabled on the router ' s interface. 
The use of the numbers to refer to each ACL statement hetps specifying the ACL to 
be deleted or changed. A tine number shoutd be specified for a new statement, so 
that the number falls between two sequential line numbers of any pair of sequentiat 
statements atready configured in the ACL's body, in order to insert the new 
statement just at the right place within the ACL. For exampte if there exist two 
statements in the ACL, numbered 10 and 20 respectively, then adding a new 
statement with number 15, inserts that new statement after statement number 10 and 
before statement number 20 . 
Using the same number-referencing technique, statements can easily be deleted off 
the ACL configuration, without having to deal with the whole ACL. 
Numbered ACLs, thus, facilitate the network engineer' s work of dealing with 
changes to be made to ACLs configuration. 
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);> Numbered ACLs have other usefu l features that add flexibility to the network 
configuration process, however since they are not the main focus of this study; we 
will skip such unnecessary detai ls. 
Example 2-4 
Numbered ACLs Example 
This example shows how usmg numbers to refer to the standard ACL 
statements transforms the ACL into a Standard Numbered ACL, and how we can 
delete or change the configuration of a single existing command statement within 
the ACL, just be referring to that statement's specifie number, without changing the 
configuration of the rest of the Numbered ACL, and without the need to disable, 
de lete it, rebuild it and re-enable it again on the interface upon which it is 
configured. 
Thus suppose that the already existing ACL configuration code is as follows: 
ip access-list standard 20 (1) 
deny 172.16.3.10 
deny 172.16.2.10 
permit 172.16.1 . 0 0.0.0.255 
This configuration doesn't show the line numbers identifying each statement within 
that ACL, which makes it hard to refer to individual statements. In order to retrieve 
the original router configuration for the previous code white showing the numbers 
corresponding to each statement of this ACL, we use the following comrnand: 
do show ip access-list 20 (2) 
The result of command (2) will show the retrieved ACL, which is the same ACL 
after including the numbers corresponding to each statement: 
Standard IP access list 20 ( 3) 
10 de ny 172. 16 .3.10 , wildcar d b i ts 0 .0.0 . 0 
20 de ny 172.16.2.10, wildca rd bits 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 
30 pe rmit 172.1 6 .1.0, wildcard bi t s 0 . 0.0 .2 5 5 
50 
Now that we can see the numbered statements, we can change the ACL's statements 
according to our needs. Specifying the statements to be changed will be done by 
referring to them using their numbers. For example in order to add a new statement 
to be placed between line 10 and 20, we give it any number that falls within that 
range, say number 15, as shown in command (4). We can also delete statement 
number 20, as shown in command (5) . 
15 deny 10.1.1.1 (4) 
no 20 (5) 
In order to retrieve the ACL 's configuration after the changes have taken place, we 
use the fo llowing command: 
do show ip access-1ist 20 ( 6) 
The retrieved ACL's code after the changes is : 
Standard IP access list 20 (7) 
10 deny 172.16.3.10, wildcard bits 0.0.0.0 
15 deny 10.1.1.1, wildcard bits 0.0.0.0 
30 permit 172.16.1.0, wildcard bits 0.0.0.255 
Part ( 1) corresponds to configuring the ACL itself using a number "20", in 
order to refer to that ACL including ali its statements, as same as we saw in the 
previous types of ACLs. ACL 20 as we see, contains 3 ACL 's statements. 
In part (2), the command is to show the configuration code of the ACL. 
Since the configured ACL is a standard Numbered ACL, the router shows the 
numbers corresponding to the ACL. lt also assigns sorne sequential numbers to the 
ACL command !ines. 
These sequential numbers have a gap, to allow the possibility of adding other 
commands in between if needed in the future. Here, we added the command line 15 
to den y access to host 1 0.1.1.1. Choosing the number 15 is to inforrn the router to 
place that configured statement between statement l 0 and before statement 20. Also, 
we can delete an ACL statement just by referring to its number, as we deleted 
statement 20, as shown in command (5) of the example. Thus Numbered ACLs 
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provide a very practical means that can help the network engineer to easily change 
the different ACLs configurations. 
2.4.5 Reflexive ACLs 
• Reflexive Access Control Lists (ACLs), known as IP-Session-Filtering security, 
are another type of ACLs used by an organization to prevent a class of security 
attacks for each allowed TCP or UDP session, on a per session basis. 
• Reflexive ACLs react to the first incoming packet of a new connection session, 
recording the Source IP address along with the UDP or TCP p01i, on one hand, 
and pairing them with the organization resource IP address and p01i (in other 
words: the destination) on the other hand. This technique helps filtering ali 
incoming traffic except packets sent by that specifie Source IP address paired with 
that specifie session. 
The main benefit of Reflexive ACLs is to allow a better control of network access 
security, by enabling the router to filter IP packets dynamically, based on the 
connection sessions established with the organization resources. 
How do Reflexive ACLs work? 
Reflexive ACLs are usually nested within the extended named ACLs that are 
applied to the interface of a border router (firewall router), enabling it to filter 
outbound traffic . Once a connection session starts, the router adds entries to the 
temporary ACLs, allowing the inbound reply packets only for the duration of the 
connection session. The Reflexive ACL entries are: the source and Destination IP 
address and the TCP/UDP port number. 
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2.4 .6 Time-based ACLs 
• Time-based ACLs are similar to Extended ACLs in function , however they also 
allow the addition of time-constraints to the configuration of either numbered or 
named ACLs, so the latter would permit packet filtering (according to the ACL's 
conditions) during a specifie period of time, e.g. during one day or specifie da ys of 
the week (Odom, 2009) . 
How do T1me-based ACLs work? 
The Network Opera ting System adds or removes different statements of the ACL 
during the appropriate time of the day in order to control the access to certain 
re sources of the organization during that specifie period of time. 
Example 2-5 
Time-based ACLs Example 
In this example, the organization needs to allow FTP access to the hosts of an 
outer network 172.16.3 .0/24 only on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, during 
working hours. 
So the configuration is as follows: 
Interface Seria! 0 
ip access-group 101 in 
Access-list 101 permit tep 172.16.3 . 0 0 . 0 . 0 . 255 172 . 16 . 1.0 
0.0 . 0.255 eq ftp time - range EVERYOTHRDAY 
Time - range EVERYOTHERDAY 
Periodic Monday Wednesday Friday 8:00 to 5:00 
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In this example, the time range called EVERYOTHERDAY is the time constraint 
instructed to the ACL to respect white permitting the hosts from the 172.16.3 .0/24 
subnet to access the FTP servers. 
Dynamic ACLs are another type of ACLs that filter unwanted packets at the 
organization's border. Dynamic ACLs are the main focus of this study and will be 
thoroughly explained in the following Chapter, Chapter 3- Dynamic ACLs. 
In general, chapter 2 can be considered as an explanation of the IP ACLs filtering 
mechanism, introducing a number of IP ACLs types, along with a thorough explanation of 
their usage, their mechanism and their configuration. The chapter's importance lies in its 
nature as a corner stone necessary for the structure of this study, explaining the typical 
organization's topology where IP ACLs are implemented in general , their filtering needs and 
their variety according to the organization's security needs. Thus the chapter is a crucial base 
upon which the following chapters are built, especially that it introduces a list of IP ACLs 
categories that ends with Dynamic ACLs, which are covered in details in the following 
chapter and which are the main focus of the study. The chapter provides information based 
upon a deep analysis of the theoretical information provided through the different references 
used, as well as through detailed developed configuration examples, from which the reader 
can better understand the theoretical explanation of the different concepts and make a 
sensible evaluation for the different potential implementation choices. 
In details, the chapter starts by a description of ACLs, their filtering process, and 
their configuration. Then the chapter fo llows by listing a number of IP ACLs categories, as 
well as their application necessities and their configuration stated in the form of exp lana tory 
example that are developed specifically to support this research study. Thus the chapter 
presented Standard ACLs, Extended ACLs, Named ACLs, Numbered ACLs, Reflexive 
ACLs, and Time-based ACLs, while mentioning Dynamic ACLs as a final category that 
belongs in the list, and that will be the main focus of the study, requiring a who le chapter in 
order to be explained in greater details, allowing its in-depth analysis. 
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CHAPTER III 
DYNAMIC ACLS 
Remote user authentication and remote user access restriction for specifie mner 
resources can be obtained by applying one of two methods: 
l. Dynamic ACLs, which are the main focus of our study. 
2. Auth-proxy 11 , which will be discussed in chapter 5, entitled 
"Authentication and dynamic ACLs". 
Thus authentication proxies are one filtering technique that can be comparable to Dynamic 
ACLs in terms of security mechanism. 
In this section, we explain Dynamic ACLs necessity, mechanism, configuration and 
authentication. 
3.1 Dynainic ACLs Purpose 
Dynamic Access Control Lists (Dynamic ACLs), known as Lock-and-Key 
security, are a special kind of ACLs used when an organization wants to grant secure 
IP access to its servers and inner resources to a small set of users that have to 
connect remotely, using their home PCs or their laptops in order to reach these 
resources. 
These remote users, usually keep changing their IP addresses as they lease 
new IP addresses using the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) every 
time they establish an Internet connection to start a session with the organization's 
network. 
Thus controlling the user secure access by limiting the range of the source 
IP addresses connecting to the organization will be impossible, since the users keep 
11 Auth-proxy, though might include an Authentication server like the ones used with Dynamic ACLs, 
works differently as a concept. 
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changing their IP addresses into unpredictable ranges due to the DHCP dynamic 
address acquisition process. 
Therefore Dynamic ACLs implementation will help the organization 
enforcing secure user access by authenticating the different users , regardless of how 
unpredictable and dynamically changing the source IP addresses they use. In order 
to perform the filtration role of these user connections, Dynamic ACLs can be used 
as substitutions for many other filtering/controlled connection methods, like Virtual 
Private Networks (VPN) 12, Traditional ACLs and Proxy servers (Authentication 
servers). 
Before we expand the details behind the configuration of Dynamic ACLs, 
let' s compare them to a number of other filtering techniques, which will help us 
better explain these ACLs and how they work. 
Let's first consider the use of VPNs versus Dynamic ACLs. When the 
remote users need to access the organization' s inners network through a public 
network (like the Internet) , usually organizations allow the establishment of such a 
connection through the use of VPNs, which provides a great level of security for 
transmitted data. However, once such a connection is established, security control of 
such connection allows remote users to freely access all the organization 's inner 
resources risking to compromise ail them all, as if that access is locally do ne from 
within the organization's network. This restriction done by the organization cannot 
be considered a full security control, since the organization cannot restrict access to 
sorne of its inner resources , white using a VPN connection, except with the use of a 
regular ACL combined with the VPN connection (E-Tutorials Lock-and-Key 
Configuration, 201 2). This ACL only filters packets based on layer 3 and layer 4 
conditions, as explained in chapter 2. Thus they don 't go all the way to filter packets 
according to upper layers concemed with session establishment, data representation 
and application involved in the connection. 
12 VPNs are Virtual Private Networks, networks that encrypt ail traffic white it flows over the 
unsecure Internet. 
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Another drawback of using a regular ACL resides in the fact that restricting 
traffic cannot be personalized according to each user ' s needs and allowed 
accessibility. As the ACLs only authenticate the remo te deviee (or the traffic it 
belongs to ), the remo te user is not authenticated nor is his access to the organization 
resources controlled on a per user basis. In fact this ACL will grant the same access 
ru les for all us ers to reach the same specifie organization inn er resources 13 . This is 
the not the right answer to meet the need of the organization to personalize remote 
access restriction according to its security rules and according to each user ' s needs. 
Since traditional ACLs configured on the organization' s router (border 
deviees) filter users based on their IP addresses, this filtering cannot be applicable in 
cases where the IP addresses keep changing dynamically. lt is impossible to edit 
every single ACL configured on the organization resources in order to cope with the 
dynamically changing user-IP addresses . Also, the maintenance of the integrity of 
these ACLs to reflect such changes is impractical. 
Another problem that might happen if we try to use traditional ACLs to 
secure dynamically changing user IP addresses is the possibility of creating security 
holes by constantly changing the current ACLs according to the users ever changing 
IP addresses. In case ofusing traditional ACLs, there will be two types of challenges 
for the organization to face : challenges when keeping track of the user IP address 
changes, as well as challenges when trying to adapt existing ACLs to cope with 
these dynamic changes, as explained in the chapter 2. The security risk of creating 
security holes is presented when forbidden users get hold and use old permitted IP 
addresses , not currently used by permitted user hosts, since keeping track of the 
permitted versus forbidden IP addresses will represent a great challenge to the 
organization in this case. 
The use of dynamic configuration of ACLs, in the lock-and-Key ACL, is 
similar to their use in Reflexive ACLs and Context-Based ACLs. What differs is 
13 The remote user authentication will be described in deta ils in chapter 4, entitled "User 
Authentication" . The Personalization of the remo te user access to the organization's resources 
topic will be analyzed in chapter 5, entitled "Authentication and Dynamic AC Ls". 
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what triggers the addition of the dynamic entries. Reflexive ACLs and Context-
Based ACLs add dynamic entries into the ACL configuration based on their 
acceptance of the inspected traffic , and then they allow only the traffic 
corresponding to the original remote user ' s deviee that initiated the connection 
through the ACL to retum back into the network. Lock-and-Key ACLs, on the other 
hand, have to authenticate the remote user first, then, depending on that 
authentication, specifie dynamic entries are temporarily added into the ACL 
configuration, already applied to the router ' s interface. So Jock-and-Key ACLs 
permit access to the user for organization resources that normally would be denied to 
him. Usually, Jock-and-Key ACLs are combined with other types of ACLs, 
especially extended ACLs, as mentioned in chapter 2. 
Extended ACLs, as explained before, contains many static conditions. Once 
configured and enabled on a router ' s interface, they remain active until disabled, 
filtering ali packets based on the same conditions. Extended ACLs don't allow 
dynamic entries to be added to the ACL' s body, in arder to suit the permissions 
granted to every user. Th us, they don 't allow controlling this access , neither do they 
allow user authentication mechanisms. 
According to Orbit Computer Solutions (Orbit Computer Solutions, 20 12), 
"Sorne of the many security benefits of Dynamic ACLs over standard and static 
extended ACLs are: 
1. The use of an authentication mechanism for individual users. 
2. Reduction of the opportunity for network break-ins by network hackers. 
3. In many cases, reduction of the amount of router processing that is 
required for ACLs. 
4. Simplified management in large intemetworks. 
5. Creation of dynamic user access through a firewall , without 
compromising other configured security restrictions." 
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3.2 Dynamic ACLs usage 
Dynamic ACLs are used to permit secure layer 3-IP packet access for remote user 
connections made to the organization's resources. 
Though many physical connection might be secured by Dynamic ACLs including 
DSL and cable, where the user acquires his own IP address from an Internet Service 
provider, such methods will still represent a single remote IP address (representing one user 
or a small number of users) trying to establish a connection to the organization's inner 
resources through Dynamic ACLs. Other broadband, multipoint connections (where many 
users try to connect to the organization' s resources), are not to be secured through the use of 
Dynamic ACLs. This limited usage is due to the fact that a given Dynamic ACL involves 
VTY connections (usually Telnet), which only allow 16 simultaneous user authentication 
processes to take place over a single router interface protected by a Dynamic ACL. 
Thus, according to E-Tutorials (E-Tutorials - Lock-and-Key Overview, 2012), 
Dynamic ACLs are needed in the following situations: 
1. Allowing inner network temporary access to certain remote user(s) 
connecting through the Internet. 
2. Allowing certain inner hosts to access a specifie remote host/network. 
The study will focus on the first implementation sih1ation ofDynamic ACLs. 
3.3 Dynamic ACLs mechanism 
Dynamic ACLs may be considered as Custom made ACLs, designed for every user 
host's IP address. Actually, Dynamic ACLs start configuring themselves automatically and 
dynamically depending on the dynamic users IP addresses . 
Triggering this dynamic configuration of the ACLs depends on the very first step, 
which is the User authentication step. Without this authentication step, the ACL itself cannat 
be triggered or built, and no access is granted to that user 's host IP address. 
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Once the user passes the first step and is considered authenticated, the router (or the 
organization edge deviee) dynamically reconfigures the ACL, permitting ac cess to the host 
used by that authenticated user. 
Actually, the router then will dynamically reconfigure the ACL using that host IP 
address temporarily, while permitting that user 's access towat:ds the inner network 
mentioned in the ACL itself. Then after the user session is done, or after a certain period of 
inactivity, depending on the dynamic ACL configuration, the router removes the temporary 
IP address from the ACL and access is restored to its previous status. 
Triggering a Dynamic ACL starts by a connection made from the remote user to the 
organization's network. Usually this connection is a Telnet connection. Telnet is a network 
protocol that provides bidirectional interactive text-oriented communication with a remote 
host command line interface (CLI) using a virtual terminal connection (VTY). Telnet is one 
of the first Internet standards and was documented in RFC 15, extended by RFC 854 
(Wikipedia- Telnet, 2012). 
Telnet belongs to layer 7 (application layer) within the OSI mode! stack, and can 
always be replaced by other connection methods, as we will discuss in chapter 5, entitled 
"Authentication and Dynamic ACLs". 
According to Orbit Computer Solutions (Orbit Computer Solutions, 2012), "This 
type of access control list is basically reliant on Telnet connectivity, authentication and 
extended ACLs. Lock-and-key is configured using IP dynamic extended access lists . This 
can be used in conjunction with other standard access Iists and static extended access lists. " 
The Dynamic ACL process is usually combined with the use of Telnet as an access 
method for the remote user to reach the network resources. However, in order to guarantee 
its security aspect, this process is quite complicated since it depends on the success or the 
user connectivity through Telnet as a first step that allows the dynamic ACL mechanism to 
take place. Though Telnet or any other VTY (line) access technique is considered 
independent from the Dynamic ACL mechanism, since the Dynamic ACL process 1s 
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triggered from within the line connection, it 1s essential that the connection takes place 
successfully. 
Thus the who le process includes two types of authentication that will take place: 
• An authentication allowing the VTY connection only (Telnet). 
• An authentication allowing for reaching the network resources (Through 
dynamic ACLs). 
This second authentication takes place within the Telnet connection 
configuration, once the user is authenticated for the use of Telnet and is getting 
authenticated to access the organization inner resource(s) . Thus this 
authentication is referred to as "the user authentication process" and it is the 
main focus of the study. 
Both authentications are independent from each other security w1se, however 
Dynamic ACL authentication process is dependent on the line connection authentication 
connectivity wise. 
Each authentication has an individual timeout, thus we end up having two types of 
timeout involved in the Dynamic ACLs mechanism, as follows: 
1. The first authentication's timeout "the Idle Timeout": 
An optional timeout parameter can be configured to limit the user access 
through the Telnet connection. This timeout is specified within the VTY's 
autocommand that ena bles the Lock -and-Key user authentication. If the Idle 
Timeout is not specified, the default is to never timeout the dynamic ACL 
entry. 
2. The second authentication's timeout "the Absolute Timeout": 
Another optional timeout parameter can be configured to limit the user 
access to the inner resources through the Dynamic ACL entry. This timeout 
is specified within the extended ACL, in order to define an absolute-access 
duration for the dynamic ACL entry that will take place within the extended 
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ACL, once the remote user is successfully authenticated. If this timeout is 
not specified, the default is to never timeout the dynamic ACL entry within 
the extended ACL. 
Thus it is recommended to specify either types of timeout within the Lock-
and-Key configuration; otherwise the remote user access will remain active 
indefinitely to the organization's inner resources. 
Either timeout parameter (idle or absolute) can range from l to 9999 
minutes. 14 And usually the absolute timeout value set is greater than the idle 
timeout's. 
A dynamic ACL is removed from the NAS configuration when the router reboots, 
when its entry in the extended ACL is manually cleared, when the idle timeout is reached, or 
when the absolute timeout is reached. Even when a router's configuration is saved, the 
dynamic ACL entry created once a user authenticates to the NAS is not saved. However 
once the router reboots, that dynamic entry can be easily recreated again once the user re-
authenticates. 
Though the Dynamic ACL's filtering mechanism takes place at layer 3 of the OSI 
mode!, as weil as ali types of IP ACLs as we explained in chapter 2, the user authentication 
process takes place at layer 7 as the user starts a layer 7-Telnet session to connect to the 
organization ' s network. 
Dynamic ACLs mechanism can be clarified by the processes shown in figure 3-l. These 
processes will help justifying the mechanism steps that will follow it. 
14 More detailed explanation about the timeout parameter will be given in the following sections. 
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Dynamic ACLs mechanism is performed according to the following steps: 
1. Telnet to the Network Access Server (NAS) : 
1.1. The user is blocked from accessing the NAS (the border r outer 
configured with the Dynamic ACL) except if he uses a Telnet 
connection 15• Thus the existing ACL must allow Telnet (or SSH) so 
that the user can enter his credentials to open a Telnet session, and 
then connect via a virtual Terminal port to the router (Telnet/SSH 
port). 
1.2. The router receives the Tel net credentials packet ( 1 st authentication) , 
opens a Telnet session; and within that session, the router prompts 
the user for his credentials to authenticate him (2"ct authentication). 
1.3 . The user enters his credentials according to the authentication 
method defined for the Telnet access method, on the NAS router. 
2. The NAS authenticates the user 
2.1. The NAS router authenticates the user (2"ct authentication) Iocally or 
through a remote authentication process; according to the 
authentication method defined within the VTY connection 
(Telnet) 16 • 
15 ln order to start a Telnet connection, the user has to enter his credentials and has to be allowed to 
start that connection through the configured ACL. 
16 The VTY connection configuration contains an autocommand that will trigger the Dynamic ACL 
entry, once a successfu l authentication process takes place. 
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3. The NAS router adds the Dynamic entry related to the user 
3 .1. If the user is authenticated, th en: 
a. The Telnet session is dropped (since the Telnet/SSH connection is 
only needed to perform the authentication step, and it is no 
longer needed). 
b. One dynamic ACL entry is added to the extended existing ACL: 
so the inbound interface is configured to allow the user 
temporary access to the inner network resources, which would be 
otherwise denied through the regular static extended ACL. 
c. The user exchanges data, through the firewall/NAS router, with 
the server/inner resources he/she needs to reach. 
d. When an absolute timeout is reached, the Dynamic ACL entry is 
taken off the original extended ACL, and the inbound interface is 
reconfigured back to its original state to block ail access 
attempts. 
If the temporary entry is not used before the idle timeout 
(configured within the Telnet session's autocommand) is up , the 
telnet session closes and the temporary entry will expire. 
If neither an abso lute timeout nor an idle timeout is configured, 
the dynamic entry (permitting access to that specifie user) will 
remain configured indefinitely on the interface until it gets 
manually removed by a network administrator. This represents 
then another way to end up that temporary access permission. 
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3.2. If the user is not authenticated then: 
a. The user has no access to the inner network resources, except for 
the resources specified inside the original static extended ACL. 
b. The user is prompted once agam, for the authentication 
information to be entered. 
3.4 Dynamic ACLs Configuration (using local authentication) 
Dynamic ACLs are configured using IP dynamic extended Access lists, and have 
been introduced in Cisco lOS release 11 .1. 
The three main steps for configuring Dynamic ACLs are as follows: 
l. Creating extended ACL, permitting either Telnet or SSH as a remote access method 
into the NAS , and setting up a placeholder in the extended ACL for the dynamic 
ACL entry that will be generated dynamically once the user authentication process 
successfully takes place. That placeholder will be a reference to the Dynamic ACL 
within the extended ACL, thus the Dynamic ACL configured name must be unique 
within the NAS. 
2. Defining the authentication method for remote users: whether it is local, extem al 
through the use of an authentication server, or using VTY (line) password. 17 
3. Enabling the authentication method on the NAS VTY line so that the NAS will be 
able to create a Dynamic ACLs entry within the extended ACL that references it, 
and that is configured on the same interface. 
(E-Tutorials - Lock-and-Key Overview, 2012) 
17 Further explanation of the different methods of user authentication within Dynamic ACLs will be 
found in chapter 5, entitled "Authentication and Dynamic ACLs". 
67 
The extended ACL should be created on the NAS external interface and should 
permit Telnet or SSH access to the IP address of the NAS external interface. The Jock and 
Key entry that is embedded within that extended ACL defines which inner resources the user 
will be allowed to access (E-Tutorials- Lock-and-Key Overview, 2012). 
Dynamic ACLs configuration cannat be explained without explaining the 
corresponding operation processes that take place as a result of the configuration process. 
Thus, let's explain the sequence ofDynamic ACLs operation processes in this section. 
Dynamic ACLs operation starts with an extended ACL that blacks ail traffic to the 
NAS except for Telnet authenticated traffic (1 st authentication). The Telnet connec ti on is 
shutdown after a successful user authentication (2"d authentication), and a single entry 
dynamic ACL is added to the extended ACL, permj tting temporary access to a specified user 
into the inner network. 
Because Dynamic ACLs' were configured in a particular way, the corresponding 
operation steps take place in a patticular sequence and logic. In this section we will analyze 
the general operation steps that will help understand how Dynamic ACLs processes take 
place, as well as to guide us through future Dynamic ACLs configurations. The steps are as 
follows: 
l. ssuming that, on the NAS , the user authentication method is defined, including a 
username and password (local authentication) 
2. Assuming, that on the NAS, the ACL is defined as follows: 
Allow Telnet session establishment between any and ail source IP address and the 
NAS IP address as a destination. 
This Telnet session is defined as follows: 
a) Check if the user login (username/password) ts as defined m step 1. 
(authenticate the user) 
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b) Once the user is authenticated, 
b ).i. Termina te the Te ln et session. 
b).ii. Make one temporary dynamic entry in the extended ACL, specifying that 
permitted user IP address as source address. 
b).iii. Execute the autocommand that is defined within the ACL. 
b ). iii.l. Allow the user specified in the dynamic ACL (that' s the source 
IP address configured dynamically) to access the inner network 
resources (that could be the IP address of the inner NAS port) . 
b ).iii.2. If a shutdown timer (idle timeout) is specified to allow a certain 
period of time for the Telnet access, and if that idle timeout is 
up before the user gets authenticated, the Telnet session closes 
and the user has to re-authenticate. 
If the user uses the Telnet connection and gets authenticated 
before the idle timeout is up, then the absolute timer takes effect 
and the dynamic access session closes with respect to the 
absolute timer. 
A few points need to be clarified about the steps mentioned above. 
These points are as follows: 
1. The user authentication can be either local (on the firewall router/NAS) or 
remote (through externat AAA server) 18 • This topic will be discussed in 
more details in the fo llowing section. 
18 Line password is another authentication option thal can theoretically be used by dynamic ACLs, 
however it is not used in real world environments, since ail users would be using the same password. 
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2. The dynamic entry is, as mentioned before, personalized according to each 
user ' s IP address. Thus each user will be either granted or denied access 
according to the organization's policies related to that user. However, the 
Lock-and-Key configuration itself, when performed on a specifie router's 
interface, doesn't allow a personalized access policy to each user in respect 
to the destination servers (inner network premises) allowed to that specifie 
user ( according to his user privileges ), exclu ding other disallowed 
premises 19• This is because Dynamic ACLs can only have one dynamic 
entty that must encompass all extemal users accessing the organization's 
resources . Thus, once authenticated, all users will have a dynamic entry 
ACL to allow them to access the same destinations (same premises) as 
configured in the Lock-and-Key ACL, even though they ' re using different 
source IP ad dresses to ac cess the very same destination ( organization ' s inn er 
resources). This is why Dynamic ACLs are usually used to securely connect 
a small number of remote users to an organization ' s bastion server, where 
they are configured. The bastion server is a network deviee that is designed 
and configured to withstand attacks. NAS routers and firewalls can be 
considered as bastion hosts due to their exposure to security attacks 
(Wikipedia - Bastion Host, 2012). Once connected to the bastion server, the 
users will then be able to access other organization inner resources (E-
Tutorials Lock-and-Key Configuration, 2012) . In the study, we will focus on 
Dynamic CLs implementation on the NAS router to directly access the 
organization ' s inn er re sources. 
3. The temporary access time period can be defined either as an idle timeout 
within the VTY configuration code, or as an absolute timeout. By the end of 
either timeouts, the temporary ACL entry, that will permit the limited time 
user access , will automatically disappear off the configuration, through the 
autocommand operation. However, if none of the timeouts is configured, the 
19 The persona lized user access policy will be discussed in detai ls in chapter 5, entitled 
"Authentication and Dynamic ACLs" . 
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remote user access period will be indefinite, as the temporary ACL entry 
will stay forever within the configuration, without being taken care of by the 
autocommand. In that case, the only way to take the temporary ACL entry 
off the configuration, will be by the network administrator, who will 
manually clears the Dynamic ACL entry off the configuration. 
The generic syntax for the dynamic entry of the Lock-and-key configuration is as follows: 
A global command for extended number Access lists (Cisco Configuring IP Access 
lists , 2007) : 
Access-list extended-A CL-number dynamic name {deny l permit) [protocol} 
{source-IP-address Source-Wildcard]any} { destination-IP-address destination-
Wildcardlany} [precedence precedence] [tos tos] [established] [Iogllogin-put] [operator 
destination-portldestination- port] 
The extended ACL has to be enabled on a given interface, so that it becomes 
functional. The interface on which it should be configured is the NAS external 
interface facing the internet. 
W e can specify the VTY (line) connection to configure Telnet, as follows : 
Line vty fin e-range 
Login local 
(Odom, 2009) 
Here, we mentioned the range of Telnet connecting !ines as well as the 
authentication method that will be performed as a result of such a connection. The 
authentication method used is local authentication, performed by this router. Other 
forms of authentication will be mentioned later in this chapter. 
In arder to better understand this syntax let's analyze an example ofDynamic ACLs. 
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3.5 Example ofDynamic ACLs using local authentication 
l 
2 
3 
In this section, we will demonstrate the configuration followed by a 
thorough explanation of the configuration code, as weil as an analysis of the 
dynamic ACLs mechanism. 
In the example, the organization needs to stop any access from reaching its 
resources, except through the use of Telnet and local authentication (authentication 
occurring locally on this NAS/firewall router) . Let's assume that a user using IP 
address 172.18.3.1 0 needs to log in remotely to the organization resources (host 
10.1.1.1), represented by the network 10.1.1.0 with network mask 255.255 .255 .0. 
This user will initially on1y be allowed to login using Telnet, in order to 
authenticate to the organization' s resources. Th en provided the authentication is 
successfu1, the user will be allowed complete access through the Lock-and-Key 
A CL. 
The configuration will look like the following: 
Interface Ethernet 0 
ip address 1 72.18 . 3.3 25 5 .255.255 . 0 
ip access-group 101 in 
1 Access-list 101 permit tep any host 172.18.3.3 eq telnet ( l ) 
Access - list 101 dynamic mylist timeout 100 permit ip 
any 10 . 1.1.0 0.0.0.255 ( 2 ) 
Line vty 0 
log in local ( 1 ) 
autocommand access-enable timeout 4 ( 2) 
Figure 3.2 Dynamic ACLs configuration using local authentication 
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Explanation of the Dynamic ACLs' example configuration: 
Part # 1 of the configuration corresponds to applying the Lock-and-key 
access list to the router ' s interface. The Lock-and-key ACL uses an Extended ACL; 
therefore, as previously explained, it will be applied to the router's interface facing 
the outside network, near the source packet to be examined. This interface is an 
Ethemet EO, having the IP address: 172.18.3.3. 
The direction of the packets to be examined is " in", so the extended ACL will match 
the packets as they go into this router ' s interface, from the outside network. 
Part # 2 of the configuration corresponds to defining the Extended ACL 
itself, globally on this router, rather than applying it exclusively on a specifie 
interface. The first command/statement # (1) permits any host to get a layer 4-
connection type using TCP only, and application connection (layer7) using Telnet 
only to the destination 172.18.3.3 , which is the telnet port of the NAS/firewall 
router. 
Command/statement # (2) in this Extended ACL is ignored until the lock-
and-key mechanism is triggered. lt corresponds to allowing the authenticated user 
referred by the key word "any", to dynamically access ail inner resources on 
network 10.1.1 .0 255.255.255.0, for a limited time of 100 minutes (absolute 
timeout) . 
Part # 3 of the configuration corresponds to the VTY line configuration 
(Te ln et configuration). In command # ( 1 ), the type of the authentication method to 
be used is specified: the authenticated is to be performed locally, directly by the 
router. 
Command # (2) in part 3 of the configuration, corresponds to an 
autocommand that is configured to trigger the dynamic ACL entry, creating it within 
the original extended ACL in part 2. That entry can be triggered only during an 
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active Telnet session where the user authentication has successfully taken place 
within a 4-minute period oftime (idle timeout) . 
The operation mechanism of the Dynamic ACLs' example configuration: 
The mechanism behind Dynamic ACLs consists of two distinct 
authentication processes that the user has to successfully go through in order to 
reach the inner organization resources. The first authentication process is to enable 
the user to start a Telnet connection with the NAS router. The second authentication 
process is to enable the user to start an IP connection to the organization's mner 
re sources. 
The mechanism will allow the following scenario to take place: once the 
user successfully enters his credentials during the first authentication process 
(Telnet, specified in part # 3), a Telnet connection is established with the NAS 
router. Next, the user is prompted to enter his credentials for the second 
authentication process where the router attempts to authenticate that user locally 
(part # 3, command (1)) . If the second authentication is successful, the 
autocommand (in part # 3 command (2)) executes, triggering a new generated 
"dynamic ACL entry" to be added into part # 2 of the configuration, and the Telnet 
session terminates. The authenticated user is theo allowed access to the organization 
resources through the generated dynamic ACL entry. Throughout our study, we will 
focus on the second authentication process, white discussing the security aspects of 
the Telnet connection (the first authentication process) as weltl0 . 
20 The topic of Authentication will be elaborated in details later in this chapter, as weil as in chapter 4 
and 5. 
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In this section we foc us on the mechanism of each part of the configuration code in 
more details: 
When looking at part 2 of the configuration, we can notice that, like in 
standard and extended IP ACLs, ail matching for the conditions stated in the ACL 
commands is made in a sequential order of these commands; and if still no match is 
found with the examined IP packet, an implicit deny ail is applied at the end of the 
ACL's body (after statement (2) in part# 2 of the ACL configuration) to discard that 
pack et. 
Tracing that ACL statement, any packet entering the router 's interface will 
be first checked for all the conditions in the first command/statement (1), which 
states a layer 4 connection type using TCP only, and application connection (layer7) 
using Telnet only to the destination 172.18.3.3, which is the telnet port of the 
NAS/firewall router If a match is obtained with all the conditions stated in that 
command, then the packet is considered as a match, and a Telnet access to the 
routers ' network will be allowed for that packet, opening a Telnet session for the 
user. If a packet doesn ' t match any of the conditions stated in the first command 
exactly, then no access is allowed and the packet is discarded by the interface. 
Since the second ACL statement (statement #2) of part # 2, will only be 
processed after the Telnet connection takes place, we will only proceed with 
explaining its operation after explaining the Telnet connection in pati # 3, which 
corresponds to the Telnet session itself including the autocommand that will trigger 
the Dynamic ACL entry itself, into part 2. Giving the precedence to part # 3 
explanation is important to understand the occurrence of the authentication process 
in the same sequence that actually happens during the ACLs filtering process. 
In part # 3, the autocommand is triggered only once the user authentication 
(2"d authentication) using the router succeeds, allowing the user access to the 
organization's inner resources. The autocommand creates the temporary ACL entry 
within part 2 of the configuration, which corresponds to the Dynamic entry "mylist" . 
The autocommand configuration states that the access will be enabled for a 
user who's been authenticated locally through NAS router (2"d authentication). 
However, as shown in part # 3, statement (2), that user has a window of only 4 
------------
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minutes, once he becomes authenticated21 ( l '1 authentication) and logged in through 
Telnet, to make use of the Telnet connection in arder to authenticate directly to the 
NAS router itself22 . If during that 4-minute session, there is no activity by the user, 
the Telnet session connection closes and the user has to authenticate again. 
This 4-minute timeout corresponds to the idle timeout for the user once he 
authenticates to use Telnet. However, if the user actually uses the Telnet connection 
to attempt to authenticate locally in arder to access the organization inner resources, 
within a 4 minute-window of time that starts at the moment he authenticates for the 
Telnet connection, the Telnet session will still terminale as weil. However, in case 
the user authentication to reach the resources is successful, closing the Telnet 
sess ion will only take place after triggering the autocommand, which will generate a 
temporary inbound access list entry on the router's interface, allowing access for the 
authenticated user through the firewall!router. 
Thus the idle timeout starts with the user authentication to use Telnet (the 
first authentication process), and te1minates either by exceeding that timeout period 
or by successfully authenticating to access the inner resources through the temporary 
ACL (the second authentication process). 
The maximum period of time for that temporary access through the ACL's 
opening is configured in the absolute timeout, which takes effect once the Telnet 
session terminates while the authenticated user is logged into the router. 
Once the absolute time is reached, the connection session permitted by the 
temporary dynamic ACL will close, and the dynamic entry is taken off the extended 
original ACL. The absolute timeout is mentioned in the extended ACL's body, in the 
command (2) of part# 2 of the configuration (timeout 100). If the user still needs 
extra connection ti me more th at the 100 minute-absolute timeout, he has to redo the 
whole process from scratch (using a Telnet connection to authenticate) . 
2 1 The user will be authenticated here only in arder to open up a Telnet session with the NAS router, 
wh ile not being allowed to access any other inner organization resources, ye t. 
22 The user will be authenticated here only in arder to be allowed access to the inner organization 
resources. 
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Coming back to the operation corresponding to the body of the Extended 
ACL, since the autocommand is triggered, a temporary ACL is entered as a 
complementary command for the command (2) of part # 2. The triggered dynamic 
entry will specify one or more IP address to be allowed access into the network 
specified in command (2) of part# 2 of the configuration. After the autocommand is 
triggered, the configuration of the Lock-an-Key ACL, is, in fact modified, so that the 
generated dynamic entry looks like figure 3-3: 
Interface Ethernet 0 
ip address 172.18.3.3 255.255.255.0 
ip access-group 101 in 
Access-1ist 101 permit tep any host 172.18.3.3 eq telnet (1) 
Access-1ist 101 dynarnic rnylist tirneout 100 permit ip 
any 10.1.1.0 0.0.0.255 (2) 
Line vty 0 
logln local 
autocornrnand access-enable tirneout 4 
Figure 3.3 Dynamic ACLs configuration including the Dynamic entry 
(1 ) 
( 2 ) 
According to figure 3-3, the new command in part # 2 of the ACL's body 
corresponds to the dynamic entry specifying the access permission for packets 
coming from the authenticated IP address 172.18 .3.1 0 into the firewall!router outer 
interface 172 .18.3.3. This command line is only added to the Lock-and-Key 
configuration after the user authenticates locally (the second authentication process) 
using the NAS router while using a Telnet connection and after the dynamic ACL 
entry is triggered through the autocommand (command (2) of part # 3). Triggering 
the dynamic entry is to allow access to one or more source IP addresses mentioned 
in the variable "mylist". This variable contains the results provided by the newly 
---------------------------------------------
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created dynamic entry (which allows access to the authenticated user 172.18.3.10), 
as we will see in figure 3-3. 
Then the Telnet connection drops so that the user can have his own ACL entry 
added to the configuration to allow him access to the organization's inner network 
10.1.1.0. 
3.6 Dynamic ACLs authentication 
Now that we introduced an example of Lock-and-Key ACLs usmg local 
authentication, let 's analyze other user authentication options that could be applied using 
Lock-and-Key ACLs. 
Lock-and-Key user authentication methods can be one of the following : 
1. The password command, on the Virtual Terminal VTY line, which is a port 
authentication requiring the same password for ail users establishing a Telnet 
connection to the NAS router. For obvious reasons, his authentication method is not 
recommended. 
2. The usemame command from the local database of the NAS router, as explained in 
the last configuration. This authentication method has its pros and cons and is more 
recommended than the previous method, for its relatively better security aspects. 
3. The Authorization, Authentication and Accounting (AAA) platform using an AAA 
ex tema! server like Terminal Ac cess Control Access Control System (TA CA CS+) 
or Remote Authentication Dia! In User servers (RADIUS) servers. This 
authentication method is sometimes referred to as "distant authentication", and is 
highly recommended, thus it will be explained in a following example. 
Ail three-authentication methods mentioned above will be analyzed in details in 
chap ter 5, entitled " Authentication and Dynamic ACLs". In the following section, we will 
demonstrate the authentication mechanism corresponding to each type of authentication 
method, whi le applied using Dynamic ACLs. 
The authentication mechanisms used within Dynamic ACLs depend on the 
situations where Dynamic ACLs are applied. The situations, altogether with the 
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corresponding authentication mechanisms (E-Tutorials - Lock-and-Key Overview, 2012), 
are as follows: 
1. When Dynamic ACLs are applied to allow/deny inner network temporary access to 
certain remote user(s) connecting through Telnet, the authentication of such users is 
either through the local firewall/router (NAS) or through another authentication 
server (AAA server). This application situation of Dynamic ACLs will be the focal 
point of this study. 
IL When Dynamic ACLs are applied to allow/deny certain inner hosts to access a 
specifie remote host/network, these inner hosts will be authenticated through an 
AAA server before allowing them to access the remote hosts/networks. This 
application situation is almost the opposite to the previous one. 
III. When Dynamic ACLs are applied to allow/deny a remote user, by comparing his 
credentials to a list of credentials located on a local database attached locally on the 
NAS/Firewall router. Configuring the NAS for that purpose will be through the 
following command: 
N AS( con fi g)# username userl ; 
N AS( config)# password helloAccess; 
Now that we introduced Dynamic ACLs using local authentication, as well as the 
different authentication methods that can be altemated and/or combined with the local 
authentication, it is worthwhile to introduce the authentication server authentication as a 
Dynamic ACL authentication method due to the wide use of this type of authentication, and 
due to the great security benefits it provides, as we will explain in details throughout the 
coming chapters. This type of authentication represents a distant authentication method, 
occurring on a deviee that is different than the NSA/firewall router (versus the local 
authentication method and the VTY authentication method with occur locally on the NAS 
router) . 
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3.7 Dynamic ACLs and Authentication Servers 
In this section we de scribe the authentication servers' concept in general and how they 
can interact, as a third authentication option, with Dynamic ACLs in order to obtain a 
secured remote user access. Thus we will start this section with a general overview about 
authentication severs followed a specifie example of Dynamic ACLs using authentication 
servers as an example of a robust authentication method that can be used within Dynamic 
ACLs. This will bring us to the importance of using Dynamic ACLs (combined with the 
authentication servers) versus only the authentication servers' security, alone. And finally, 
we analyze the configuration codes of authentication servers as used with Dynamic ACLs to 
secure remote user access. The detailed analysis of such codes will be a cornerstone for 
further analysis of other authentication server concepts that will be studied in the following 
chapters. 
3. 7.1 Authentication Server overview 
Authentication servers, which are s<Jmetimes called "authentication proxy"23 , were 
introduced in Cisco lOS software release 12.0.5.T to authenticate inbound and outbound 
users using a TACACS+ or a RADIUS AAA server24 . The AAA servers can be used either 
by themselves or accompanied by dynamic ACLs, which is the case researched in our study. 
AAA servers depend on the AAA paradigm, which separates the Authentication, 
Authorization and Accounting functions , allowing different configuration for each function, 
which provides flexibility to allow a becter control and more reliability of the network 
security process. These elements will be discussed in details in chapter 4 and 5. 
In order to reach the inner resources of a network secured by a Dynamic ACL using an 
AAA server authentication, the remote users are originally blocked by the NAS' dynamic 
23 lt is not recommended to use the « Authentication proxy» terminology in order to refer to AAA 
servers, as Authentication proxy mechanism is a little different than the AAA servers combined with 
Dynamic ACLs. 
24 Kerberos, as weil as DIAMETER, are also used as alternative authentication servers, along with 
RADIUS and TA CA CS . 
------------
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ACL, which only allows Telnet connections. Once that connection is established, a user bas 
to authenticate through an authentication server in order to reach the organization's inner 
resources. 
Authentication servers are based on a client/server architecture, where the client 
software resides on the network NAS/firewall router. Thus we will refer to the NAS router 
as "client". This router is in fact the access server situated at the boundary of the inner 
network, the one accepting access requests from remote users attempting to access the 
organization's resources located on the inner network. The Authentication Client Software, 
in sorne cases, can be distributed throughout the network. For the purpose of this study, we 
only consider the case where the client is located on NAS. 
The server software runs on a computer typically situated within the inner network of 
the organization, which we will refer to as the authentication server (the AAA server). The 
server receives access requests sent from the NAS (the client) , authenticates the remote users 
(referring to its local data base) and returns sorne configuration changes back to the client or 
to another authentication server (that will return them eventually to the client). 
Local 
data base 
Figure 3.4 
NAS 
Local 
data base 
The Authentication server (AS) and the Dynamic ACLs User Authentication 
pro cess. 
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According to figure 3-1 , let's assume a certain user, using the IP address 172.18.3.10, 
needs to login remotely to the organization resources, represented by the network 
1 0.1.1.0/24. The user establishes a Telnet connection, going through the organization's 
firewall, in order to authenticate through an authentication process done by the 
authentication server. The TA CA CS+ or RADIUS server, then, modifies the Lock-and-key 
ACL configuration, by sending additional ACLs entries to the NAS router (firewall) in order 
to allow the user 's access once the authentication process is done successfully. 
3.7.2 Dynamic ACLs need versus Authentication Servers 
N ow let' s ask the question, wh y do we need Dynamic ACLs, in the first place, if we already 
have the option of using authentication servers? 
The answer for this question lies in the capability of Dynamic ACL to create a temporary 
opening in the NAS router to allow access to the authenticated remote users, so that they can 
reach the organization's inner resources. Dynamic ACLs design allow choosing any of the 
authentication methods mentioned before (including authentication servers) , according to 
their application situation, their reliability, efficiency, and many other factors that will be 
explained in details in chapter 5, entitled "Authentication and Dynamic ACLs". 
Authentication servers by themselves help authenticate the user to allow resource access 
only to legitimate users. However that role doesn ' t specify a limited-time temporary access 
to the resources, that can dynamically terminale according to each resource specified access 
policies, as it is the case with Dynamic ACLs. 
As a conclusion, in order to get a dynamic time-controlled access , Dynamic ACLs should be 
implemented to secure the remote access to an organization, whether using the 
authentication servers as user authentication methods, or not. 
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3.8 Dynamic ACLs Configuration (using Authentication Servers) 
Now, let's think about the authentication server as an authentication method option to 
authenticate Dynamic ACLs' users, as shown by the following configuration: 
Dynamic ACLs configuration using proxy servers will follow the same 
configuration steps as the previous configuration, using Telnet authentication. Th.ese 
steps are as fo llows: 
Stepl : Creating an extended ACL, permitting Telnet and specifying a placeholder 
entry for the dynamic entry that will be created through the autocommand. 
Step 2: Specifying the authentication method used, which is one of the thiee options 
already mentioned above. 
Step 3: Enabling that authentication method, on the router's VTY line so that the 
router is able to create dynamic entries through the autocommand, on its interface 
that has the Lock-and-key reference (E-Tutorials- Lock-and-Key Overview, 2012). 
In order to configure the NAS router for Dynamic ACLs using TACACS+, the generic 
configuration code, according to Cisco (Cisco lOS Security Configuration Guide, 
Release 12.2-Configuring Authentication, 2006), is as follows: 
nas(config)# aaa new-rnodel 
nas(config)# tacacs-server host IP address 
nas(config)# tacacs-server key key 
nas(config)# aaa authentication login 
autbentication_ name group tacacs+ 
nas (config)# line vty 0 15 
nas(config- line )# login autbentication name 
1' \ 
1 •••• ! 
\ i 
This configuration starts by enabling the AAA security services globally on the NAS router, 
in command (1) . 
Command (2) is to specify the TACACS+ server(s) IP address (es) . 
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Command (3) is to specify the TA CA CS+ shared encryption key as a variable (ca lied key). 
Command ( 4) is to specify TACACS+ as the login authentication method, and the variable 
ca lied "authentication _na me" was substituted by the value called "group tacacs+", to indicate 
that the authentication method used is the TACACS+ authentication server, as we will see 
through the following detailed example. This command is also to enforce the use of the list 
of ali TA CA CS+ servers located in the organization' s inn er network wh en authenticating the 
remote user login. This command tine can be ended by the word "local", to indicate that in 
case the authentication through TACACS+ server(s) returns an error25 during the 
authentication process, then the authentication will be attempted using the local database on 
the NAS server itself. 
Command (5) is to enter a tine VTY mode and, it is essential to include ali VTY tines when 
authenticating Lock-and-Key access . 
Command (6), which is the last tine of the configuration, is to specify the authentication 
method used upon user login, and can be substituted by the following code: 
nas(config-line)# login tacacs+ 
Now let ' s consider an example in order to show how Dynamic ACLs can be configured to 
use authentication server authentication. 
25 An error during the authentication process may occur because the TA CA CS+ server is down or 
cannot be reached, as weil as any backup TACACS+ servers. An error is not the same as failed 
authentication which returns: access denied; in such case the user is denied the access and no attempts 
for further authentication are made by the NAS. 
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3.9 Example ofDynamic ACLs using authentication servers 
Internet 
TACACS+ 
172.18.23.21 
Figure 3.5 
(172.18.23 .9) 
The TACACS+ server and the Dynamic ACL's User authentication process 
The scenario through which the user will access the inner network resources will be 
almost the same as we saw with the last example using Dynamic ACLs with local 
authentication. According to figure 3-2, the remo te user, say at IP address 172.18.21.1 0, will 
start his connection by establishing a Telnet session with the NAS interface 172.18.21.2. The 
Dynamic ACL will only allow such a VTY connection and the authentication method 
described within the VTY connection will be followed. The VTY connection will follow a 
default authentication method attempting to authenticate the user using the first TACACS+ 
server available 172.18.23 .21. In case the authentication process is successfully performed 
by the TACACS+ server (which means no etTors are returned from the server), and the user 
is successfully authenticated as weil (which means his privileges allow him access to the 
inner resources and his credentials were correct) , the user will be allowed access to reach the 
organizations inner resources allowed by the dynamic ACL. 
This scenario might differ slightly in case the first TACACS+ server (172.18.23.21) 
is not available, in case the authentication using ail TA CA CS+ servers returned errors, or in 
case the user could not authenticate, as his credentials are not valid. Such situations will be 
explained in details in chapter 4, entitled "User Authentication". 
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The configuration ofDynamic ACLs using authentication servers on the NAS router 
is represented by an example developed by Cisco (Cisco lOS Security Configuration Guide, 
Release 12.2-Configuring Lock-and-Key Security, 2006) within a specifie implementation 
situation, where the network access is through ISDN. Renee the configuration includes a 
BRI-ISDN interface, in order to address such specifie needs. The BRI-ISDN interface details 
are out of the scope of our study, thus we will not analyze such details amongst our in-depth 
analysis for the configuration code. 
The NAS router configuration will be as follows : 
aaa new model 
aaa authentication login defau1t group tacacs+ enable 
aaa accounting exec stop-only group tacacs+ 
aaa accounting network stop- only group tacacs+ 
enable password ciscotac 
isdn switch-type basic-dms100 
interface ethernetO 
ip address 172.18.23.9 255.255.255.0 
interface BRI 0 
ip address 172.18.21.1 255.255.255.0 
encapsulation ppp 
dia1er idle-timeout 3600 
dia1er wait-for-carrier-time 100 
d ia l er map ip 172.18.21 .2 name Diana 
d ial er-group 1 
i sdn spid1 2036333715291 
isdn spid2 2036339371566 
(1 ) 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 
( 4 ) 
( 5 ) 
( 6 ) 
( 7 ) 
( 8 ) 
( 9 ) 
(1 0 ) 
( 11 ) 
(12 ) 
(13 ) 
( 14 ) 
(1 5) 
( 1 6 ) 
(17 ) 
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ppp authentication chap 
ip access-group 102 in 
access-list 102 permit tep any host 172.18.21.2 eq telnet 
access-list 102 dynamic testlist timeout 15 permit ip any 
any 
ip route 172.18.250.0 255 .255. 255.0 172.18.21.2 
priority-list 1 interface BRIO high 
tacacs-server host 172.18.23.21 
tacacs-server host 172.18.23.14 
tacacs-server key test1 
tftp-server rom alias all 
dialer-list 1 protocol ip permit 
line con 0 
password cisco 
line aux 0 
line VTY 0 4 
autocornrnand access-enable timeout 5 
password cisco 
( 18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24 ) 
(25 ) 
( 2 6) 
(27 ) 
(28 ) 
( 2 9) 
( 30 ) 
( 31 ) 
(32 ) 
( 33) 
(34) 
From the configuration code above, we can see that the Lock-and-key is configured directly 
on the NAS router, then it is applied to the BRI interface. The configuration commands are 
explained as follows: 
• Command ( 1) corresponds to: enabling the AAA security services globally on the 
NAS router. 
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• Command (2), (3) and (4) correspond to: specifying the AAA functions to be used 
once a user logs in. In particular, once the user is logged in (via a Telnet 
connection), he will be authenticated through TA CA CS+ servers. 
• Command (5) corresponds to: defining the enable password used on this router. 
• Command (6) corresponds to: configuring the ISDN switch type, in order to match 
the service provider switch type. The ISDN switch is the same switch where the BRI 
0 interface is located to connect to the ISDN line coming from the Internet. 
• Commands (7) and (8) correspond to: defining the NAS router inner interface IP 
address (the Ethernet interface facing the organization's network). 
• Commands (9) to (19) correspond to: defining the BRI NAS interface. Since the 
detailed examination of this portion of code is unnecessary in order to ela borate the 
configuration of Dynamic ACLs using AAA servers, we will explain it quickly 
without going through a lot of details . The explanation is as follows: 
• Command ( 1 0) de fines the interface IP address. 
• Command (11) defines the interface encapsulation. 
• Command (12) to (16) define the interface dialer, which is the remote host from 
which the remote users will dia! in the BRI interface. Assigning the interface to a 
dial-in group helps controlling access into the interface. The mapping of the dial-in 
group into the BRI interface will transfer the functions of such group to the BRI 
interface. Thus, though the dynamic ACL is really to allow Telnet connection into 
the dial-in interface, it will be transferred into the BRJ interface. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Command ( 17) and ( 18) are to are to specify a service profile identifier and a local 
directory number to the B 1 channel. 
Command ( 19) is to apply the Dynamic ACL 102 onto the BRI interface . 
Command (20) corresponds to defining a statement for access list 102, allowing on! y 
Telnet traffic to the dial-in interface. 
Command (21) corresponds to defining another statement for the same access list 
allowing only authenticated users (through TACACS+) to access any of the inner 
network resources for a maximum duration of 15-minute absolute timeout period. 
Command (22) corresponds to defining the routing path for network traffic . 
Command (23) corresponds to defining the BRI interface priority . 
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• Command (24) , (25) and (26) correspond to defining both TA CA CS+ servers. 
Having two TA CA CS servers is helpful for redundancy purposes. 
• Command (27) corresponds to defining the Transfer File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) 
server. 
• Command (28) corresponds to associating the dialer group number with an access 
list number. 
• Command (29) and (30) coiTespond to defining the password for the console 
connection into the NAS router. 
• Command (31) corresponds to defining the auxiliary connection into the N AS 
router. 
• Command (32) corresponds to defining the VTY connection. 
• Command (33) corresponds to defining the autocommand to be triggered from 
within the VTY connection in case the user is successfully authenticated within a 5-
minute idle timeout period. 
• Command (34) CO!Tesponds to defining the VTY connection password. 
The mechanism that takes place while a user tries to login is as follows: 
l. The user at IP address 172.18.21.10 will attempt to access the BRI interface, the 
ACL defined on the interface (in command (19) will only allow him to Telnet to the 
dial-in interface, where he enters the VTY password specified in command (34) in 
order to establish a Telnet connection. 
2. Once the connection is established, the user has only 5 minutes to enter his 
credentials forT A CA CS+ authentication before the Telnet session terminates. 
3. The authentication method mentioned in command (2) specifies TACACS+ to be 
used, so TA CA CS+ servers (in command (24) and (25)) have to be tried one after 
another in case any retumed an error. The command also mentions enable as a 
second authentication method, so the user has to be prompted for the enable 
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password in command ( 5) in case ail TA CA CS+ servers are not available to perform 
the authentication. Once the user is authenticated successfully the autocommand in 
command (33) within the VTY connection will be triggered. 
4. The autocommand will add a temporary dynamic ACL statement to ACL 102 
mentioning the remote user !P address and the inner resources to be allowed to him, 
which are the same resources allowed by the original ACL statement (in command 
(21 )). The statement will look like: 
"access-list 102 permit ip host 172. 18.21.10 any" 
The statement will be placed after command (19) and before command (20). 
The user will be disconnected if he uses the organization ' s inner resources more than 
15 minutes as mentioned in the absolu te timeout of command (21 ). 
Now that we explained Dynamic ACLs using both local authentication method as weil as 
TA CA CS+ authentication as an AAA server authentication method, the reader can have a 
better understanding about dynarnic ACLs in general, which was the main purpose of this 
chapter. The following chapter will consider user authentication methods in details , 
explaining how they take place and analyzing the main differences about their techniques. 
In general, chapter 3 can be considered as a continuation of chapter 2, introducing 
one more type of IP ACLs. However, since this specifie type is the main concem of the 
research, a whole chapter was needed in order to thoroughly study its rn chanism, the way it 
is applied and the different options related to its application. 
Thus the chapter provides an in-depth explanation of the concepts related to 
Dynamic ACLs through a deep theoretic analysis as weil as through developing detailed 
configuration codes that will help draw the focus of the reader towards the smallest details of 
the implementation and the operation methodology of the concepts introduced, in order to 
better understand the mechanism behind each detail, and the potential security issues it 
might represent, in order to further emphas ize these issues in the following chapters. Thus, 
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the chapter, in brief, introduces the Dynamic ACLs as a concept, stressing on its mechanism 
in general, as weil as while using different authentication options. 
In details , the chapter starts by providing a thorough explanation of Dynamic ACLs 
purpose, usage and mechanism. Then the chapter introduces the concept of Dynamic ACLs 
authentication, starting with the local authentication details, emphasized by a detailed 
configuration example; and en ding by the authentication servers (ex te mal) authentication, 
followed by a comparison with authentication servers, in arder to emphasize the importance 
of Dynamic ACLs creating a temporary access to the remote user; and emphasized by a 
detailed configuration example of Dynamic ACLs application along with authentication 
servers. Analyzing Dynamic ACLs along with its detailed operation and configuration along 
with the local and the external configuration method, in this chapter, helps understanding the 
detailed mechanisms of these concepts and thus allows for more analysis in the following 
chapters, in arder to easily pinpoint the related security issues related to such concepts. 
CHAPTERIV 
USER AUTHENTICA TION 
4.1 The user authentication and the AAA paradigm 
In a standalone, isolated system, identifying users ts easily perforrned through 
recognizing the persons physically accessing the system, thus system data and resources are 
easily protected through the physical system protection procedures. However, in a time-
sharing multi-user environrnent as weil as a networked environment, other security 
procedures must be applied. User access mies must be set for each user, and thus, each user 
must be identified by secure means. 
There are three approaches to implement on a given system once a user attempts to 
access it. These approaches are as follows: 
1. User will be allowed access right away; 
2. User will be allowed access only after providing his identity and will be tmsted by 
the system; 
3. User will be allowed access only after providing his identity and will be asked to 
prove it by the system; 
The first approach is used in closed environments where ali system machines are under 
control, of the persons physically situated in the system environment. 
The second approach is used in more open environments for hosts (with known IP 
addresses) that are under organizational control (rlogin and rsh programs are used by these 
hosts' users). 
The third approach is used in what's more likely the usual environment for today ' s systems, 
where being networked means having a functional/productive system. Thus the users on the 
network cannot be classified by their physical location or by their IP addresses (which are 
constantly changing), hence the need for the user authentication process in order to 
guarantee the security of computer systems. 
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Th us , Authentication is the process that insures that the person (or product) is who 
he claims to be, regardless of the access rights he's entitled to. According to the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST- Electronic Authentication Guideline, 2006) 
Authentication refers to three different classes/factors that can determine that a person is 
really who he claims to be: 
1- Ownership factor: when the user owns something that would help him authenticate 
(ID card, wristband, security token, phone or ce li phone) 
2- Knowledge factor: when the user knows something that would help him authenticate 
(password, persona! ID number) ; 
3- Inherence factor: when the user 1s or does something that would help him 
authenticate (Biometrie identifier, persona! signature, bioelectric signais or a 
combination of these ). 
Two factor authentication: might require the user to use one of the ownership factors along 
with one of the knowledge factor. In other cases, where very highly secured systems are to 
be reached, a combination of biometrie factors could be required along with one of the 
knowledge factor in order to grant access to the user. 
Authentication is one of the three main processes to be done by an Authorization, 
Authentication and Accounting (AAA) paradigm, as it is obvious from its name. According 
to the IETF (IETF- RFC 2309- Generic AAA Architecture, 2000), the AAA paradigm 
provides three main network security features, needed to guarantee the safety of any remo te 
access communication. The features are as follows: 
1- Authentication, to specify which users are permitted access to the organization 
network, and to allow their access. 
User authentication takes place when a user first logs in to a network, and might be 
configured to take place only in cases where the user attempts to access certain types 
of services, network servers or extra user privileges . 
User authentication is a process upon which authorization (granting a privilege to 
the user), privacy (hiding information from unauthorized users) as weil as non-
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repudiation (the inability to deny an authorized action that has taken place based 
upon the authentication process) depend (Wikipedia, 2012). 
2- Authorization, to specify which network resources are permitted for each user's 
access, once that user is authenticated. U sually the user Authorization process 
follows the user Authentication process. Since Authorization might not be 
configured, the user will be considered in this case, as having the same 
authentication as non-authorized users . However, in case the authorization is 
configured, while being preceded by a successful user authentication process, the 
user authorization will be applied according to the user corresponding profile. In 
sorne cases, the user profile might take place as a dynamic process when integrated 
with connection negotiations, like in PPP connections using TA CA CS server 
Authorization process, where both user authentication and user authorization 
processes are separately negotiated and integrated. In sorne other cases, user 
authentication and user authorization are both inseparably coupled using the user 
profile, like in the case of RADIUS server, as will be explained in Chapter 5. 
3- Accounting, to monitor the network access and activities for alllogged in users. The 
Accounting process usually follows the user Authorization process. It can be used 
for accounting/billing for the organization network services used or for network 
activity auditing and security. Certain fields can indicate the beginning, continuation 
or termination of the ervice to be billed. 
The AAA paradigm enforces a distinction of the three AAA functions in order to 
guarantee the flexibility and reliability of the implementation. Since each function will take 
place independently and can be performed rigorously by different independent servers, each 
of which configured differently; or they can even be skipped sometimes, depending on the 
needs for the implementation situation . . 
Such flexibility offered by the AAA paradigm, due to the separation of the AAA 
functions, would help us imagine the AAA paradigm as a framework or a cloud that 
encompasses the concept of independent security functions situated on one or more 
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authentication server (of the same type or different types) , with which the NAS has to 
communicate in order to apply such security functions . Such a concept can be explained by 
figure 4-1, which represents the N AS re la ting to the AAA functions from a service 
· perspective rather than from connection prospective. 
Security servers 
.... 
AAA Paradigm 
... 
""" 
,.. TACACS+or 
RADIUS or 
N AS/ Access R outer 
Kerberos 
v 
Figure 4.1 
paradigm 
The relationship between the NAS and the security servers through the AAA 
As shown by figure 4-1, The AAA paradigm is the means through which the 
organization can establish a secure communication between the Network Access Server 
(NAS/Firewall router) and the security servers . The AAA paradigm uses protocols like 
TACACS, Kerberos and RADIUS to administer its security functions during a connection 
between a client (like the NAS router) and any of the TACACS+, Kerberos, or RADIUS 
servers respectively. 
As we introduced the three main functions of the AAA paradigm, it is important to 
know that the success of the Authorization and the Accounting processes totally depend on a 
successful Authentication process. Practically, once the user attempts to log into the network 
for a certain service, his identity is provided and approved by the authentication process, 
then his user privilege will be set according to that identity, specifying the types of services 
he's allowed to access through the Authorization process and then he can be billed for such 
services according to the amount and duration they were provided through the Accounting 
process. 
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Out of the three AAA functions, we will ex plain, in this chapter, the authentication 
concept, along with the different authentication methods ( excluding local and line 
authentication26) that can be combined within Dynamic ACLs remote access process, in 
arder to understand the different mechanisms they rely upon. Also we will demonstrate the 
means to combine them, and how to configure the NAS router in order to alternate between 
then as redundant security processes. 
This chapter will help us better classify these authentication methods, compare them and 
suggest their combinations in different ways, within Dynamic ACLs, in arder to ensure the 
redundancy of the authentication process. 
The most important authentication methods that can be used to secure the Dynamic 
ACLs ' remote access process is through the implementation of servers that abide to the 
AAA paradigm concepts. These servers are called " authentication servers" . The 
authentication servers are to provide a proper user authentication, which would allow ali 
network deviees to tmst that user's access. In the following we will describe the term 
"Authentication Server", then we will describe the different types of these servers. 
4.2 Authentication server (AS) 
The Authentication server (AS) is a central server, within an organization network, that is 
available to ali the networked routers, switches and even servers for authenticating user. An 
AS is usually part of the AAA paradigm, thus providing the three main AAA functions for 
the networked deviees using it. Also, the AS operates within the framework of client/server 
architecture, where the client is usually the NAS through which the remote user logs into the 
organization network, and the AS will authenticate that user in order to give him access to 
the network. This server is usually referred to as Authentication Server (AS), and it is the 
last deviee involved in the connection between an organization's inner network and the 
organization's remote users. 
26 Line authentication and local authentication will be explained in details in chapter 5, entitled 
"Authentication and Dynamic ACLs" . 
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The following figure will help the reader better visualize the NAS, AS and client 
relationship; as follows : 
Internet 
AS 
(server) 
Figure 4.2 
NAS (client) 
User 
~.· .0 ·· .. ~) 
The Authentication server (AS) and the user authentication process 
The AS can actually allow many remote users to connect to the same inner 
organization resource. However, since Dynamic ACLs mechanism doesn't allow securing a 
large number of connections, when combining AS within dynamic ACLs ' authentication, 
securing connections will only be limitted to one remote user entry per each VTY line 
connecting to the inner network resources. Hence the number of connections can only be up 
to the number of the VTY !ines. Dynamic ACLs nature is not scalable, that 's the reason why 
it limits the scalability aspects of AAA servers27 . 
A strong authentication, as approached and defined by many organizations, relies on 
a layered architecture of authentication points where many techniques are used to reach a 
certain authentication security leve!. Thus , an organization canuse Dynamic ACLs as a fi rst 
point of authentication, while combining them with other security techniques (like AAA 
servers) as further points of authentication. Thus AAA servers can be used as being both 
Dynamic ACLs authentication servers to authenticate the use access through the NAS router, 
27 The scalability subject will be further explained in chapter 5, entitled "Authentication and Dynamic 
ACLs". 
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on one hand, and/or as further authentication points after allowing user access through the 
Dynamic ACLs on the other hand. In this chapter we will exclusively focus on 
authenticating the user access through Dynamic ACLs using the AAA servers, using such 
servers as possible redundant authentication method in order to create an authentication error 
recovery process. In chapter 5, an example of AS as multiple-layer authentication using 
Dynamic ACLs will be introduced. 
Now, we will introduce the different authentication servers used. However, in order 
to better understand the concept of authentication, there are sorne authentication approaches 
that sometimes are used within the mechanism of the authentication servers, and it is 
important to introduce these approaches beforehand in order to better understand the 
authentication servers' mochanism. 
4.3 Approaches that are sometimes associated with the authentication process 
The first and second approaches represent different mechanisms to rece1ve the 
remo te user credentials b)' the AS server; the third approach describes the layer-2 connection 
protocol that supports the fourth and fifth approaches; the forth and fifth approaches 
represent two authentication protocols, one of them applies the first approach introduced, 
and the other applies the second approach. The last approach represents a way to implement 
the AAA servers within the organization network. 
These authentication approaches are as follows: 
1- Challenge response . 
2- One Time Password (OTP). 
3- ppp 
4- PAP. 
5- CHAP. 
6- Proxy servers . 
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4.3.1 Challenge/response 
The authentication server (AS) can be configured to accept different types of user 
credentia1s, in order to authenticate the user. These types depend on the mechanism to be 
followed by the server to interpret and process the user's credentia1s. The two main types of 
user credentials are: 
1- Regular passwords, which need 1ess processing (than challenge/response) by the 
server. Sorne connection authentication protoco1s are based on this approach, 1ike 
PPP-PAP, as we will introduce in the following section. 
2- Challenge/response, which needs a certain mechanism to be interpreted and 
processed by the server. Sorne connection authentication protocols are based on this 
approach, like PPP-CHAP. In this section we will thoroughly explain that 
mechanism. 
When the server IS configured for challenge/response, the user supposed to 
authenticate using such a method, is usually pre-equipped with an extemal deviee on which 
he enters sorne numbers. The deviee performs sorne encryption for the numbers entered by 
the user. That deviee would be either a smart card or a security software, provided through 
the organization 's network, in order to allow that encryption process. 
----------------------------------------~ 
The Challenge/response mechanism 
Access Challenge Packet 
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According to figure 4-3, when the user attempts to access the organization's inner 
network, he sends an Access Request to the NAS, and he receives an unpredictable number 
(challenge) that he's expected to encrypt (using an extemal deviee) and to send the 
encrypted result back to the authentication server (AS) through the NAS router, in the form 
of a new Access Request. 
The challenge sent to the user is a non-repeating pseudorandom number, originally 
generated by an authentication server (AS), which knows the type of the authenticator deviee 
that the user uses to authenticate. Thus the challenge generated by the AS server changes 
every time the user attempts to authenticate; and since the credentials to be entered by the 
user (the response) are based on the value of the challenge encrypted through the user 
deviee, then these credentials will change also every time the user authenticates. In other 
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words, the user response continuously keeps adapting to the different challenges generated 
by the AS server. 
The encrypted response provided by the user, which is the encrypted resuit calculated 
using the deviee, will be the first value that the server (AS) will use to authenticate that user. 
The second value will be generated by the AS server, through performing the same 
encryption (as the one calculated by the user's deviee) for the challenge that was originally 
sent to the user. 
If the encrypted response entered by the user (the first value) matches the encryption 
that the AS server expects (the second value), then an Access-Accept is sent to the user. 
Otherwise, if a wrong encryption is received, then the user gets an Access-Reject message 
for his access attempt through the NAS. 
The steps for the challenge/response authentication process within the organization network 
boundaries are as foliows: 
1- The user attempts to access a resource belonging to an organization inner network, 
by sending an Access-Request packet to the NAS router. 
2- The NAS sends an Access-Request packet to the AS server, inc luding a request ID, 
aNAS Identifier and a port number as weil as a user name and password (that were 
included in the user ' s Access-Request). 
3- The AS server sends an Access Challenge Packet, inciuding a State attribute and a 
Reply-Message, towards the user. The repiy message is basically a text message to 
be shown to the user indicating his challenge number and prompting him to enter the 
encrypted response corresponding to that challenge. The state attribute helps the AS 
server correiate between the challenge number, sent to the user within the Access 
Challenge Packet, and the encrypted repiy to be sent by the user to match the 
encryption of that challenge number. 
4- The user uses his externat deviee to get the encrypted response, and enters that 
response at the prompt (on the user client). 
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5- The NAS sends a new Access-Request to the AS server including a new request ID, 
a NAS Identifier and a port number as weil as a user name and password. The latter 
is the encrypted response entered by the user. This new Access-Request also 
includes the same State attribute that was included in the Access-Challenge. 
6- The AS server calculates the required value to which the user's response will be 
compared. Thus the AS server encrypts the challenge that was sent to the user, and 
keeps that value as a required value. 
7- The AS server sends an Access-Accept or an Access-Reject based on whether the 
encrypted value entered by the user matches the required value. In sorne cases, 
according to each organization's need, the externat server (RADIUS server) sends 
another Access-challenge, with a new number to encrypt. 
4.3.2 One Time password (OTP) 
A one Time Password (OTP) is another type password that is used only during 
one login session or one transaction, in order to avoid the security vulnerabilities of 
traditional static passwords. Though they require higher technology to generate and to 
implement, OTPs are reliable since they are only valid for a short time period. 
OTPs are based on a time synchronization process between the client 
providing the password and the authentication server, and each OTP is generated as a 
new password based on a previous password using a mathematical algorithm 
involving a challenge (number) and/or a counter originated from the authentication 
server or the authentication process itself. Thus sequential OTPs are generated as a 
chain, and are used in a predefined order. 
In order to inform the user about the next OTP to be used, new OTPs can be 
displayed on the user's security tokens that generate them, on the user's cel! phone 
using a special software that generates them, on the user's cel! phone white being sent 
through an SMS message as they are generated on the Authentication server side, or 
as a printed password on a paper carried by the user. 
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Now that we explained response/challenge as weil as OPTs, let's introduce two 
authentication approaches/protocols that are sometimes used within authentication server 
mechanisms, including AAA servers. These layer-2 protocols are mainly used to 
authenticate the connection between the NAS as a client and the AAA server, in case when 
the AAA client/server connection is a layer 2-PPP. 
These protocols are: 
v' Password Authentication Protocol P AP 
v' Challenge Handshake Authentication protocol CHAP. 
In this section, we will explain PPP connections before we highlight PAP and CHAP 
authentication methods in details. 
4.3.3 Point-to-Point connections (PPP) 
According to Tom's notes (IETF- RFC 1662, 1994), layer-2 Point to Point 
connections are link access procedures that are considered as one of the derivatives of the 
Cisco proprietary High-Level Data Link Control (HDLC) protocol, which is the main 
signaling standard used by W AN links. 
Point to Point Protocol (PPP) has a layered architecture and is made of two sub protocols: 
1. Link Control Protocol (LCP): to set up a PPP link. 
2. Network Control protocol (NCP): To configure each of the OSI network layer 
protocols (for example, IP control protocol will be used to Control the OSI network 
layer IP protocol. 
The LCP is responsible for PPP connection authentication, using PAP or CHAP, link 
compression, error detection, multilink support and Joad balancing, and PPP cali back, which 
is requesting the other remote deviee to caU back in order to establish the connection; thus it 
wou id increase the security of the link. 
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In order to establish a PPP connection, three steps have to take place in the following order: 
~ Link establishment: where LCP frames are used to configure the link. 
~ Authentication: as an optional phase where the link is authenticated for 
security, using PAP or CHAP. 
~ Network layer protocol: where the network layer protocols are configured. 
(IETF- RFC 1662, 1994) 
Now let's explain PPP authentication protocols in details. 
4.3.4 Password Authentication Protocol (PAP) 
PAP is one of the two authentication protocols used with PPP connections, and it is 
based on the regular password approach. In order to establish a P AP authenticated session, 
the remote station's PAP keeps sending the usemame and password repeatedly until the 
NAS acknowledges it as correct, or otherwise terminates the session. According to E-How 
(E-How - What Are the Different Authentication Protocols, 2012), during a PPP-PAP 
connection, the usemame and password are sent in plain text, th us P AP authentication is not 
considered as a secure PPP connection. 
To establish a PPP-PAP connection, once the NAS receives the PAP usemame and 
password, it includes them into an Access-Request packet that it sends to the AS server. The 
Access-Request packet also includes other attributes informing the AS server that a PPP 
service is expected. 
These attributes are such as : 
Service-Type=Framed-User 
Framed-Protocol= PPP 
Once the AS server receives this information, it looks up the user by the usemame in 
the server 's database, and checks if the password sent by the NAS matches the password 
104 
expected. If match is found, the AS server sends an Access-Accept to the user through the 
NAS. Otherwise, an Access-Reject is sent. 
4.3 .5 Challenge Handshake Authentication protocol (CHAP) 
CHAP is the second authentication protocol used with PPP connections. 1t is based 
on the challenge/response approach in arder to authenticate a user or host (remote 
workstation) to an AS. CHAP authentication is based on a shared secret (like the client' s 
user password)28 , which is al ways encrypted. CHAP also uses an incrementally changing 
identifier and a variable challenge value. In arder to establish a CHAP authenticated session, 
a three way-handshake has to take place between the NAS and the remote station. It starts by 
a challenge sent from the NAS to the remote workstation 's router. Then the router uses the 
user ' s password and the challenge received to calculate a checksum, using a one-way hash 
function to be sent back to the NAS. Then the NAS checks if the checksum is correct 
(according to the AS server authentication) , and accordingly allows the connection, or drops 
it. There is always a limit for the numbers of trials received from the remote station's 
routers, which further limits the security risks. During a PPP-CHAP connection, the 
usemame, password and ali data are sent between parties as an encrypted code, thus CHAP 
authentication is considered as a secure PPP connection. 
CHAP authentication process can be detailed as follows : 
To establish a PPP-CHAP connection, the NAS generates a random challenge to the 
user (CHAP Challenge). The user response includes a usemame, a CHAP ID and a CHAP 
challenge response. The CHAP ID and a CHAP challenge response represent the CHAP 
Password that the NAS would send, along with the usemame, within the Access-Request 
packet to the AS server. The Access-Request packet would also include other attributes 
informing the AS server that a CHAP service is expected. These attributes are such as: 
28 CHAP secret is referred he re by the ward "password" si nee it is mostly based on the user 
password, in an encrypted form. 
Service-Type=Framed-User 
Framed- Protocol= CHAP 
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Once the AS server receives this information, it looks up the user by the username 
and gets the corresponding password, and hashes it along with the CHAP ID and the CHAP 
challenge using MD5. Thus the user authentication dictates the presence of two main 
hashing processes, one is done by the user 's router in order to conceal the entered user 
credentials (in a form of a checksum), and the other is done by the AS server in order to 
calculate a hash result based on the information already available in its database. This latter 
result is to be considered as a trusted reference, crucial for the authentication mechanism 
done by the AS for that specifie user. 
The AS server then, compares the hash result with the corresponding hash received 
from the user through the NAS. If a match is found, the AS server sends an Access-Accept 
to the user through the NAS. Otherwise, an Access-Reject is sent. 
According to E-How (E-How - What Are the Different Authentication Protocols, 2012), 
CHAP requires that the user CHAP password to be available to the AS server in clear text 
f01mat, so that the server would be able to hash the CHAP challenge and compare the result 
to the CHAP response. 
In case where the AS server is unable to perform the requested user authentication, 
due to any reason, an Access-Reject is sent as authentication result. 
Now that we explained the authentication protocols performed with PPP 
connections, let's introduce the concept of proxy servers. A proxy server, like the previous 
approaches introduced, is an approach that defines the security design and mechanism of a 
given network, and can be applied with ali types of authentication servers. Therefore, it is 
important to thoroughly explain this approach before we get to explain the different types of 
authentication servers. 
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4.3.6 Proxy Server 
Proxy servers are regular authentication servers, based on client/server architecture, 
where the NAS is the client. However, in the proxy server case, the NAS sends an access 
request to the forwarding server (an authentication server). The latter forwards the access 
request to a remote server (another authentication server), where the authentication takes 
place. An Access-Accept, Access-Reject, or an Access-challenge is generated by the remote 
server, and forwarded to the forwarding server, which will then forwards it back to the NAS. 
Proxy state attributes contained in the forwarded packets must not modify the forwarding 
server behavior, must not be modified by the forwarding server, and must not be omitted 
from the packets to be sent to the NAS (client). 
Using proxy servers allows roaming, which is a feature perrnitting users of more 
than one device/server to connect to either device ' s network (realrn) to get the same service 
at any point in time. Choosing the device/server that will receive the forwarded request, and 
thus will provide the service depends on either aspect of the following: 
The authentication realm, which may be a part of the network access identifier. 
• The configuration of the forwarding server. 
An authentication server can be both: a forwarding server (for sorne realms) as weil 
as a remote server (providing authentication for other realms) at the same time. A forwarding 
server can forward access requests to one or more forwarding server, creating a chain of 
proxies, which ends with a remote server that provides authentication for any number of 
realms. In order to perform its functions securely, the forwarding server encrypts ali 
messages received or transmitted; thus the server has to share a secret with the deviees it 
forwards the authentication messages to and from . Thus, let's consider a network with a 
NAS router, a forwarding server and a remote server that authenticates the remote users 
Jogging through the router. The forwarding server will share a secret with the NAS router as 
weil as different secret with the remote server, in order to avoid forwarding the user 
authentication messages to rogue deviees. Before forwarding the user authentication request 
and response between the NAS and the remote server, the forwarding server has to 
authenticate the messages with the different shared secret corresponding to each deviee. 
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In more details, proxy servers function according to the following steps: 
l- The NAS sends an encrypted Access-Request to the forwarding server. 
2- The forwarding server, already having a secret shared with the NAS, decrypts the 
user password using that shared secret. Any other attributes must not be modified by 
the forwarding server, from point of view contents, or place-order in the packet. The 
forwarding server might be configured not to send sorne attributes to the remote 
server, however all state attributes must be sent back to the NAS. The forwarding 
server might choose to add one (and no more than one) more proxy-state attribute to 
the packet. 
3- The forwarding server already having a secret shared with the remote server re-
encrypts the user password using that shared secret, and forwards the Access-
Request to the remo te server (or to other pro x y forwarding servers). 
4- Once the remote server becomes the final destination, it authenticates the user using 
the user password or the CHAP password and returns the authentication result: 
Access-Accept, Access-Reject, or an Access-challenge, included in a Response-
Packet to the forwarding server. 
All Proxy-State attribute that were originally included in the Access-Request that 
reached the remote server must be copied in the same order into the Access-
Response to be sent by the remote server to the forwarding server. 
5- Once the Response-Packet reaches the forwarding server, the latter authenticates the 
remote server first in order to make sure it is not a rogue server, by verifying the 
Response Authenticator attribute, using the secret shared with the Remote server. In 
case that the authentication faits, the Response-Packet will be discarded. Otherwise, 
the forwarding server will remove th.e last Proxy-State attribute, sign29 the Response 
Authenticator, encrypt the transmitted packets using the secret it shares with the 
NAS (so that the NAS would not identify the forwarding server as a rogue server 
29 When a deviee signs a packet, it is to prove the deviee legitimate identification for the other deviees 
that will handle that packet latter, so that these deviees won ' t consider the original deviee as 
illegitimate. 
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either), restore the Identifier which relates the Access-Response to the original 
Access-Request sent by the NAS, and finally send the access-Response to the NAS. 
Now that we explained the different security approaches to be used with authentication 
servers, let' s introduce in this section, sorne of the AAA authentication servers/protocols in 
details . 
4.4 AAA authentication servers/protocols 
The protocols introduced are: 
1. RADIUS . 
2. DIAMETER. 
3. TACACS+. 
4. Kerberos. 
4.4.1 Remote Authentication Dial In User Server- RADIUS 
According to Wikipedia 's definition ( (Wikipedia- RADIUS, 2012), RADIUS30 is a 
networking protocol that provides centralized Authentication, Authorization, and 
Accounting (AAA) management for computers to connect and use a network service. 
RADIUS, as an authentication protocol, is specified by RFC 2865 and RFC 2866. 
Many commercial and open source RADIUS implementations are available on the market. 
Though it was originally developed to authenticate dial-up connections, RADIUS was 
adapted to authenticate most types of connections that can be established to the 
organizations' network resources, including layer 3 connections. Also because of the broad 
support and the ubiquitous nature of the RADIUS protocol, it is often used by ISPs and 
enterprises to manage access to the Internet or internai networks, wireless networks, and 
30 RADIUS was developed by Livingston Enterprises, lnc., in 1991 as an access server authentication 
and accounting protocol and later brought into the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards . 
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integrated e-mail services. These networks may incorporate modems, DSL, access points, 
'1 VPNs, network ports , web servers, etc. , 
RADIUS is implemented via UDP Port 1812, between a Network Access Server 
(NAS or client) that needs to authenticate its links and a shared Authentication server (the 
RADIUS Server) . RADIUS client components might reside on any of the access points 
(gateways) of an organization's inner network, such as a Network Access Server (NAS) , a 
Virh1al Private Network (VPN) server, a network switch with port based authentication, or a 
Remote Access Server (AS). 
RADIUS user authentication process and user authorization process are inseparably 
coup led, as weil as they take place white using the policies within the user profile. Th us once 
the user logs into the network, he gets authenticated and his profile dictates which types of 
network resources and services he is permitted to access. 
RADIUS, as an authentication protocol, can look up users in text files , Lightweight 
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) servers, and varions databases. Although RADIUS can 
be used for authorization and accounting, as mentioned above in the study, we will only 
describe RADIUS as an authentication protocol. 
Implementing RADIUS, as an authentication technique, usually takes place white 
managing a single database of users containing the users authentications (usemame and 
password and/or challenge/response) as weil as the specification of the type of service 
entitled to them (example: SLIP, Telnet, rlogin, .. ). 
RADIUS is a transaction-based protocol, which relies on UDP to establish the 
connection between the client (NAS) and the server. RADIUS requires the following : 
1- Allowing the Access-Request to be transmitted to a secondary server in case the 
Primary authentication server faits. 
31 Defined in RFC 3588, DIAMETER is the upgrade authentication protocol for RADIUS. 
DIAMETER will be introduced later in this study. 
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2- RADIUS protocol doesn 't reqmre respons1ve data loss detection, so it doesn 't 
require the usage ofTCP with its related acknowledgement overhead. 
3- The user, to be authenticated using RADIUS, doesn't need to wait a longer time 
while the reliable TCP protocol reflects the authentication result, while he can use a 
faster altemate server by repeating the authentication attempt. Thus, UDP makes 
sense to be used as a faster transport layer protocol. 
4- The stateless nature of RADIUS makes UDP a better choice, as no need to detect 
lost connections. The RADIUS servers UDP connections to Clients are opened once 
and stay open for simplicity. 
5- UDP handles the transport of many processes to answer a client Access-Request 
better when processed by a multi-threaded server like RADIUS. 
RADIUS depends on the client/server architecture where the NAS is the client that 
needs the RADIUS server to perform the user authentication. Thus, the NAS hands the 
RADIUS server the user login information as a request for authentication, and waits for the 
authentication results coming back from the server as a response, along with sorne 
configuration details. Upon receiving such response, the NAS becomes ready to take sorne 
actions, and to deliver a certain service to the user accordingly. 
According to RFC 2865 draft Standard (Rigney, Willens, Rubens, & Simpson, 
2000), RADIUS supports a number of authentication methods, like PPP PAP, PPP CHAP, 
UNIX login and other authentication mechanisms. The NAS should only ask for access 
authorization depending on the type of access services it provides. NAS provides PPP and 
Telnet services for dial-in users. If an authentication for an access service not provided by 
the NAS is received by the NAS, the NAS should reject that authentication since that NAS 
doesn ' t provide that access service. 
RADIUS may act as a proxy client for other servers, either RADIUS or other 
authentication servers, as weil . However, for the sake of simplicity, during this study, we 
focus on the model where there is only one RADIUS servicing one NAS. 
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RADIUS mechanism 
RADIUS mechanism can be described according to its draft RFC (Rigney, Willens, Rubens , 
& Simpson, 2000), through the following steps : 
• Users, desiring a connection session(s) into the organization's network, provide their 
login information to the NAS (client) through a customizable login prompt, allowing 
them to enter the ir credentials32 , or through a link fra ming protocol like Point-to-
Point (PPP) protocol that has its own authentication packets to carry such login 
information. 
• The login information (user credentials) communicated between the NAS and the 
RADIUS are always secured. This information can take of two possible forms: in 
the form of passwords that are communicated between the NAS and the RADIUS 
server, while being hashed (usually through using the Message Digest Algorithm 
MD5); or in the form of shared secrets that are never sent over the network. This 
eliminates the chance of malicious snooping and security attacks over the network 
connections. 
• Then the NAS sends that login information (received from the remote user) to the 
RADIUS Server in order to authenticate the user, the user credentials will be sent in 
the form of an "access request" . l'he login information usually includes the user 
credentials, and the client ID and the port through which the user is accessing the 
network. If the NAS receives no response (from the RADIUS server) for the access 
reque t authentication within a certain time, the authentication request has to be 
resent to the RADIUS sever. 
• Upon receipt of the authentication request by the RADIUS server, the latter validates 
the client (the NAS, in this case). Thus the RADIUS server has to have a valid 
shared secret fo r that NAS client, or the request will be discarded. 
The RADIUS server, then, verifies information sent by the client, so the user ' s 
credentials have to be identical to the user 's information located within the 
RADIUS' database, as one condition to authenticate the user. Also the NAS and 
32 Credentials can be usemame/password and/or challenge/response. 
112 
• 
NAS access port through which that user attempts to connect to the organization's 
network have to be identical to the NAS information within the network topology 
located within the RADIUS' database, as another condition to authenticate the user. 
If any of the conditions mentioned above is not met, the access request is rejected 
and the message is sent from the RADIUS, through the NAS, to the user. If ali 
conditions are met, and the RADIUS is configured to challenge the user using a 
challenge/response mechanism: the RADIUS sends a challenge response to the user 
through the NAS. After receiving the challenge response from the user, the NAS 
sends it back to the RADIUS server in a new request ID, replacing the user 
password by the challenge response that came from the user, encrypted; as described 
in the challenge/response section above. 
The RADIUS server response to this request is either: access-accept, access-reject, 
or another access-challenge. In case of access-accept, the RADIUS response to the 
NAS will include the type of service to be given to the user (EX: SLIP, PPP, and 
Login User), along with other values that would allow the NAS to deliver the 
desired service (e.g., IP address , subnet mask, MTU, desired compression, desired 
packet Fil ter identifier, network protocol, host) . 
4.4.2 DIAMETER 
With the emergence of new telecommunication technologies, including wireless 
networks and IP mobility, the requirements of the AAA framework as weil as user access 
control mechanisms have increased in complexity and diversity. However, RADIUS as an 
AAA protocol was not sufficient to fulfill such emerging needs, thus DIAMETER was 
developed by an IETF team, mainly for the US military, in order to cope with the access 
control features, with the flexibility to be extended in order to support new functionalities . 
Defined in RFC 3588, DIAMETER was developed by Pat Calhoun, Glen Zorn and 
Ping Pan in 1998, for providing newly needed requirements as an AAA framework and as an 
upgrade authentication protocol for RADIUS. Though it is not compatible with RADIUS, 
DIAMETER was introduced to overcome RADIUS issues related to reliability, scalability, 
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security and flexibility , as weil as handling remote access, IP mobility and policy control. In 
this study we will elabora te DIAMETER only from the user authentication point of view. 
According to Wikipedia (Wikipedia - Authentication Protocols, 20 12): "since it 
relies on TCP and SCTP (Port # 3 868) as more reliable Transport layer protocols and on 
IPsec and Transport Layer Security (TLS) versus unreliable UDP Transport layer protocol 
and only TLS in the case of RADIUS, DIAMETER is considered as a more robust type of 
RADIUS server. Especially that LI is further enhanced with the introduction of the 3rd 
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) as weil as with its 
applications support to different types of interfaces and its extensibility, which allows the 
support for Proxies, Brokers, Strong Security, Mobile IP, Network Ac cess Servers 
(NASREQ), Accounting and Resource Management." 
Other advantages of DIAMETER over RADIUS, according to Wikipedia 
(Wikipedia- Authentication Protocols, 2012), include the following: 
• Larger space for Attribute Value Pairs (A VP)33 and application ldentifiers. 
• Bath stateful and stateless models can be used. 
Dynamic discovery of peers. 
• Capability negotiation. 
• Support application layer acknowledgements and defines failover methods (RFC 
3539) . 
• Enor notification. 
• Better roaming support. 
• Basic support for user session and accounting. 
According to Wikipedia (Wikipedia Authentication Protocols, 2012), 
"DIAMETER applications" is a terminology referring to the protocols that are based on 
33 A VP defines DIAMETER protoc(\ ls (applications) . 
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DIAMETER, and it doesn ' t refer to software applications. A DIAMETER application should 
be defined by an Identifier and can add new command codes and a new mandatory Attribute 
Value Pairs (AVP)(Wikipedia- Authentication Protocols, 2012). 
4.4.3 Terminal Access Control Access-Control System Plus (TACACS+) 
T ACACS+34 is another prominent security client/server protocol that controls access 
into networks, and that follows the AAA paradigm. T ACACS+ is the la test generation of 
TA CA CS and was developed by Cisco after RADIUS in arder to cape with the ever-
growing security market, as it is more scalable and more adaptable to new security 
technologies . 
TACACS+, as an AAA server protocol, separates the AAA functions so that they 
can be implemented on three different servers, where each function provides a unique 
service and when ali functions are combined they provide a powerful network protection. In 
fact, T ACACS+ separa tes the user authentication and the user authorization processes wh.ile 
other AAA protocols/servers, like RADIUS, combines them into one user profile. Thus, the 
implementation of TACACS+ doesn ' t dictate using ali three functions ; such separation 
allows choosing the specifie functions needed according to each network design targets, 
though ali three functions can be provided by TA CA CS+ if needed. 
And According to the International Engineering Task Force (IETF) (IETF-
T A CA CS+ Internet Draft, 1997), when it cornes to the user authentication, which was 
always linked to the user authorization in previous TACACS generation, it is now a separate 
process, which allows dynamic user authorization independently from the user profile. So 
34 According to Wikipedia (Wikipedia, 2012), TACACS was originally developed by BBN in 1934 
for MILNET, the US. Department of Defense with the purpose of automating login onto a network 
deviee for a user once he' s already authenticated to login onto another deviee located onto the same 
network. Over the 1980s, Cisco added some extensions to TA CA CS and it was called XT A CA CS. 
Th en in 1996, T ACACS+ is the Ci seo proprietary enhancement of the original TA CA CS, however it 
had no official RFC documentation . TA CA CS+ is allowed on port 43 on TCP/IP connections. 
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instead of a one standard user profile , TACACS+ can involve other negotiations, such as 
PPP, for more flexible user profile that could be per-access user profile. Separating the AAA 
functions has improved the Accounting portion as weil , as it took it to the next leve! of 
security auditing and billing services. TACACS+ allows the client to send very fine-grained 
access requests and allows the server to res pond to every part of that request. 
The authentication types supported by TA CA CS+ are the following: 
• ASCII 
PAP 
• CHAP 
• ARAP 
MSCHAP 
TACACS also supports Forwarding Proxies (already explained above). 
In this section, we focus on the authentication function of TACACS+, as the Authorization 
and the Accounting function details are out of the sc ope of this study. 
Another interesting feature of TA CA CS+ according to The IETF (lE TF-T ACACS+ 
Internet Draft, 1997), is that it encrypts al! traffic between the client, which is the Network 
Access Server (NAS), and the TACACS+ server (the AS server performing the TACACS+ 
authentication). TA CA CS+ allows flexibility re garding site customization, future 
development features to be added as weil as multiprotocol support like IP and AppleTalk (as 
Network layer protocols). 
According to Cisco (Cisco-TA CA CS+ and RADIUS Comparison, 2008), TA CA CS+ uses 
the trans pott layer protocol: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), as opposed to TA CA CS 
and XT A TACS that use UDP. Using the reliable, connection-oriented transport TCP 
protocol has many advantages over using the best effort-de li very UDP protocol : 
1- Every timea request is received, TCP has to provide an acknowledgement from the 
receiving deviee to assure that the packet has been sent to its destination, no matter 
how busy the TA CA CS+ server might be. 
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2- TCP connections g1ve indications about crashed, slowing down, shut down, non-
existent or up and mnning servers, while UDP doesn ' t differentiate between the 
different servers status. 
3- The management of many server connections 1s more easily performed, and 
simultaneously maintained, while allowing the detection of crashing servers, allowing 
the possibility of sending messages on! y to functional servers. 
4- TCP is scalable, reliable and works weil within congested networks. 
TA CA CS+ and Authentication 
Authentication configuration is not mandatory for TACACS+ functiona lity, as it is 
considered an optional security measure that depends on a given network's design goals and 
organization's security policies. Sorne networks/sites might incorporate TACACS+ with no 
authentication configuration; sorne other sites might only require user authentication in case 
the user attempts to access certain types of services, to reach certain network servers or to 
gain extra user privileges. In any of these cases, TACACS+ would perfonn its AAA 
functions properly. 
User authentication can take many fonns. The most popular authentication form is a 
usemame and a fixed password, though this authentication form has its own drawbacks. 
TA CA CS+ permits such an authentication fonn; other more secure authentication forms 
(like the one-time password or challenge/response queries) as weil as potential future 
authentication fonns are supported as weil. Also, TA CA CS+ allows more types of 
Authentication requests and more types of Authentication responses, than its predecessors 
TACACS and XT ACACS. 
An authentication session is a single authentication sequence of encrypted packets, 
an interaction between the client and the TA CA CS+ server, identified by a session ID to be 
known between the client and the TA CA CS+ server and to be included within the encrypted 
connection. Many sessions may be multiplexed over the same TCP connection if both the 
client and TA CA CS+ server support such multiplexing. Otherwise, a new TCP connection 
should be opened at the beginning of each session and closed at the end of the session. In 
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case of Authentication sessions, this process in volves the exchange of an arbitrary number of 
packets , compared to only a couple of packets (a request and a reply) in the case of 
Authorization and Accounting sessions. ln this study, we focus on highlighting the 
Authentication sessions, including the different activities that take place within. The 
Authorization and Accounting sessions are out of the sc ope of this study. 
The session ID doesn ' t change through the whole duration of a given session and it 
has to be a cryptographically strong random number, otherwise it might compromise the 
packets ' encryption security. Only one packet encryption mechanism should be used during 
a single session. This mechanism could rely on a secret value, which is a shared secret 
between the client and the TA CA CS+ server; or it could rely on a different key per client or 
TA CA CS+ server they communicate with. The latter option should be more se cure if 
available; however such configuration choices are optional decisions to be taken by each 
organization network designers (lE TF-TA CA CS+ Internet Dra ft, 1997). 
The packet's body is encrypted by XOR-ing it with a pseudo-random pad, which is 
generated by concatenating a series ofMD5 hashes. The first hash is generated based on the 
concatenation of the secret key (shared between the client and the TA CACAS+ server) , the 
session ID (in network byte order), the version number of T ACACS+ (major and minor 
version numbers combined), and the sequence number (of the packet in that session). The 
latter three items are ali included in the packet header. Each subsequent hash concatenation 
would include the same four values, just mentioned, ali concatenated with the result of the 
previous hash (lEIF-TA CA CS+ Internet Dra ft , 1997). 
The authentication process starts by the following steps, according to the lEIF Internet Draft 
(IETF-TACACS+ Internet Draft, 1997): 
1- The client sends a START message to the TACACS+ server, including the type of 
the authentication to take place, a username and sorne authentication data. The start 
message is the firs t packet to be sent when starting a communication between a 
client and a TA CA CS+ server or in case of a res tart; so it has the sequence 
number= 1, sin ce it is the first packet within a given session. 
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2- The T ACACS+ server should send back a REPL Y message indicating if the 
authorization process is finished (by a termina ting REPL Y of either PASS or F AIL) , 
or it should continue, by asking (prompting the remote user) for more authentication 
information within the reply (GETDATA, GETUSER, GETPASS to get data, a 
username or a password respectively)35. 
3- In the latter case, the client will send the required information (co ming originally 
from the user) in a CONTINUE message, to the TA CA CS+ server. 
4- For every START or CONTINUE message (only sent by the client), the TACACS+ 
server has to send a REPL Y message (ont y sent by the TA CA CS+ server); unless 
the client message includes an ABORT field in the CONTINUE message where the 
session should be immediately aborted, with no message sent by the TA CA CS+ 
server. The different messages exchanged for different remote access requests witt 
be elaborated in the following section. 
The types of message sent by the NAS (client) could be one of the foltowing options, 
according to the IETF Internet Draft (IETF-TACACS+ Internet Draft, 1997): 
1- An ENABLE request, to change the current privilege levet of a principal36 . In this 
case, many messages might get exchanged between the client and the TACACS+ 
server; so that the TA CA CS+ server would get the information it needs in order to 
change the privilege. This exchange is very similar to an INBOUND ASCII LOGIN. 
2- An INBOUND ASCII LOGIN, where the START packet sent by the NAS may 
contain the username (not required), and might be followed by zero or more pairs of 
REPLY (sent by TACACS+ server) and CONTINUE (sent by client) in case the 
TA CA CS+ server needs more information, and then witt be followed by a 
termina ting REPL Y of either PASS or F AIL (sent by TA CA CS+ server) . 
35 Sometimes the TACACS+ server might send a RESTART ERROR message, or a FOLLOW 
message as weil. 
36 A principal is a term defining an authenticated party (user or deviee) . 
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3- An INBOUND PAP LOGIN, where the START packet coming from NAS contains 
the usemame and the ASCH password, and then the START packet will be followed 
by a single terminating REPL Y of either PASS or F AIL (sent by TACACS+ server). 
4- An INBOUND CHAP LOGIN, where the START packet sent by the NAS may 
con tain the username (secret) and the concatenation of the PPP ID, the challenge and 
the response; and then the ST ART packet will be followed by a single terminating 
REPL Y of either PASS or FAIL (sent by T ACACS+ server). To perform the 
authentication, the TA CA CS+ server runs MD5 on The PPP ID, the user secret and 
the challenge; and th en compares the result to the response, to check if they match. 
5- An INBOUND MS-CHAP LOGIN, where the START packet sent by the NAS may 
contain the usemame (secret) and the concatenation of the PPP ID, the MS-CHAP 
challenge and the MS-CHAP response; and then the ST ART packet will be followed 
by a single terminating REPL Y of either PASS or F AIL (sent by T ACACS+ server). 
To perform the authentication, the TACACS+ server runs a combination of the 
cryptographie hash function Message Digest Algorithm (MD4) and the symmetric 
encryption algorithm Data Encryption Standard (DES) on the user secret and the 
challenge; and then compares the result to the response, to check if they match. 37 
6- An INBOUND ARAP LOGIN, where the START packet sent by the NAS may 
contain the username (secret) and the concatenation of the NAS challenge to the 
remote peer38, the remote peer challenge to the NAS, and the remote peer response 
to the NAS challenge; and then the START packet will be followed by a single 
termina ting REPL Y of ith r PASS or F AIL (sent by T ACACS+ server). In case of 
a PASS REPL Y packet, it will include an encrypted Peer Challenge. To perform the 
authentication, the TA CA CS+ server runs a DES encryption on both challenges 
using the user secret as an encryption key; and th en compares the result to the peer' s 
response, to check if they match. 
37 An OUTBOUN D MS-CHAP LOG IN is an example, among others, of situation the NAS needs to 
provide MS-CHAP authentication credentials to the remote PPP peer. Such authentications are out o f 
the scope of this study, so will not be explained in this study. For a fu ll list of such authentications, 
interested readers may re fer toT A CA CS+ dra ft (IETF-TA CA CS+ Internet Dra ft, 1997). 
38 
" Remote peer" is another name referring to many local and/or remote authentication servers 
working a lternative ly for redundancy. 
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7- An ASCII CHANGE PASSWORD REQUEST, where there would be multiple 
message exchanged between the TACACS+ server and NAS as the TACACS+ 
server would collect the information needed in order to change the user password. 
8- A PPP CHANGE PASSWORD REQUEST, are not valid since PPP protocol doesn't 
supp01t password changing. 
9- An ARAP CHANGE PASSWORD REQUEST, where the START packet sent by 
the NAS may contain the username (secret) and both the old and new password 
encrypted; and then the START packet will be followed by a single terminating 
REPL Y of either PASS or F AIL (sent by TACACS+ server). 
10- An ABORT field in the CONTINUE message, and it might be followed by the 
reason why; the session drops without a REPL Y message needed from the 
TACACS+ server. 
The status of REPL Y message sent by the TA CA CS+ server (server) could be one of the 
following options: 
1. PASS, is sent when the user authentication takes place successfully; 
2. F AIL, is sent when the user authentication doesn't takes place successfully, or 
doesn 't take place at ali; 
3. FOLLOW, is sent when the authentication session should be terminated, regardless 
of the authentication action or type, and usually the sent packet includes a message 
to be displayed to the user. When sending a FOLLOW REPLY message, TACACS+ 
TACACS+ server request, at the discretion of the client, to switch the authentication 
process to be performed by an alternative T ACACS+ server, described in ASCII 
text, as weil as, optionally, by an alternative suggested authentication method ( otber 
than TACACS+). If no alternate host is chosen as a TACACS+ server, the 
authentication returned status is as a F AIL. 
4. ERROR, is sent when the authentication session should be terminated, regardless of 
the authentication action or type, and usually the sent packet includes a message to 
be displayed on the administrative console or log. When sending an ERROR 
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REPLY message, TACACS+ TACACS+ server indicates that the alternative host 
couldn 't be reached. 
5. REST ART, is sent wh en the authentication session should be terminated, regardless 
of the authentication action or type, and usually the sent packet includes a message 
to be displayed to the user. When a REST ART REPL Y message is sent, TA CA CS+ 
server indicates that the Authentication value (indicating the authentication type) 
included in the START packet sent by the NAS is not acceptable to be negotiated 
with the alternate hasts, however other START packets might be acceptable, that's 
why a REST ART action is requested so that the NAS would be able to negotiate the 
choice of such authentication types with the alterna te peers (lE TF-TACACS+ 
Internet Draft, 1997). 
4.4.4 KERBEROS 
Designed by Steve Miller and Clifford Neuman, Kerberos is a network security 
protocol, based on the client server architecture. The Massachusetts lnstitute of Technology 
(MIT) developed K.erberos to sec ure network services of project Athena, in the 1 070s. 
Version 5 is the last version of Kerberos made by John Kohl and Clifford Neman 
and documented in an RFC 4120 in 2005. In 2007, the Kerberos Consortium was formed, 
with many vendors such as Oracle, Apple Inc, Google, Microsoft, Centrify Corporation, and 
TeamF 1 Inc., and many academie institutes such as KTH-Royal Institute of Technology, 
Stanford University and MIT sponsored it. 
The latest updates done by the IETF Kerberos working group are documented into 
RFC 3961 , RFC 3962, RFC 4120, RFC 1510, and RFC 4121. Kerberos provides a free, 
secure, reliable, scalable and user transparent authentication solution and is considered as a 
standard for windows 2000 networks . 
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Kerberos and authentication 
Kerberos is a client server architecture whose idea depends on authenticating both 
the user as weil as the server (mutual Authenticationi9, in order to prevent rogue servers 
from identifying themselves as legitimate ones, and then taking control of the system. 
Kerberos authentication depends on a Kerberos-proprietary certificate mode!, where an 
Authentication server (AS) performs the authentication process, while issuing permission 
tickets to its clients in order for them to grant user access to sorne other inner 
servers/services . 
According to Steiner (Steiner, Neuman, & Schiller, 1988), the AS connects to a 
database that contains client information and private keys40 , on the organization' s inner 
network, as weil as being connected to the application server, which would be accessed by 
the user, on one hand. On the other hand, the AS connects to a NAS as a client through 
which the remote user connects to the network. 
Like RADIUS and TACACS+, Kerberos authentication process for a user is through 
one whole connection session, however this access permission is not for ali application 
servers situated on the network, it is only to the service to which the permission ticket was 
issued. In case other services need to be accessed; the client has to go through another 
authentication process to get a permission ticket that corresponds to that specifie service. 
Thus when a remote user attempts to access an inner server, Kerberos has to provide a ticket 
to that server corresponding to that user as weil as a proof that this ticket was not stol en. 
During one session between two authenticated parties (principals) , Kerberos can 
provide the option of generating temporary private keys (called session keys) to ensure a 
communication encryption throughout that connection session. 
39 Both users (clients) and servers to be authenticated by Kerberos are known as "principals". 
4° Kerberos uses private Key encryption, where each principal is assigned a large number, only known 
to that principa l and to Kerberos . ln case when the principal is a user, the private key is a user 
password. 
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There are three levels of Kerberos authentication, according to Steiner (Steiner, Neuman, & 
Schiller, 1988), as follows : 
1. Authentication that happens with the connection initiation, assummg that ali 
consecutive messages will originate from the same authenticated user. This leve! of 
authentication is used by the Kerberos File server as weil as other application 
servers; 
2. Authentication that happens with the connection initiation, combined with an 
authentication for every communication message originated by the same 
authenticated user. This leve! of authentication is used by Kerberos app lication 
servers, which don ' t care about the disclosure of the message contents, however they 
want to make sure ali messages are originated from the same authenticated principal. 
These authenticated messages are then called: Safe messages; 
3. Authentication that happens with the connection initiation, combined with an 
authentication for every communication message originated by the same 
authenticated user, as weil as message encryption. This leve! of authentication is 
used by the Kerberos application servers that do care about the security of the 
message contents, besides making sure ali messages are originated from the same 
authenticated principal. Kerberos uses this authentication leve! when exchanging 
passwords and private keys. These authenticated encrypted messages are then called: 
Private messages; 
The choice of the different levels of authentication is to be determined by the network 
designer according to the connections security needs of every application server located on 
the network. 
According to Steiner (Steiner, Neuman, & Schiller, 1988), Kerberos authentication 
process is based on Needham and Schroeder key distribution mode! and its target is to 
generate a ticket that authenticates the remote user to the end server. The process takes place 
through the following phases: 
• Kerberos creates user credentials to be used with access requests to different 
servtces. 
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Credentials are tickets including the remote user password and authenticators. 
Tickets are used to pass the user identity between the AS and the End server, 
as weil as to ensure the identity of the user. A ticket is good for a single 
service and a single client, however it can be used many times until it expires. 
The authenticator is for proving the user's identity. lt contains information 
that, when compared with the ticket 's information, can prove that the client 
sending the ticket is the same as the one to which the ticket was issued. The 
authenticator can be used only once. Both the tickets and the authenticators 
are based on private key encryption; however they are encrypted using 
different keys. 
• The user requests authentication for a certain service. 
The Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) lifetime is the duration through which the 
Kerberos client will consider a certain user as authenticated to access the 
organization's network to use a certain service. In order to obtain an access 
ticket for a certain end server, the AS has to communicate with the Ticket 
Granting Server (TGS) that generates such tickets. That communication is by 
sending a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the TGS. 
Kerberos authentication processes can be illustrated by figure 4-4. 
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Figure 4.4 The Kerberos Authentication Process 
The steps are as fo llows: 
• The user obtains credentials to be used to request access to a service: 
When the user needs to access the network for the first time, he enters his username 
(1) and the AS gets it from the client along with a request to use TGS (2). The AS 
checks (in the database) if it has this usemame, then the AS generates a session key 
to be sent back to the client41 along with a TGT (3) that would allow that user to use 
4 1 Ail communications between the AS and the client is encrypted with the client private key, which is 
a key derived from the user password and is known on! y to both of them. This fact has an exception, 
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the Ticket Granting Server (TGS)42 . The sessiOn key is used to encrypt the 
communication between both the client and the TGS. Then the user is prompted for 
his password (4, 5) that will be converted into a DES key (6) . That DES key is to be 
used by the client to decrypt the AS response (7) that included the TOT ticket as 
weil as the session key, then the DES key and the password will be erased from the 
client memory and the session key as weil as the TGT will be stored for future 
communications. 
• The user requests an authentication for a specifie service: 
• 
Once a client is issued a ticket to use the desired server, including the TGS server, 
the application43 generates an authenticator (8) including the remote user IP address 
and the cunent time.44 Then the client encrypts the authenticator using the session 
key (used between the Client and that specifie server) (9), and sends the 
authenticator along with the ticket and the desired server' s name to the server ( 1 0). 
This process involving an authenticator created by the application, is called "Service 
Access protocol", and allows the end user to access a service provided by an 
organization inner server. The server decrypts both the ticket provided by the client 
as weil as the authenticator, compares their information, and if everything is 
matching, allows the request to proceed45 . By the end of this process, the server is 
assured of the remo te user identity. 
The user presents the credentials to the end server: 
represented by number 3 in the figure, where the communication is encrypted with a key known only 
to the TGS and the AS. That's why the user has to decrypt this information, as shown in the figure . 
•z TGS generales access tickets through which the remote user can access the end server. 
Communication between AS and TGS are ali encrypted using a key known only to TGS and AS. 
-IJ The application is an interface that includes routines and generales private keys (as exp lained 
be fore) . 
44 The current time wou ld help identify message replay. 
45 Sometimes the client asks for the server to get authenticated as weil , additional steps wi ll then be 
laken by the AS in order to perform such a request. 
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As already explained, when a remote user requests a service for the first time, that 
request has to go to the TGS. Since granting a ticket for the end-server through the 
TGS is a service by itself, it uses the Service Access protocol just described above, 
that is also the case for requesting a service from any other server. The TGS checks 
the authenticator and TGT, and if valid, the TGS generates a new session key to be 
used between the client and the end-server (End-Server Session Key (ESSK)) . Then 
the TGS builds a ticket permitting the client to use the end-sen'er (End-Server 
Ticket (EST)), whose !ife time is the minimum of either: the default time to use that 
specifie service, or the remaining lifetime of the TGT already issued for that user. 
The TGS sends the EST, along with the ESSK back to the client, ali encrypted (11 ) 
in the session key used between the client and the TGS. The client then would 
present that ticket to the end-server, along with a new authenticator (generated using 
the "service access protocol", as described above, however this time : to enable the 
client access to the End-server), ail encrypted using the ESSK (12). 
Now that we explained the Kerberos authentication process m details, we can 
conclude that this process ensures the following security benefits: 
1- By the end of the authentication process, the end-server should be certain of the 
identity that the client d aims to have and, if mutual authentication took place, the 
client also would be certain of the identity of the end-server as weil. 
2- Since the docks are synchronized between the client and the end-server it needs to 
u e, once the end server checks the time of the received EST and finds a significant 
difference between its time and the present time of the end-server itself, the end-
server would consider that EST as a replay for another legitimate EST and will 
discard it immediately. 
3- Both the client and the end-server share a session key to encrypt their mutual 
communications. Nobody else can have that key, which was generated from within 
the Kerberos system (from the TGS), thus it is authentic to both party. That session 
key gu aran tees that messages between both parties are authentic ( especially if 
they're comparably recent enough, as explained in the previous point). 
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Now that we introduced a number of remote user authentication methods that can be 
used either within Dynamic ACL to control access into an organization' s NAS router, or by 
themselves to control access to a router. Let ' s introduce in the following section the way to 
combine a number of such authentication methods together for the sake of redundancy, and 
robustness, by creating a practical approach that can prevent intruders ' attacks in a real 
world situation. 
4.5 Creating recovery peers for the authentication server 
Before implementing authentication servers on a given to network, it is important to 
crea te a certain levet of redundancy, in order to a void situations when the server is no longer 
able to provide the required authentication service, which might lead to the impossibility of 
accessing the network by ail remote users. 
In this section, we introduce the concept of creating peers for the AS (authentication) 
server, altogether with other re1ated concepts. Let' s first introduce sorne aspects about the 
NAS router ' s access, in order to better lead the reader to the explanation of the AS recovery 
concept. 
4.5.1 The difference between Exec access and Privileged access 
Actually aNAS router can support authentication for two different modes of access: 
1- Exec access 
2- Priviledged access 
"Exec access" mode is a user access mode that allows the user to use the connection 
without being able to change any of the router configurations. Exec access mode is usually 
used for remote users connecting through dynamic ACLs with an intention to reach an inner 
network resource. 
The Privileged Access mode allows the connected user to change the router configuration, 
and is used for users connecting to the network with an intention to administer the router. 
In order to reach the Privileged access mode, the user has first to successfully go 
through the Exec access mode authentication process in order to access the router in the 
Exec access mode. Once logged in through exec access mode, the user can go through the 
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privileged mode authentication process in order to access the router in the privileged access 
mode. Thus any user connection into the router's Command Line Interface (CLI), whether 
for Exec or privileged access, starts by successfully logging through the Exec access mode, 
and then the user might or might not use the privileged Exec mode access , according to his 
needs. 
According to Cisco (Cisco lOS Software release 11.0, 2012), the user can Exec 
ac cess the router using one of the four tine access methods: 
• Console, which is a physical socket on a router where a cable can be inserted allowing a 
computer connection to that router in order to access its Command Line Interface (CLI). 
• 
• 
• 
Auxiliary, which is a physical connector on a router allowing a remote terminal or a PC 
with a terminal emu1ator, to access the router CLI using an ana1og modem. 
TTY, which is a standard asynchronous 1ine used for communication with a computer 
terminal. 1t is a teletype-printer or a typewriter equipped with an electronic 
communication channel , and can still be configured on Cisco 2509 router, using Cisco 
IOS software version 12.2(19) (Cisco lOS Software Releases 11.0, 2012). 
VTY, the Virtual Terminal Line, allowing terminais to access the router CLI . 
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4.5.2 Method lists 
Since Dynamic ACLs security 1s considered a front-line prevention against 
illegitimate user access into the organization's NAS router, they are concerned with securing 
the first access mode the user has to reach in order to get access to any other mode or 
organization's resource, namely the user Exec access mode. Thus we focus on explaining the 
concept of securing the Exec access mode, within the study. In particular, we fOCllS on 
explaining the concept of enforcing security best practices to ensure the elimination of 
security gaps that might happen during such access. Thus we will enforce the concept of 
creating recovery peers for a given authentication server protecting this mode, so that, by 
any means, if the server is not available to perform its security functions, other servers 
automatically becomes available to provide it. This process in vo lves the use of method lists, 
which help determine the order in which the peers will take turns providing such security 
functions . In other words, method lists determine how the authentication, the authorization 
and the accounting functions wi ll take place securing the user Exec access mode (Cisco lOS 
Software Release 11.3, 1999). 
The authentication method lists can be used to secure the privileged mode as weil, 
however this authentication is beyond the work to be done by the Dynamic ACLs, as th is 
authentication will only take place after the user successfully authenticates for the Exec 
access mode and reaches it. Since an authenticated user through NAS Dynamic ACLs might 
need to access the NAS in order to administer it, we will explain the privilege mode 
authentication as weil. 
Now that we explained the router access modes, let's introduce the concept of the 
peer recovery, which will insure that the authentication process takes place for certain, in 
arder to secure the user access into the organization's network. 
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4.5.3 Peer recovery mechanism 
The authentication method lists specify, to the NAS router, one or more types of 
authentication methods to be performed as weil as the sequence in which they will be tried 
for that performance. Whether the authentication method is through AAA or non-AAA 
(through the use of enable password versus an AAA server for instance), the named 
authentication methods should be put in order in the form of a sequential list; according to 
the priority they will be queried so that they can provide the user authentication process 
accordingly. Each of these methods refers to one or more security protocol/server to be used 
in the authentication process, thus each method defines how the Exec mode access will be 
authenticated. Next, that authentication method list should be applied to the NAS interface 
where the authentication should take place. A default method list is automatically applied to 
all interfaces of the NAS router, except when overridden by a named method list. 
In case of using the methods list within Dynamic ACLs context, where user Exec 
access method uses the corresponding line methods (console, auxiliary, VTY or TTY) in 
order to reach the router 's CLI, the authentication method list should be applied to the NAS 
!ines to be secured, rather than the NAS interface, so that the users accessing the NAS router 
using any of those !ines methods would have to go through the authentication process 
specified by the method list applied for that tine. 
If one method on the list faits to respond, the process goes to the next authentication 
method on the list. When a router successfully uses one authentication method on the list, the 
rest of the methods are ignored. Thus, except for the fi rst method, a designated method is 
performed in case of the unavailability of the previous authentication method mentioned on 
the list, the unavailability of a method might be due to the unavailability of the 
authentication server or the existence of a connection problem preventing to reach it. 
If the authentication fails: this means the user has been denied by one of the 
authentication methods on the list or by the local username Database. At this point no further 
authentication methods included on the list are attempted, as the authentication method itself 
functioned as desired (didn't fail, and the authentication server was available) and rejected 
the user as a result. That's different from the failure of the authentication method due to 
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inability to rea ch the authentication server (or the authentication server is not respondiqg 
back), thus no authentication takes place at ali, neither rejecting nor accepting the user, and 
thus the next method on the list has to take place. If ali authentication methods on the list 
fail , including the last method, the router will end up in a user deniai action, since no 
authentication took place and no more authentication methods exist on the method list. 
Thus the result of an authentication method used by the NAS router can be narrowed down 
to the following: 
1- Success: the method was available and the user was authenticated. 
2- Fail: the method was available and the user wasn ' t able to authenticate. 
3- Error: the authentication was unavailable as a service because one of the following 
cases occurred: 
The first authentication server m the group of the specified method is 
unreachable and thus the next server in the group is used. 
The specified method either doesn't exist, or in case of a group of 
authentication servers, none of the group servers is reachable. 
(Cisco lOS Security Configuration Guide, Release 12.2-AAA overview) 
The mechanism of the recovery process can be summarized in the following: 
The NAS will query ali authentication servers according to the designated authentication 
methods mentioned on the list, respectively, white going through a pattern until the user gets 
either authenticated or rejected, or until the user session gets terminated. The fact of 
specifying multiple types of authentication methods within the method list provides 
redundancy, since these methods will recover for each other's unavailability. 
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Figure 4-5 will help the reader better visualize the NAS , the AS , the user and the recovery 
peers relationship; as follows: 
Figure 4.5 
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r------
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1 1 
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1_----- ~ 
r------
: 10.0.0.4 : 
1_----- ~ 
NAS (client) 
The Authentication server (AS)'s peer recovery 
Internet 
As we can see in figure 4-5, the architecture of the network topology might refer to a 
number of servers that might be planned to be treated as one server group, server group 1, 
authenticating users through one authentication method, these could be RADIUS servers for 
example, versus another group of servers, server group 2, authenticating users through a 
different authentication method, and tho se latter on es could be TA CA CS+ servers. In 
another design, one subset of the first server group, along with another subset of the 2''ct 
server group could be assigned to one authentication method from the method list, while the 
other subsets of group 1 arrd server group 2 could be assigned for a different authentication 
method from the method list. 
According to Cisco (Cisco lOS Security Configuration Guide, Release 12.2-AAA 
overview ), each server will be identified within the authentication process, uniquely through 
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its IP address and a UDP port number. One server can have more than one entry, each 
identified uniquely in the server group; so that different authentication requests might be sent 
simultaneously to the same server at the same IP address. Thus, two servers (hosts) 
belonging to the same server group represent a failure backup for each other, in order to 
provide the authentication service for the users attempting network access. 
If we consider figure 4-5 as an example, it will help a clearer explanation: let's 
define three authentication methods on the NAS as follows: 
RADIUS server group aaaradgroup, which includes servers 10.0.0.1 , and 10.0.0.2 . 
TACACS+ server group aaatacgroup, which includes servers 10.0.0.3, and 10.0.0.4. 
Local authentication database using username command 
When the user at IP address 10.10.10.10 attempts to access the network, the Cisco 
IOS configured on the NAS, first tries to contact the first AAA server in the RADIUS 
aaaradgroup, with IP address 10.0.0.1. If the server is reachable, it will perform the 
authentication and none of the other methods on the list is needed. In this case, the user 
10.10.10.10 has to enter the username/password combination as they're configured on the 
authentication server, or the user would fail the authentication and will be denied access, and 
still none of the following authentication methods are tried, sin ce the authentication has be en 
performed already by 10.0.0.1 denying the user. 
If the router is unable to rea ch 1 0.0.0.1, it wi ll still use the aaaradgroup, contacting 
the second server 10.0.0.2 . If that server is unreachable, the NAS tries the next method on 
the list contacting the servers in the TACACS+ aaatacgroup, one by one the same way as 
aaaradgroup servers. If still unable to reach any of them, then the router will try the 
username authentication method, where the user has to enter the username/password 
combination that's configured locally on the router, in order for the NAS to verity the user 
logins. In case neither username command, enable secret command, nor tine password was 
configured on the NAS, when the router attempts to use any of these methods, it will 
consider them as unsuccessful and will try the next designated method on the list. And since 
no more designated methods exist on the list, then the user will be denied access. 
--------------- ----------
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This example represents an introduction to the concept of peer recovery implementation, and 
will help the reader to understand the more detailed example presented in the following 
section. 
4.5.4 Peer recovery implementation and configuration 
In this section we demonstrate the possibility of combining many types of authentication 
methods into method lists in order to secure remote Exec user access to the NAS. Sorne of 
the combined authentication methods will implement the AAA security services, through the 
use of AAA servers, while other methods will implement non-AAA services using regular 
passwords that can be locally configured on the router (like enable password and login 
password). In order to create such hybrid combination, we have to enable the AAA services 
on the router before defining the method lists, so that the router would be configured to use 
such services. 
Actually the AAA security services, once enabled on a router, support a variety of login 
authentication methods. The network engineer would decide to choose a certain number of 
such authentication methods to recover for each other while perforrning the authentication 
process. This is achieved by creating one or more lists of authentication methods that are 
tried at the user Exec access. Authenticating the user in the Exec access mode to reach the 
router CLI is referred to as " login authentication", which will be explained in this section. 
- ----------
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For user Exec shell access, the syntax commands sown in figure 4-6 must be configured on 
the NAS: 
1 Router(config)# aaa new-model (A) l 
Router(config)# aaa authentication login {default 1 list_name} 
methodl [method2 ... ] (Dl 
Router(config)# line (aux 1 console 1 tty 1 vty] start_line_# 
[end_line_# ] 
Router(config-line)# login authentication {default 1 list_name} 
Router(config-line)# timeout login response seconds {C) 
Figure 4.6 Peer recovery syntax code 
The command in part (A) of figure 4-6 is to enable AAA globally, on ali interfaces 
of the NAS router. This command should be executed before configuring any other AAA 
command. 
The command in part (B) of the figure is to secure Exec access to the router by 
creating a local authentication method list. The login keyword is to force authentication at 
login, as it is the specified type of user Exec access method used to rea ch the N AS line, and 
is followed by the reference to the authentication method(s) to be used. This reference is a 
character string specifying the unique name of the authentication method list to be used, 
followed by the authentication methods included within that list, listed in the order the NAS 
will perform them. Thus the method argument/keyword refers to the actual method the 
authentication algorithm tries; a table including such keywords along with their description 
will fo llow. A method li st can include up to four authentication methods to be tried by the 
router. An authentication method is tried on! y if the previous method retums an error, not a 
fa ilure. In order to configure the router to accept the user authentication even if ali methods 
--- ----------------
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return errors, the router can be configured with "none" keyword, as a last method on the 
method list, which is never recommended, according to E-Tutorials (E-tutorials -
Authentication ). 
The default list is used when a method list is not specified in the AAA authentication 
login command, and it is automatically applied to ali router interfaces. To create it, the 
"default" keyword is used, followed by the authentication methods to be used as default. 
Part (C) of the figure corresponds to entering into the line configuration mode as 
chosen by the network engineer (AUX, Console, TTY or VTY), where the authentication 
method list will be applied. According to E-Tutorials (E-tutorials - Authentication ),The 
timeout command is optional and it is to specify the time the lOS waits for the user login 
information before the authentication is timed out. The default timeout is 30 seconds, though 
it can be set from 1 to 300 seconds. The default number of login attempts permitted by Cisco 
lOS is three, in order for the user to enter his correct login information. Once the user 
reaches 3 times, the lOS disconnects him and forces him to repeat his login attempts again; 
however with AAA, that number can be changed from 1 to 25 attempts. The fo llowing 
command can be added to the router, as an optional configuration to change the number of 
user login attempts, using AAA servers: 
Router(config)# aaa authentication attempts l ogin #_of_attempts 
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According to Cisco (Cisco IOS Security Configuration Guide, Release 12.2-
Configuring Authentication, 2006), the AAA authentication methods for user Exec access 
(line Jo gin) are summarized in table 4- l , as fo llows: 
Method Descrip tion 
Keywo rd 
en ab le The enable password or the enable secret is used for the authentication. An enab le password 
has to be defined/configured before such an authentication method is used. 
KrbS The Kerberos5 server is used for the authentication. The user password is never sent to the 
NAS: Once the user is prompted for his username, the Key Distribution Center (KDC) checks 
for an entry for that user, then creates an encrypted Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) with thal 
user existing password and sends it back to the router. Then the user is prompted for his 
password, thar the router wi ll use to decrypt the TGT. If thar decryption is successful , the user 
becomes authenticated and his TGT is stored on the router's user credentials cache. Before 
using the Kerberos authent ication method, communication between the router and the 
Kerberos security server should be enabled. 
KrbS- The Kerberos5 Telnet authentication protoco l for authentication, when Telnet is used to 
tel net connect to the router. If used, this method must be listed first on the method li st. 
li ne The line password , on the line the user is attempting to access, is used for the authentication. 
A li ne password has to be defined/configured be fore such an authentication method is used. 
loca l The loca l username, within the router database, is used for the authentication. 
Local- The case sensitive local username, within the router database, is used for the authentication. 
case 
None No authentication is performed. 
Gr oup Ali configured RAD IUS servers perform the authentication . Before using the group RADIUS 
RADIUS authentication method, communication between the router and the RAD IUS security server 
should be enab led. 
G roup Ali configured TA CA CS+ servers perform the authentication. Be fore using group TA CA CS+ 
TACACS+ authentication method, the communication between the router and the T ACACS+ security 
server should be enabled. 
Group Only a subset of RADIUS or T ACACS+ servers perform the authentication as defin ed by the 
Group-
AAA group server rad ius or AAA group server TACACS+ command. First the group 's group 
name and server members have to be defined by the command: AAA group server. Then the 
na me 'group group-name' should be specified as the authentication method. Before using group 
name authentication method, the communication between the router and the RADIUS or 
TA CA CS+ security server should be enabled. 
Table 4.1 The AAA authentlcatwn methods for user Exec access (line Jo gin) 
---· --- - ---- ------------------ - ---- --
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Now that we explained the use of the authentication method lists to authenticate user 
Exec access mode, let's demonstrate, in this section, the use of the authentication method 
lists in order to authenticate the privileged Exec mode access (ena ble authentication). 
In order for the user to access the privilege Exec mode, he has first to be 
authenticated to access the user Exec mode. Thus when it is time for building the 
authentication method lists that will determine whether the user is authenticated to access the 
privilege access mode, the router will be already configured with the authentication for the 
Exec mode which includes the AAA authentication services enabled, as shown in the code 
above, thus there will be no need to reconfigure that feature on the NAS router again. 
Building the authentication method lists for the privileged access mode then will 
take place right away; though unlike the User Exec mode, the Privilege Exec mode doesn't 
allow building many authentication lists, only the "default" list is allowed to be built. This 
makes sense: because there is only one-way to access the privi lege access mode for the 
remote user: through the user Exec mode, thus after going through the users Exec mode 
authentication process successfully. Also in user Exec mode, there exist many different types 
of login access methods/lines (console, auxiliary (AUX), TTY, VTY), while in the privilege 
mode, the user accesses the NAS from within, as he would have already accessed the user 
Exec mode. 
According to Cisco (Cisco lOS Security Configuration Guide, Re lease 12.2-
Configuring Authentication, 2006), for user privilege shell access authentication method list, 
the following syntax commands must be used: 
Router(config)# aaa authentication enable default methodl 
(method2 ••• ] 
Figure 4.7 Privilege access allthentication method list - Syntax code 
Thus the command is to enable login checking for the users accessing the router 
through the user privilege Exec mode. The authentication methods allowed to be used within 
the default authentication method list are the same as the methods allowed within the user 
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Exec mode except for " local" and "local-case" authentication methods . The privilege access 
mode authentication will be elaborated in an example that will follow in the next section. 
In order to better understand the mechanism for AAA authentication methods, let's 
elaborate the algorithm that the NAS lOS follows in order to secure user access in general, 
as follows : 
1. Whenever a remote user attempts to login into the NAS, The NAS checks if the AAA 
services are available. 
2. The NAS recognizes the authentication method list that is configured along with that 
specifie type of user access, and recognizes the authentication methods specified within 
that list. 
3. The NAS proceeds with the first method on the list, and after the authentication takes 
place, the NAS receives an authentication message (including the authentication result) 
from the authentication server performing the authentication. 
4. If the authentication message is an error, then go to step 5; otherwise: if it is a fail 
( deny), th en no access is allowed, and the authentication pro cess stops. If it is a success 
(pass) , then the user is allowed access, and the authentication process stops. 
5. The NAS proceeds with the next authentication method on the list, then it will go to step 
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The fo llowing configuration example of figure 4-8 will help understand the way the 
NAS can be configured with a number of authentication method lists in order to secure many 
types of router access methods. The configuration is followed by an explanation about how 
the router processes such authentication methods. 
Router(config)# aaa new-rnodel ( l) 
NAS(config)# tacacs-server host 10.0.0.5 single-connection (2) 
key secretS 
NAS(config)# tacacs-server host 10.0.0.6 single-connection 
key secret6 
NAS(config)# tacacs-server host 10.0.0.7 single-connection 
key secret? 
NAS(config)# aaa group server tacacs aaatacgroup ( 3) 
NAS(config-sg)# server 10.0 . 0 .5 
NAS(config-sg)# server 10.0.0.6 
NAS(config)# a aa group server radius aaaradgroup ( 4) 
NAS(config-sg)# server 10.0.0.1 
NAS(config-sg)# server 10 . 0.0.2 
NAS(config-sg)# server 10 . 0.0 . 3 
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NAS(config)# aaa authentication console group aaatacgroup (5) 
local 
NAS(config)# username admin1 secret cisco1 ( 6) 
NAS(config)# username admin2 secret cisco2 
NAS(config)# aaa authentication login default (7) 
group aaatacgroup group tacacs+ group aaaradgroup krbS 
NAS(config)# aaa authentication enable default ( 8) 
group aaatacgroup enable 
NAS(config)# enable secret OutKeep ( 9) 
NAS(config)# aaa authentication attempts login 1 ( 10) 
NAS(config)# line console 0 ( ll) 
NAS(config-line)# login authentication console 
NAS(config)# line vty 0 15 ( 12) 
NAS(config-line)# login authentication default 
Figure 4.8 Example ofNAS configuration using authentication method lists 
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The configuration code of figure 4-8 demonstrates the different types of 
authentication methods to be applied to different types of access to the router. These access 
types covers both modes: the User Exec mode as well as the privilege mode. Also the 
configuration code demonstrates the use of authentication server groupings, and how to 
specify a certain set of a given server grouping versus a who le group of servers. 
The examp1e starts by enab1ing the AAA functions on the NAS router, then 
specifying the TA CACAS+ server grouping and subgrouping, as weil as the RADIUS server 
grouping in command sets 1 to 3. 
Next, the configuration code defines the authentication method 1ists to be fo llowed 
with console access, user Exec access (login) in comrnand sets 5 and 7, respectively. Each 
method list identifies the authentication methods to be followed in a certain order, where 
every method has to be tried by the N AS router in case the previous method was not 
available. 
Next, the configuration code defines the authentication method lists to be followed 
when the user wants to privilege access the router from within the Exec access mode, in 
order to reach the Privileged mode access (Enable) , as shown in command set 8. 
Then, the configuration code applies the specified authentication method lists for 
each access Exec method mentioned (console and VTY), in command sets 11 and 12 
respective1y as specified by the following explanation. 
Before we proceed with the code explanation, it is worthwhile to clarify that the 
default authentication method list has to be used by the router' s lOS whenever there is a type 
of login access without an authentication method list specified. E.g., if we consider figure 4-
8's configuration, there is no specification for the authentication method list to be used for 
the auxiliary line access (AUX), since this type of VTY !ines are not mentioned in the 
configuration, hence, lacking ali reference for an authentication method list assigned to it, so 
the NAS lOS will automatically assign it the default authentication method list in order to 
se cure this type of access. 
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The code of figure 4-8 can be explained as follows: 
1. This command enables AAA globally on ali NAS interfaces. 
2. These three commands specify the three TA CA CS+ servers used to perform the 
authentication process (as a grouping). This grouping of servers represents a whole set of 
TA CA CS+ servers configured on the router, and can be referenced as a potential 
authentication method within an authentication method list to be built. Referencing this 
method would be implicitly by mentioning the word "TACACS+". 
3. These three commands set up a subgrouping including on! y two specified TA CA CS+ 
authentication servers. This subgrouping can be referenced as a potential authentication 
method within an authentication method list to be built. Referencing this method would be 
explicitly my mentioning the subgrouping name: "aaatacgroup". 
4. These four commands set up a grouping of three RADIUS authentication servers. This 
grouping can be referenced as a potential authentication method within an authentication 
method list to be built. Referencing this method can be done either implicitly by mentioning 
the word "RADIUS", or explicitly my mentioning the subgrouping name: "aaaradgroup"46 . 
5. This command builds an authentication method list for user EXEC access mode. The access 
authentication method list's name is "console" (to refer to a method list to be used with 
console access), and it has two authentication methods within its method list: 
• The first authentication method (group aaatacgroup) uses only the TACACS+ 
subgrouping, two servers specified within the aaatacgroup to perform the 
authentication process. Thus the NAS will first try TACACS+ server 10.0.0.5 to 
perform the authentication; if it returns an error, then the NAS will try TA CA CS+ 
server 10.0.0.6 to perform the authentication; if it returns an error, then the NAS 
will try the next authentication method on the list, sin ce no more TA CA CS+ 
46 Referencing a method implicitly by mentioning the word "RADIUS" or "TATACS+" implies 
trying ali RADIUS (or TACACS+ servers that are configured on the NAS router, since they ali act as 
recovery peers for each other in this case. However, referring explicitly to a specifie subgrouping 
name, e.g. "aaaradgroup", specifies only the specifie servers mentioned in that subgrouping, rather 
than ali other RADIUS servers that might be configured on the NAS router. 
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servers are configured on the N AS router. 
• The second authentication method (local) uses the local database usemame/secret 
password logins, specified within the username commands that are configured 
globally on the NAS (to involve ali NAS interfaces) . Since the username local 
logins are configured on the NAS in part # 6, then the local authentication method 
can take place. If there were no local logins configured on the NAS, the local 
authentication method would have returned an error, and since no more 
authentication methods are listed on the "console" method list, then the user will 
not be authenticated and will be denied access to the NAS. 
This "console" authentication method is referenced in part # 9, where it is applied 
to the console access line configuration, as the authentication method list to be 
followed in order to authenticate users during their console login to the NAS. The 
use of the word "consoLe" as a name for the authentication method list is a 
descriptive term; any other name can be used to describe this authentication method 
list. 
6. These commands define the two logins to be used when users need to access the router 
directly through the console. 
7. This authentication method list includes the following four authentication methods: 
• The first authentication method (group aaatacgroup) tries only the two TA CA CS+ 
servers specified within the aaatacgroup to perform the authentication process, as it 
is explained above in step # 5. If both TACACS+ servers return an error, then the 
NAS will try the next authentication method on the list. 
• The second authentication method (group T ACACS+) tries ali three TACACS+ 
servers configured on the NAS router to perform the authentication. In this example , 
there are three servers configured: thus the NAS will first try 10.0.0.5, if an error is 
returned, The NAS will try 10.0.0.6, if an error is returned, the NAS will try 
1 0.0.0. 7, and if an error is retumed, the NAS will try the next authentication method 
on the list, since no more TACACS+ servers are configured on the NAS router. 
• The third authentication method (group aaaradgroup) tries ail three RADIUS 
servers specified within the aaaradgroup to perform the authentication process: thus 
the NAS will fi rst try 10.0.0.1, if an error is returned, The NAS will try 10.0.0.2, if 
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an error is retumed, the NAS will try 10.0.0.3, and if an error is returned, the NAS 
will try the next authentication method on the list, since no more RADIUS servers 
are configured on the NAS router. 
• The fourth , and last authentication method (krb5) , tries the Kerberos authentication 
server to perform the authentication process: if an error is retumed, the NAS will 
have try the next authentication method on the list, since no more authentication 
methods exist on the list, then the NAS router will deny user access. 
8. This command builds an authentication method list for privileged EXEC access mode, 
using the "enable" access method. The access authentication method list's name is 
"default" (which is a keyword referring to a method list to be used by default in case no 
other lists are specified), and it has two authentication methods. If both methods retum error 
as authentication results, then the user will be denied enable/privileged access to the router. 
This authentication method list includes the following authentication methods: 
• The first authentication method (group aaatacgroup) tries only the two TACACS+ 
servers specified within the aaatacgroup to perform the authentication process , as it is 
explained above in step # 5. If both TACACS+ servers return an error, then the NAS 
will try the next authentication method on the list. 
• The second authentication method (enable) uses the enable secret password logins, 
mentioned in command # 9 and configured globally on the NAS (to involve ail NAS 
interfaces). Since the enable secret47 is configured on the NAS, then the enable 
authentication method can take place. If there were no enable secret configured on the 
NAS, the enable authentication method would have returned an error, and since no 
more authentication methods are listed on the "default " method list to secure the 
privilege access, then the user will not be authenticated and will be denied access to the 
NAS. 
9. This command identifies the enable secret password logins, configured globally on the 
NAS, thus applied to ail NAS interfaces. 
47 Enable secret is the password configured on the NAS for user Privileged access mode (Enable 
mode) . 
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1 O. This command is to res tri ct the number of user authentication attempts, during a login 
session. The number specified is one, implying that in case the user cannat successfully 
authenticate on his first trial, his session wi ll be terminated, and he will have to reestablish a 
new access session to NAS in arder to retry to authenticate. 
11. This command applies the "console" authentication method li st, which is the authentication 
method list mentioned in part # 5, ta the console access line configuration, specifying how 
authentication should be done trying bath authentication methods that are included, 
mentioned above, to secure user access through the console line. 
12. This command applies the login "dejàult" authentication method list, which is the 
authentication method list mentioned in part# 7, to the Virtual Terminal (VTY) access line 
configuration, specifying how authentication should be done, trying all four authentication 
methods that are included as mentioned above, to secure user access through the VTY line. 
This chapter has studied the AAA paradigm, the authentication servers/protocols as 
weil as the peer recovery concepts in depth, through introducing a thorough explanation as 
weil as a deep theoretical analysis of each concept, presenting the mechanisms related to the 
details introduced, while developing configuration codes that help understand and emphasize 
the different approaches, including different configuration options that are related to their 
app lication. 
In the chapter, we introduced the different remote user authentication methods to 
secure user access into the NAS router. We started by defining authentication as a security 
concept in arder to emphasize its importance, along with the AAA paradigm as a concept 
that dictates the use of authentication servers/protocols. Next, we introduced the mechanism 
of an authentication server, followed by the different secure access approaches that are 
usually used along with the authentication servers, like Challenge/Response, OTP, PPP, 
PAP, CHAP and proxy servers. Th en we introduced the different authentication 
servers/protocols in details, analyzing their different mechanisms white concentrating on the 
authentication functions for each of them. Thus we introduced RADIUS, DIAMETER, 
TA CA CS+ and Kerberos. The latter was thoroughly analyzed to justify the different nature 
of its mechanism, which prevents us from further considering it in this study for the 
---- ----- ---- ----
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authentication comparison using Dynamic ACLs concept. Finally, we introduced the concept 
of the AAA authentication method lists that are used to crea te a transparent peer recovery for 
the different user login access methods as weil as with the enable method. We proposed a 
syntax code as weil as a simplified example and a full NAS router configuration coded 
example that demonstrate different configurations of T ACACS+ and RADIUS us ing 
different user login methods and as weil as enable methods. This code can be considered as a 
reference to understand and apply the AAA server authentication for different user access 
methods to any organization's NAS. 
This chapter's importance stems from its thorough explanation for the concepts 
mentioned above, ending by relating most of such concepts into a weil developed code that 
put them ali together into a practical application, and that will help us explain/develop 
further more sophisticated concepts and configurations codes about dynamic ACLs 
authentication using the AAA servers, as will be introduced in chapter 5. 
In the next chapter, we explain the authentication process that takes place within the 
Dynamic ACLs as a security technique. And based on the analyses of the concepts 
introduced in chapter 4, we discuss the possibility of the application of the authentication 
concepts explained within the dynamic ACL's authentication process, along with the 
comparison between them, which will allow the reader to better understand their weaknesses 
and strengths, and to better make his own choices either by applying them as a 
complementary option or as a substitute for the dynamic ACL process. 
- -------- --- ----
CHAPTER V 
AUTHENTICATION AND DYNAMIC ACLS 
The study's main focus is the elaboration of the user authentication step, which is the 
mam step upon which relies the Dynamic ACLs filtering process and which traditionally 
involves the use of Telnet as a vütualline connection, as a way to access the NAS upon which 
the filtering process takes place. 
Dynamic ACLs, also known as Lock-and-Key, are used to authenticate a remote user, by 
opening a temporary hole in the extended ACL that filters the user access to the organization 
inner resources . Lock-and-Key is typically used in small networks to authenticate a specifie 
type of remo te us ers' access48. 
In this chapter, we will ana lyze Telnet as a connection method, as weil as an authentication 
mechanism, and its drawbacks that constitute sorne security limitations , and sometimes 
security ri sks, while performing remote user authentication within dynamic ACLs filtering 
process. Then we will introduce the use of other connection and authentication methods and 
how they can help overcome such drawbacks, when authenticating dynamic ACLs ' remote 
us ers. 
Thus we will introduce sorne combination case scenarios of different authentication 
methods in order to compare them in terms of scalability, reliability, ease of configuration, 
manageability, and cost efficiency. 
Finally we will introduce orne application recommendations built upon the research 
conc lusions obtained from such comparison, in order to provide the study 's recommendations. 
4~ Lock-and-key is to be configured on the NAS router when it doesn ' t have the Cisco lOS firewall 
feature set with authentication proxy installed, as authentication proxy is considered as a substitu te for 
Lock-and-key, as we will elaborate within this chapter. 
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5.1 Dynamic ACLs and choosing an authentication method 
Before we analyze the Telnet authentication mechanism, let' s recall that during 
dynamic ACLs, the NAS router has to authenticate the user connection, and can be configured 
with three choices of authentication methods: 
• 
• 
• 
Using the local database through username command . 
Using the VTY line through password command . 
U sing an AAA server. 
Out of the three authentication methods, let 's consider the AAA server 
implementation, which is a little different than the other two authentication methods. There 
exist two case scenarios for the implementation of the distributed application of the AAA 
servers as a dynamic ACL 's authentication method. Implementing such an authentication in a 
networked environment can be done through one oftwo approaches: 
1- In the first approach, the authentication server is located on the user' s network. 
Performing such an approach will require the server to be located on every remote user 
boundary firewa ll , within the user ' s premises. Such an application approach of AAA 
authentication is impractical, extremely expensive and, thus, inapplicable. 
2- In the second approach, the authentication server is located within the organization 
network, in arder to avoid the previous infeasible, high priced authentication method. 
With this second approach, the authentication takes place within the organization 
network premises and thus , can be applied as a distributed authentication process. As a 
conclusion, the second approach is the way AAA servers are implemented in real 
world networks. 
Thus in arder to reach into the organization network, the user has first to reach the 
organization NAS using Telnet as a VTY session, allowing the remote user authentication 
process to take place, according to the configuration of the local router, even though this 
connection is theoretically not secure enough to transmit the user's credentials reaching AAA 
authentication server. 
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In case the user fails to get authenticated, he will be re-prompted to re-enter his 
authentication information49 . Successful or not, the authentication process as weil as its 
corresponding VTY connection will be temlinated by the router. Thus the only purpose of 
Telnet is for authenticating the remote user, so, it will no longer be needed after the user 
successfi.illy becomes authenticated, since the user will be dynamically granted access for the 
organization's inner resources through the Dynamic ACL. 
Before we introduce the Telnet mechanism in details, let ' s elaborate the reason why 
Telnet is often used with dynamic ACLs authentication process, at !east as a first step for 
connecting remote users to reach the organization NAS. 
As we explained through "the Dynamic ACLs Configuration" section of Chapter 3, 
Dynamic ACLs have to mn an autocommand in order to execute the dynamic entry entered 
into the extended ACL. Such an autocommand has to mn within a shell. Therefore, the 
connection performed by the user into the organization NAS (border router), as the very first 
step of the dynamic ACLs occurrence, has to be a connection that allows a shell environment 
where the autocommand can be run, such as Telnet. 
However, Telnet is not the only connection method that would allow user access to the 
NAS Command-Line Interface (CLI), through a shell connection. According to Odom (Odom, 
2009), accessing a Router's CLI can be done by one of the three possible methods: 
1- Console access, 
2- Telnet access , 
3- Secure Shell (SSH) access. 
Out of the three connection methods mentioned above, only Telnet and SSH can be established 
remotely, thus we will study them in the following section, in order to compare their security 
aspects. 
49 The number of re-prompting trials is to be configured depending on the organization 's security 
policies . 
152 
Before we get to that comparison, let 's introduce the dynamic ACLs mechanism using a Telnet 
connection, established between the remote user and the NAS. 
5.2 Dynamic ACLs mechanism using Telnet 
As explained befo re, in order for a Dynamic ACL user authentication process to take place 
through the NAS , the NAS should be configured with Lock-and-Key/Dynamic ACe0, and a 
Telnet connection has to be established between the user premises and the NAS. 
During such a Telnet connection, the user has to pass the authentication process before access 
is allowed through the network resources. Once authenticated, the user Telnet session 
terminates, and the NAS creates a temporary entry in the dynamic ACL to allow user 
temporary access for a certain range of network resources. Such a range can be limited by a 
wise configuration of the temporary entry, in a way that complies to the security policies of the 
organization.51 Then user exchanges data with the inner resources he 's granted access to , by 
the dynamic ACL entry configuration. Such resources would otherwise be denied without the 
dynamic ACL entry. Once the configured timeout (either the idle or the absolute) is reached, 
the temporary entry is deleted by the NAS. The temporary entry can also be deleted once the 
network engineer manually deletes it out of the dynamic ACL's configuration. 
If the authentication process faits, the user will only be granted access to the inner resources 
specified in the static ACL configured on the NAS, without a dynamic ACL entry. Thus the 
dynamic ACL entry is triggered by the success of the user authentication process. 
Now that we explained the dynamic ACLs' mechanism using Telnet as a VTY connection, 
let's introduce the problem of our research, to guide the reader for a better grasping of the 
objectives of this study, as follows: 
50 Lock-and-Key/Dynamic ACL is a static ACL that can accepta dynamic ACL entry. 
51 The temporary entry drawback is that it doesn ' t allow flexibility when pennitting access to inner 
resources, in order to personalize such permissions to diffe rent privileges spec ified to different user 
profiles. As you will see later in the chapter, you cannot set upper-user access policies. lnstead, you 
define one policy for ail your lock-and-key users, and this single po licy is applied to ali the authenticated 
users. 
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5.3 Problem of the research 
The research focuses on studying Dynamic ACLs, when they're used to restrict remote 
user access to an organization's inner network52 . In particular, the study's targets the 
user authentication step, which is the first step of the Dynamic ACLs filtering process 
and which involves the use ofTelnet connection to carry the user's credentials before a 
given authentication process begins. Exposing user logins during a certain connection 
can be the opened door for many malicious attackers to get access through such a 
connection. Specially that the Dynamic ACL access allows Telnet, as an externat 
event, to place an opening into the NAS/ border firewall , which even increase that 
router security risks . 
In fact, the user authentication process is built, in the first place, upon trusting the 
identity of the user telnetting into the network border router (NAS): During the Telnet 
session the user has to enter sorne login information so that the authentication process 
begins. Thus establishing a user Telnet session is considered, as an essential 
connection process to access the NAS, before getting the NAS to start any further 
authentication for the user. 
The study's main focus is to elaborate the security aspects of the Telnet process as a VTY 
connection to access the NAS, on one hand, and as one of the choices of Dynamic ACLs user 
authentication methods configured on the NAS, on the other hand. 
Thus, we wi ll analyze Telnet security drawbacks that can affect the dynamic ACLs' user 
authentication process. Other VTY connection methods that can be used in lieu of Telnet as a 
first step to access the NAS dynamic ACLs, namely SSH, will be explained and compared to 
Telnet. Then we will compare the different authentication methods involved in Dynamic ACLs 
user authentication process, in terms of security aspects, scalability, reliability, ease of 
configuration, manageability, and cast efficiency; in arder to create one or more scenario(s) as 
guidelines that can enable network engineers to choose a more secure user authentication 
process to be used within dynamic ACLs' filtering process. 
52 Dynamic ACLs can also be used to restrict a group of inner users' access to a host on a remote 
network protected by a firewall. This use of Dynamic ACLs is out of the scope of our study. 
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Now that we pinpointed the main focus of our study, let's begin by explaining Telnet as a VTY 
connection method to reach the NAS command tine interface (CLI) on the organization border, 
as weil as SSH that can substitute Telnet in this matter. Let's compare SSH with Telnet, in 
arder to decide which option can be considered as a more secure VTY connection method. 
Thus in this section, we will explain each connection method in details, sa that we can 
thoroughly compare between them in terms of different comparison criteria. 
5.4 Telnet as a VTY connection 
Telnet is the standard terminal-emulation application layer protocol in the TCP/IP protocol 
stack. Telnet is used for remote terminal connection, enabling users to log in to remote systems 
command line interface (CLI) and to use recourses as if they were connected to a local system. 
Using Telnet, users connect to the remote systems (deviees, servers or company 
resources) , which are called "Telnet servers", using a terminal emulator, which is called a 
Telnet Client, through an IP network connection. Telnet client applications are available for 
most computer platforms. Port 23 is the connection port used by Telnet on the felnet Server 
(the Router orNAS, in this case) in order to allow user connections into the Server' s CLI. 
Figure 5-1 will help better visualize the NAS, the AS and the user re lationship; as follows: 
Internet 
AS 
(server) 
Figure 5.1 
NAS (c lient) 
The Telnet connection 
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5.4.1 Telnet vulnerability 
A connection that lacks relia ble user authentication is considered as an unsecure connection. In 
this section we will explain the main security risks associated with the use of Telnet as a 
connection method, the limitations of user authentication security. 
• Telnet 's main security issue is that it sends user login information across the network 
in Plain text, where the username/password will be unencrypted and visible throughout 
the network) , thus exposing the network to many security attacks. 
• 
Telnet sends ali connection data as a clear-text data type, thus the login password is 
exposed, ali the time, for potential security risks. Using a packet analyzer, a network 
sniffer that can intercept network traffic, decoding its raw data and its field values, an 
intruder can obtain the user credentials or even the message contents from any Telnet 
communication (Odom, 2009). 
Thus we can get to the conclusion that Telnet authentication process is not secure. 
By default, Cisco Routers only allow console access without a password, and prevent 
ali remote access (including Telnet and SSH) whenever there is no password 
configured on the router within these access modes. Thus if a VTY line password, an 
enable password, or an enable secret is not configured on a Cisco Router, there is no 
way for a remote user to 2ccess it through Telnet or SSH53 , which insures sorne leve! 
of securi ty about both Telnet and SSH. Thus in order for the router to be reached, it 
has to be configured with an enable password as weil as line usernames/passwords. 
However, accessing the router using Telnet doesn't require the user to enter a 
combination of username/password, only a password is needed, which proves Telnet 
vulnerability, specially when compare to SSH, which requires a username/Password 
combination (Odom, 2009). 
53 User can connect to routers without a VTY password in case VTY is configured with "no Iogin" 
command, which disables ail authentication checking and thus, would allow ali users to directly access a 
router's CLI , which is never recommended for any local or remote connection, from a security point of 
v1ew. 
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• This will lead us to the next risk of using Telnet as exactly stated by Wikipedia 
(Wikipedia - Telnet Security, 2012): "Most implementations of Telnet have no 
authentication that would ensure communication is carried out between the two desired 
hosts and not intercepted in the middle." Thus, throughout a Telnet connection, 
intmders might interpret the message contents, during their end-to-end transmission 
between the user and the authentication server. This risk of revealing the connection 
contents is known as a man-in-the-middle attack, as explained in chapter 1. 
• A third risk is about Telnet daemons, which are the programs mnning without a user 
direct control or interaction and are proven over time to have sorne vulnerability 
problems, which represent potential possibilities of malicious attacks (Wikipedia -
Telnet, 2012). 
Now that we introduced a number of Tel net security risks, 1et's consider sorne solutions to face 
them. 
5.4.2 Overcoming Telnet's drawbacks 
Overcoming Telnet security issues can be achieved by following sorne security procedures. 
Sorne of them will be explained in this section, however interested readers can find sorne more 
in Appendix A of the study, entitled: "How to improve Telnet security issues?" The procedures 
that the study recommends to help diminish Telnet security vulnerability, by integrating 
alternative options, as fo llows: 
• 
• 
Through using extended Access lists, a pp lied inbound on each and every interface of 
the NAS router. This suggested solution, though, is not very practical or feasible due to 
the large number of interfaces that might exist on su ch routers . 
Through controlling VTY line (Telnet or SSH) access by applying the well-kn<>wn 
"Access class" within the VTY line of the NAS router. However, this solution depends 
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on limiting the source addresses telnetting to the NAS into a defined list or subnets 
(Odom, 2009). The configuration code of this solution is as follows: 
NAS (config) # access-list 10 permit 10 . 100.50 . 0 0.0.0.22 
2 NAS (config) # line vty 0 15 
NAS (config-line) # access-class 10 in 
Figure 5.2 The Telnet configuration using "access class" 
• 
According to the configuration code, the access list mentioned in part 1 limits 
access exclusively to the IP addresses that range from 10.100.50.0 to 10.1 00.50.225; 
while part 2 cotTesponds to applying that access limitation to the VTY line. 
Limiting the source IP addresses accessing to the VTY line, as a solution, doesn't 
prevent the source address spoofing problem and the other potential login exposure, 
associated with the use of Telnet. Besides, this solution doesn ' t work with the regular 
application of Dynamic ACLs that heavily depends on the ever-changing remote 
source IP addresses (due to DHCP or due to the remote user changing physical 
positions) that would like to connect to the NAS router. 
In order to overcome the possibility of spoofing, encryption can be configured, so that 
ali traffic (including the source IP address) coming from remote users would be 
encrypted at a e ured r mote router and decrypted locally at the seriai NAS interface 
providing the Lock-and-Key. Since, this way, ali dynamic ACL traffic entering the 
NAS would be secured; no hackers would be able to spoof the source address , as it 
would be impossible for them to duplicate the encryption, in order to be successfully 
authenticated, as it is a required first step to trigger the dynamic ACL entry, and to 
reach the inner network resources. This solution transforms the Telnet process into one 
that is equivalent to SSH's . 
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• In order to face the password exposure security risk of Telnet, the following steps can 
be followed : 
1. The NAS can be configured with "service password-encryption" command, 
which can be configured at any given time. According to Odom (Odom, 
2009), the service password-encryption is a feature that helps encrypt all 
existing and future passwords strings that are already stored on the router as 
weil as passwords newly entered onto the NAS, so that they would not be 
shown within the router configuration, as a clear text. 
Although the password encryption is not extremely stronger than the normal 
"enable password command", it might prevent casual observers from seeing 
Telnet passwords in the clear. 
2. The NAS can be configured with "enable secret" command, which uses a 
stronger hash algorithm than the normal "enable password command", as it 
depends on applying the Message Digest 5 (MD5) mathematical function to 
the password strings. 
According to Odom (Odom, 2009), the enable secret help defining a certain 
password to be entered by the user once he would like to privilege access the 
NAS router, however it can never be shown within the router configuration, 
as a clear text, which is a detail unavailable in regular passwords. 
By now, we can conclude that Telnet has a considerab le number of security issues, 
therefore, we don ' t recommend its use as connection method for remote users: thus, restricting 
telnetting altogether, white finding a substitution connection method, is one way to avoid its 
security disadvantages. Therefore, in this study, we wi ll e laborate SSH as another more secure 
VTY connection method that can be a substitution for Telnet54. 
54 A VPN connection can be considered as another option to substitute a Telnet connection. 
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5.4.3 SSH as a Telnet substitute 
Actually, according to Wikipedia, because of the security issues with Telnet, its use for many 
connection purposes has waned in favor of SSH. Thus, let's ask the following question: Why is 
SSH considered as a more secure authentication than Telnet? 
In this section, we will compare both Telnet and SSH, according to their functionality 
and their security aspects. 
features : 
Both Telnet and SSH are very similar as they both are characterized by the following 
1. Both are CLI (shell) connection authentication methods, 
2. Both require an IP network connection to access the CLI USER mode, 
3. Both require a Client software with a terminal emulator to be installed on the 
user host, 
4. Both use TCP, with a weil known po1t on the Server (Port#23 for Telnet, and 
Port#22 for SSH), 
5. Both have the server receive the text messages, processes them in terms of 
commands and resend the results to the client. 
SSH, however, requires both a username and a password from connecting users, white 
Telnet doesn ' t require any. So the NAS router must be configured to use one of the two user 
authentication methods that require both a username and password: one method with the 
usemame and password configured locally on the switch database, or the other method with 
the username and password configured extemally on an AAA server. 
Also SSH uses encryption fo r ali data exchange between the SSH client and SSH 
server (login data and message contents), which provides a more secure connection than 
Telnet, by protecting user login information and data from being intercepted by intruders. 
Also SSH uses public key authentication in order to authenticate the interconnected 
hosts and to assure they're the intended recipients within a certain communication. In fact, 
SSH cl ients use SSH protocol to connect to SSH authentication server, which would be the 
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NAS in Dynamic ACL application case. However, in case of SSH, the NAS (cisco IOS image) 
has to support RSA, which is an encryption algorithm that generates public and private key 
pairs; Data Encryption Standard (DES) or 3DES, as weil as password authentication. Cisco 
Internetwork Operating System (lOS) version 12.1(3) is recommended to be installed on the 
NAS to guarantee a client sever SSH connection, also SSH version2, which is the latest 
version, is recommended to be used for such a connection. 
Thus, SSH is considered a more secure VTY connection method, providing more reliable 
authentication algorithms than Telnet. Setting the VTY access to SSH, even though considered 
as optional, it is highly recommended. 
SSH configuration would look like the fo llowing: 
Router(config)# hostname router name 
Router(config)# ip domain-name ONS domain name 
Router(config)# crypta key generate rsa 
Router(config)# username name secret password 
Router(config)# line vty 0 4 
Router(config-line)# transport input ssh 
Router(config-line) login local 
The configuration starts by assigning a host name and a domain name to the NAS router. Then 
The NAS lOS will generate a public key that will be sent to the SSH client and a private key 
that wi ll stay at the server, once the command "crypto key generate RSA" is executed. Then, 
both the global "usemame" command as well as the VTY " login local" command are to set up 
the authentication to be performed locally, by the NAS router itself. AAA server authentication 
can be applied using SSH connection as weil. 
Now that we explained both Telnet and SSH VTY connection methods mechanisms, 
as weil as compared their security aspects, and their authentication mechanisms, this section 
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will demonstrate the different cases where Telnet or SSH, as connection methods, can be 
combined with other authentication methods, in order to perform the authentication process 
required by dynamic ACLs mechanism. 
5.5 Telnet as an authentication method 
As we explained before, the remote user authentication through the authentication server 
method is impractical to be performed at the user premises, thus user authentication has to take 
place locally, on the organization NAS, or on an authentication server after connecting to the 
NAS . Thus, in ail cases, a user connection to the NAS has to take place first , and such a 
connection will be do ne using either tel net or SSH. During su ch a connection session, the N AS 
can perform one or more user authentication processes, to guarantee the legitimacy of the user 
identity, as a main requirement for the dynamic ACL entry to be dynamically placed within the 
Lock-and-Key ACL, which would grant the user access to the inner network resources. The 
authentication process, as mentioned above, can be through the use of Telnet as one of the 
authentication methods that can be configured upon the NAS. In this section, we will analyze 
Telnet as remote user authentication method, comparing it to other authentication methods that 
can take place when configuring dynamic ACLs on the organization' s NAS. We will also 
discuss the subject of combining one or more user authentication methods into Dynamic 
ACLs, to guarantee an even higher leve! of security for the organization's inner resources. 
Tenet as an authentication method takes place under Dynamic ACLs authentication methods , 
as we will explain in the following section. 
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5.6 Dynamic ACLs authentication methods 
Let's, then explain the three main authentication methods used within VTY line along with 
Dynamic ACLs' application: 
5.6.1 Telnet as a user authentication method 
When explaining Telnet as a user authentication method, which is also referred 
to as " line password", it is highly recommended not to use it within Dynamic ACLs, 
because the password is configured for the Telnet port on the NAS router, not for the 
remote user. Therefore every user would have to use the same password, and any user 
who knows the password will be able to authenticate successfully. Thus it will make 
no sense to authenticate the user upon such unsecure login information. The 
configuration syntax is as follows : 
NAS (config-line) # passwordpassword 
NAS (config-line) # Iogin 
The first command assigns a password to a terminal or to another deviee on a line 
(VTY) . 
The second command enables password checking at login according to the password 
specified locally on the router's VTY line, by the previous command. 
If applied, and since it is related to the port versus the user, line password 
authentication would allow ail illegitimate users , once they know that common 
password, which is likely to happen as it is assigned to the port. Having the password, 
the illegitimate users will easily pass the authentication process, which will trigger the 
dynamic ACL entry that, in turn, would grant such users legitimate access; exchanging 
data with the organization secure inner resources. This problem might appear like the 
one used by any system using a given password, however, the fact that the password is 
assigned to the Telnet port makes it so widespread to be known for a large number of 
users, which increase its Vlllnerability leve!. 
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However, there can be one or more preliminary authentication steps for the 
user to go through, before he actually authenticates using Telnet. Actually, when 
configuring dynamic ACLs, it is best practice to combine many authentication 
methods. The following combination of authentication methods along with Telnet 
might be of a great interest for our research, in arder to find a better authentication 
security white using tine password: 
Sometimes dynamic ACLs are referred to as "Double authentication", according to E-
Tutorials (E-Tutorials- Lock-and-Key Overview, 2012). With double authentication, 
the dialup user is first authenticated through PPP-CHAP, then through the Jock-and-
Key ACL. 
Double authentication has two stages, according to Cisco (Cisco lOS Security 
Configuration Guide, Release 12.2-Configuring Authentication, 2006): the first stage 
authenticating the remote host, and the second stage authenticating the specifie users 
on the host. TA CA CS+ and other AAA servers can be used to perf01·m both 
authentication stages, providing a stronger authentication technique than authenticating 
only the host, leaving the same host password to be used by ali host users, as it is the 
case with the use of line (Telnet) authentication method by itself. 
And since PPP-CHAP OSI layer-2 authentication method depends upon a strong 
encryption mechanism, as explained in Chapter 4 titled "Authentication methods", 
combining it and configuring it to lake place as a first authentication stage before the 
layer-7 Telnet as a second authentication stage, would provide a more reliable user 
Jogin, personalized according to each us r. Also, CHAP 's strong encryption aspect will 
eliminate the possibility of eavesdropping over the user logins, which exists in case of 
using Telnet authentication, which allows a chance of overcoming sorne of Telnet 
authentication security drawbacks (Cisco lOS Security Configuration Guide, 
Release 12.2-Configuring Authentication, 2006). 
5.6.2 The local database as a user authentication method 
Like Telnet user authentication method, this authentication method takes place locally 
within the N AS itself, and consists of a global configuration of a usemame along with 
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a password. The local authentication method is considered stronger than Telnet 
authentication method, as it depends on a pair ofusername/password, which represents 
a stronger approach than the password approach provided by Telnet authentication; 
and thus somehow protects the user access into the router. Also this authentication 
methods ' usemame/password are per user credentials stored on the local database of 
the NAS router, as opposed to Telnet's authentication ali-user password that will be so 
easy to remember and to propagate among hackers once known or exposed to an 
untmsted user. 
Let's consider the code configuration that implements the local authentication method 
on the N AS router: 
The global configuration is followed by a line configuration including a "login local" 
command, which makes the local password override the password configured on the 
VTY line, and thus takes a remote user connecting through a Telnet connection to 
verify his credentials against the credentials stored in the local router database, before 
his access is permitted through the autocommand to reach the organization's inner 
resources. 
nas (config) # username user' s name password user' s_pasS'IlOrd 
nas(config)# line vty 0 4 
nas(config-line)# login local 
Thus this method is about authenticating a number of users for the Router access. 
However when we consider the possibility of having hundreds of routers, it would be 
diffi cult to maintain ail of the user accounts on ail of the routers, which poses a 
scalability problem related to this type of authentication. In order to overcome this 
problem, AAA authentication servers can be implemented to authenticate the user 
Exec access (Telnet connection). 
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5.6.3 The AAA authentication servers as a user authentication method 
The AAA paradigm has many advantages and disadvantages when it cornes to 
the remote user authentication process. In this section, we highlight sorne of the 
reflections about that type of authentication, while comparing it to the local 
authentication method (since line authentication method is never recommended to be 
used within dynamic ACL 's connections). 
The AAA paradigm offers great benefits, when it cornes to scalability, as it allows the 
centralization of the user accounts on one (or more) dedicated server(s) containing ali 
the security policies that define the list of users and what they are allowed to do. Thus 
the AAA server main tains all remo te users credentials instead of managing and storing 
them directly on one or more NAS router. Once users need to access to organization's 
network, The NAS router(s) sends the authentication and authorization requests (as 
weil as the accounting requests in sorne cases) to the AAA server to validate them, 
according to the security policies contained in the user profiles. The NAS router then 
applies the AAA server ' 'alidation result permitting or denying users ' access to the 
network. 
Having an AAA centralized user login management is more scalable than configuring 
and changing the user credentials on many individual switches and routers. Thus the 
AAA server authentication method is considered as having a better manageability 
a pect, as well as scalability features, when compared to the local database 
authentication method. 
AAA server user authe!ltication method depends on usmg the IEEE 802.1X user 
authentication standard55 as a part of the overall Network Administration Control 
(NAC) strategy, where the user will not be granted access to the organization' s inner 
network, unless he supplies sorne login credentials to the NAS. Then the NAS sends 
the user credentials to the AAA server. There wi ll be a series of authentication 
55 802.1 X is an IEEE standard authentication protocol fo r network ac cess control (Wikipedia - IEEE 
802.1X, 2012). 802.1X encapsulates the authentication messages between the user (supplicant) and the 
authenticat ion server, passing througll the NAS (authenticator). 
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messages going back and forth between the user and the NAS, as weil as between the 
NAS and the AAA server. The AAA server discards ali frames on the inner network, 
except for those 802.lx messages to and from the user. Once the NAS receives 
messages from the AAA server indicating that the user has been successfully 
authenticated, ali traffic will be permitted between the user and the ultimate destination 
the user originally needed access to, according to the access permitted by the dynamic 
ACL entry. With a user unsuccessful authentication message received from the AAA 
the server, the user will be denied access to the destination stated within the dynamic 
ACL entry. 
The message exchange between the remote user and the AAA server may someiimes 
delay the authentication process, especially in case of the existence of sorne connec ti on 
problems or network congestions. Thus local authentication, where the NAS checks 
and decides for the authentication of the user login information, by itself, might be 
considered a faster way, in this sense, since no authentication messages have to be 
exchanged over the LAN. 
The message exchange delay possibility, in the case of AAA server authentication 
used during a Dynamic ACL connection, might cause the user VTY login timeout 
duration, which is the idle timeout, to expire before the authentication results are sent 
from the AAA server to the NAS router. This will cause the authentication to close 
and thus the user has to reconnect through VTY in order to re-authenticate. Which 
might cause a delay for the whole access process for the user. This can be considered 
as one reason to favor local authentication method than the AAA server authentication 
method, as weil as it demonstrates that network security always has a conflict with 
network connectivity. 
AAA server method applies encryption to the exchanged login information between 
the NAS and the AAA server, an aspect that indicates reliability. In the case of the 
local authentication method, the encryption aspect need depends on the location o:f the 
database: since the database is located on the NAS router itself, then there is no need to 
encrypt the data since there is no data exchange. This means that the reliability aspect 
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IS still present in the case of the local authentication, even though there 1s no 
exchanged data encryption done or needed. 
When it cornes to ease of configuration and deviee manageability, choosing one 
authentication method, white excluding another, is relative to the size of the network to 
be protected. Local authentication method should be preferred to the AAA 
authentication method only when the network size is small, having on ly one or two 
NAS router(s) to be configured, updated with users credential information, and 
maintained for consistency. Since AAA security services involve a certain number of 
security deviees to be configured, and to be contacting each other through certain 
settings, such a configuration will be more complicated than helpful when compared to 
configuring/maintaining only one or two NAS routers. 
However the AAA authentication method will be very helpful in case of medium to 
large size networks, as it will facilitate the management of user credentials, by 
maintaining them in one or more centrally controlled AAA servers, which will provide 
ease of manageability as weil as consistency between a large number of NAS routers 
(Begl2 ; Beg l2 ; Begl2) . 
AAA security services provide redundancy amongst the used AAA servers, which 
allows for risk management in case of failure or inability to reach any of the servers. 
AAA servers allows the grouping of a number of server from th sam typ , so that 
referencing this group would try the authentication process using one server after 
another within that group, enforcing redundancy. That redundancy feature is not 
provided by the local autltentication method. 
AAA security services provide a great degree of reliability, for all three services: 
authentication, authorization and accounting, as it gives the possibility of combining 
more than one method of each service, in order to allow recovery for the NAS-AAA 
server connection errors whenever they occur. For instance, when it cornes to the 
authentication process, AAA provides the possibility of defining authentication 
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method lists, which combine many types of authentication methods for the NAS router 
to use, in arder to secure remote user access to the organization ' s network, as 
explained in chapter 4. This feature provides another layer of redundancy, as weil; 
since allowing a number of authentication methods will cover for each other's 
unavailability. The login access ' users, for example, will be authenticated using more 
than one type of authentication method depending on the configuration and the 
network engineer preferences. We specified the login access in this study as Dynamic 
ACLs mechanism mainly depends on it, where the users have to use VTY !ines to 
initiate their access into the NAS router. That reliability feature is not provided by the 
local authentication method. 
As we explained the drawbacks of Telnet (Jo gin authentication method) in this chapter, 
we will show how it can combined with, or substituted by other authentication methods, such 
as AAA authentication server, using authentication method lists in order to authenticate users ' 
login access (Telnet as an access method). Thus we will introduce some examples of partial 
configurations to illustra te the use of the different authentication combinations within dynamic 
ACLs, followed by a differentiation between the different types of AAA server authentications 
that can be applied within the configuration, comparing them according to many perspectives, 
including scalability, reliability, ease of configuration, manageability, and cost efficiency. 
Example ofTelnet implementation as an access method and as an authentication method 
In the following example, we show the implementation of AAA authentication along with 
Telnet as an access method, as weil as an authentication method. The detailed configuration 
and explanation of this example will help the reader identify the se two different uses of Telnet, 
as weil as the use of authentication method lists as described in chapter 4. 
Example l - Line password and TA CA CS+ authentication 
In this example, we configure a dynamic ACL with TA CA CS+ authentication server 
protection. The T ACACS+ authentication method is configured in a default authentication 
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method list, which wi ll be automatically app lied to the VTY tines, overriding the tine 
authentication (telnet authentication). 
Figure 5-3 will help the reader better visua lize the topology: 
lnner network 
NAS (c lient) 
T ACACS+aaatacgroup 
~------~ ~------~ 
1 10.1.1.2 1 1 10.1.1.1 1 
~------2 L-- --- -2 
Figure 5.3 The Authentication server (AS)'s peer recovery 
The scenario is as follows : 
The user attempts to access the NAS interface 10.0.0.10 through a Telnet connection in 
order to reach the organization's resources. The Telnet connection will be allowed by an 
extended ACL configured on that router interface, however this Telnet conn ction willlead the 
user to an access authentication method. Once the user is successfully authenticated, the Telnet 
connection drops after triggering an autocommand. The autocommand will open a temporary 
entry for the authenticated user connection, through the creation of a Dynamic ACL's entry 
within the extended ACL. The Dynamic entry will allow user 's access to the network inner 
resources. 
Important implementation points to be considered: 
o The authentication method included within Telnet (VTY as an access method), 
should be specified right after the reserved word " login", however, in our 
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configuration, the word " login" doesn't specify any specifie authentication 
method. Since the code includes a method list named "default", that default 
method will be the authentication method applied to ali users accessing the router 
through ali access methods whose authentication methods are not specified, 
including Telnet access method. Also, this default method will be automatically 
applied to ali router interfaces that are assigned these specifie access methods, 
including Telnet. 
Thus Telnet access method will neglect the Telnet password specified within the 
Telnet (VTY) access method portion and will lead the user to the defa ult 
authentication method. 
o The default authentication method list has only one authentication method 
specified, nam ely the TA CA CS+ method. This method uses the default name 
"T ACACS+", which refers to the whole set of TACACS+ servers that are 
configured on the N AS router. Sin ce the re are two T ACACS+ servers configured 
on the router, then the authentication will be tried on the first server at IP address 
l 0.1.1.1, and if the server is not available to perform that function , the next server 
at IP address l 0.1.1.2 will be tried. 
The configuration code is as follows: 
NAS(config)# aaa new-mode1 (1) 
NAS(config)# aaa authentication 1ogin default group tacacs+ (2) 
NAS(config)# tacacs-server host 10 . 1.1.1 sing1e-connection (3) 
key secret1 
NAS(config)# tacacs-server host 10 . 1.1.2 sing1e-connection 
key secret2 
NAS(config)# access-1ist 101 permit tep any host 10.1.1.10 eq (4) 
telnet 
NAS(config)# access-1ist 101 dynamic testaccess timeout 15 
permit i p any any 
NAS(config)# line vty 0 15 
NAS(config-line)# autocornmand access-enable timeout 10 
NAS(config-line)# password cisco4dacl 
NAS(config-line)# login 
NAS(config)# interface sO 
NAS(config-if)# ip address 17 2.18.23 .9 255.255.255.0 
NAS(config-if)# ip access-group 1 01 in 
The configuration numbers refer to the following: 
1) This command enables AAA globally on all NAS interfaces. 
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( 5) 
( 6) 
(7) 
( 8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
2) This command builds an authentication method list, default, to be applied on the 
VTY line or any other access method as long as no other authentication method 
list is applied to it. The access authentication method list contains one 
authentication method: 
The TACACS+ authentication method (group tacacs+) tries all two TACACS+ 
servers configured on the NAS router to perform the authentication. Thus the NAS 
will first try 1 0.1.1.1, if an error is retumed, The NAS will try 1 0.1.1.2, if an error 
is returned, the NAS will try the next authentication method on the list, since no 
more TA CA CS+ servers are configured on the NAS router. And since there are no 
more authentication methods configured on the default list, then the user will be 
denied access to the NAS in this case. 
3) These two commands are to identify the T ACACS+ daemons to be used with this 
NAS router: 1 0.1.1.1 and 1 0.1.1.2, as weil as the ir shared encryption keys to be 
used when they communicate with the NAS, respectively: secret! and secret2 . 
4) These two commands are to identify the Jock and key ACL allowing only Telnet 
ac cess to the NAS router 1 0.1.1.1 0; and the dynamic entry, testaccess, that would 
permit all access to the organization inner network once the autocommand, 
configured within the Telnet configuration in part # 5, is triggered by the user 
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authentication process. 
5) This command is to switch the configuration mode from global configuration to 
vty line configuration; it also identifies the specifie !ines being configured. 
6) This command is to specify the autocommand that will place the dynamic ACL 
entry into the NAS router configuration, as shown in part # 4. The autocommand 
will allow user access by creating that dynamic entry only after the user 
authentication process is successfully perforrned. 
7) This command defines the line password. 
8) This command is to make the N AS prompt the user for a login password. 
9) This command is to switch the configuration mode from global configuration to 
interface configuration mode; it also identifies the specifie interface being 
configured, sü. That interface will be the access interface through with the user 
will access the NAS router. 
1 0) This interface subcommand is to specify the IP address of sü interface as weil as 
its subnet mask. 
11 ) This command is to apply the lock-and-key ACL 101 configured in part # 4, to sü 
interface, to filter all incoming packets on that interface. 
As the configuration shows, the default authentication method list contained only 
T ACACS+ authentication method. Actua lly this method list could have been a pp lied for any 
access method, other than the VTY (Telnet/line) access induded within the configuration, as 
weil as it could have been included other authentication methods besicles TACACS+. 
According to the configuration, when the user attempts to Telnet access the NAS router, he 
will be prompted to ènter a password, because of command # (8). Though the VTY !ines 
(Telnet) have a password configured, according to commune! # (7) , the TAC.t\CS+ 
authentication, con fig med as a deümlt login authentication method in command # (2). will 
oven·ide the line (Telnet) password authentication (Cisco lOS Security Config11ration Guide , 
Re lease 12 .2-Configuring Authentication, 2006). 
Thus. in this case, the Telnet connected user wi ll be prompted to enter hi s own 
credemia ls as config:ured within his user profile located on the TACACS+ server(s) . in order to 
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access the NAS router. The Telnet authentication will be used, then, only as a connection 
method, not as an authentication method, since the authentication will be provicled by 
TACACS+ server(s). 
Provided the configuration was missing command # (2), wbich included the 
TACACS+ server(s) , the Te lnet connectee! user would have been prompted to enter his Telnet 
password in orcier to access the router, and Telnet would have been used as both a connection 
method, as weil as an authentication rnethod. 
This examp le was introducecl in order to di fferentiate between Telnet as a connection 
method for Dynamic ACLs ' rem ote users, versus its use as an authentication metbocl, within 
the same context. 
Now that we explained the authentication mechanism that takes place while 
implementing Dynamic ACLs, let's introduce sorne of the Dynamic ACLs security aspects that 
might represent main concerns when deciding whether to implement Dynamic ACLs as a 
security solution to protect an organization network. 
5.7 Dynamic ACLs security aspects and the scalability issue 
Dynamic ACLs provides a great leve! of security robustness, flexibility to use a variety 
of authentication methods , reliability of packet transport, interoperability as weil as network 
resource manageability. However, out of ail the parameters that have to be considered when 
evaluating the security performance of Dynamic ACLs as a security technology, scalability is 
not we ll supported by dynamic ACLs, according to TacACK (TacACK.com - TACACS+, 
2009). 
In order to better explain this point, let's consider the following configuration code : 
access-list 102 permit tep any host 172 .18. 21 .2 eq telnet (1) 
access - list 102 dynamic testlist timeout 15 permit ip any any (2) 
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line VTY 0 15 
autocommand access-enable timeout 5 
password cisco 
( 3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
We can notice that the autocommand at command line # 4, includes an "access-enable" 
subcommand. Actually the "access-enable" subcommand opens up ali dynamic ACL on a 
certain number of connections to the inner network resource. That number is only up to the 
VTY line numbers permitted by the router, thus only 16 connections (from 0 to 15). Using a 
scalable AAA server (like TACACS+) doesn ' t expand that number because the Dynamic 
ACLs nature doesn ' t permit it. 
Th us Dynamic ACLs' lack of scalability aspect cannat be direct! y compensated by the 
scalability aspect of AAA servers (like TACACS+ ). 
5.7.1 The Auth-proxy as a solution for the Dynamic ACLs' scalability issues 
In order to improve scalability, the dynamic ACLs concept can be substituted by the 
use of Authentication proxy (auth-proxy) in a design where per-user-ACLs can be configured 
on the NAS in order to create the scalability aspect. 
The auth-proxy server permits the network engineer to apply security policies through 
personalized per-user-ACLs. It will act as a virtual server, where every per-user connection (to 
the inner network resources) can be triggered independently, once the user authentication has 
taken place. Also, every user is identified and authorized access according to his individual 
user profile. 
The connection to the organization's network starts by an HTTP session where the 
auth-proxy will check if the user is authenticated. If the user is already authenticated, then no 
intervention from the auth-proxy will take place. Otherwise, the auth-server will act as a screen 
(that the user interacts with) between the user and the organization network to authenticate the 
user, according to Cisco (Cisco - Implementing Authentication Proxy, 2006). 
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In the following, we will introduce the auth-proxy mechanism, followed by a 
comparison between the auth-proxy server and Dynamic ACLs followed by the NAS 
configuration steps applying the use of auth-proxy server in order to reach a per-user-ACLs 
configuration. 
5.7 .1.1 Authentication proxy (Auth-proxy) as a substitute for Dynamic ACLs 
user authorization profile(4) 
1.---------·.~ ~r----------. AAA server · ji'o,-... ---.. "",~!!II!, :!!JIIIIN.--.. _·_~_ • •. A:!:~~~~:~tion(J) 
The organization's NAS SO (5) HTTP request (!) 
,~····· 
network 
\, 
/. •· ···· 
Lo2:in successful message (6) 
/ 
Figure 5.4 Auth-proxy and Dynamic ACLs 
According to figure 5-4, the Auth-proxy 's mechanism involves the followings steps: 
1. The user starts an HTTP session with the organization's HTTP server, through the 
NAS router. 
2. The NAS triggers an auth-proxy server, sending the HTTP request to the auth-proxy 
server. 
3. The auth-proxy checks if the user is already authenticated (by the auth-proxy itself or 
by another authentication method): 
a. If yes, there exist a valid user authentication, the connection to the mner 
resource is allowed with no intervention of the auth-proxy. 
b. If no, the auth-proxy prompts the user to enter his credentials, so that the 
authentication can take place. 
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4. Once the user is successfully authenticated by the auth-proxy, the user authorization 
profile is sent from the AAA server (like TACACS+) to the auth-proxy server to check 
if the access request is eligible for that user. 
5. The dynamic ACL entry is built allowing the user access to the inner resource and is 
added to the NAS access interface configuration. The auth-server actually substitutes 
the source address, in one or more temporary dynamic ACL entry, by the authorized 
user IP address. 
6. The HTTP server sends a " login successful" message to the user. 
When we compare Dynamic ACLs ' mechanism to the auth-proxy mechanism, we obtain the 
following: 
1- Dynamic ACLs are triggered through a VTY (Telnet) connection request from the 
user, while the auth-proxy are triggered through an HTTP connection request from the 
user. 
2- Dynamic ACLs use local authentication, VTY authentication or AAA server 
authentication; while the auth-proxy uses only AAA server authentication. 
3- Dynamic ACLs have both an absolute timeout, and an idle timeout; while the auth-
proxy has only an absolute timeout. 
4- Dynamic ACLs entries are configured on the NAS router, while the auth-proxy 's 
dynamic ACL 's entries are created from the user profile retrieved from the AAA 
server. 
5- Dynamic ACLs access privileges are granted on a per host basis (host IP address) , 
while the auth-proxy ' s access privileges are granted on a per host basis (host IP 
address) as weil asper-user profi le information. 
6- Dynamic ACLs entry is only limited to one entry, while the auth-proxy ' s dynamic 
entries are multiple, as defined by the user profile information. 
7- Dynamic ACLs entry only allows connection coming from a certain host ' s IP address 
(or group of hosts ). In case there are many us ers, they ali have to connect using that 
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host (or group of hosts) . While the auth-proxy's allows coming connection based on 
the DHCP-based IP address, which means the free choice for the user to login from 
any location he needs , independently from the host. 
(Cisco - Authentication Proxy, 2008) 
5. 7 .1.2 Au th pro x y configuration on the N AS router 
Let's consider an example where we need to implement auth-proxy onto the NAS 
router, the router 's seriai interface sO has IP address 10 .1.1.10, while its Ethernet interface eO 
has IP address 10.10.1 0.1 0, and the TACACS+ server has IP address 1 0.1.1.1 . 
According to Cisco (Cisco IOS Security Configuration Guide, Release 12 .1-Configuring 
Authentiation Proxy), configuring the NAS router to use auth-proxy involves the following 
configuration steps: 
1) Enable AAA. 
2) Defi ne the list of Jo gin authentication methods. 
3) Define the list of authorization methods. 
4) Enable authorization proxy for AAA. 
5) Defi ne the HTTP server and enable auth-proxy to use it. 
6) Define the security server (TACACS+ in this example) and a server key (T ACACS+ or 
RADIUS). 
7) Secure the NAS external interface, by applying arr ACL only allowing access to the HTTP 
server. 
8) Ena ble the N AS internai interface, to recem traffic from the TA CA CS+ server, by 
applying an ACL only allowing access to traffic coming from the TA CA CS+ server. 
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A configuration code would look like the fo llowing: 
NAS(config)# aaa new-model (1) 
NAS(config)# aaa authentication l ogin methlist group t ac ac s (2) 
NAS(config)# aaa authorization exec group tacac s (3) 
NAS(config)# aaa authorization a ut h-proxy defau l t gr oup tacac s (4) 
NAS(config)# aaa accounting auth-proxy default s tar t-stop (5) 
group t acacs 
NAS(config)# i p http server (6) 
NAS(config)# ip http authentication aaa (7) 
NAS(config) # ip auth-proxy name check-out http list check-http (8) 
NAS(config)# ip access-list extended chec k-http (9) 
NAS(config-ext-nacl)#permit t e p any host 10.1. 1.10 eq www 
NAS(config-ext-nacl)#deny ip any a ny 
NAS(config-ext-nacl)#exit 
NAS(config)# t a c acs -server ho s t 10 . 1 . 1 . 1 s ingle- connection 
key secret l 
NAS(config)# access-1ist 102 permit t e p 10 .1. 1. 1 eq tacac s 
hos t 10 . 10 . 10 . 10 
NAS(config)# interface sO 
NAS(config-if)# ip address 172.18.23.9 255.255.255 . 0 
NAS(config-if)# ip access-group check-http in 
NAS(config-if) # ip auth-proxy chec k- out 
NAS(config) # interface eO 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
( 14) 
(15) 
(16) 
NAS (con f ig- if)# ip address 10 . 10.10 . 10 255.255.255.0 
NAS( conf i g- if)# ip access-group 102 in 
NAS (con f ig-if)# e xit 
The configuration line numbers refer to the following explanation: 
l . This command enables AAA globally on ail NAS interfaces. 
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(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
2. This command builds an authentication method list, methlist, to be applied on vty line 
or any other login access method. It contains only one authentication method: 
TACACS+ (group tacacs+) , where the TACACS+ servers configured on the NAS 
router (in part# 5) to perform the authentication. Thus the NAS will first try lO.l.l.l , if 
an enor is returned, then NAS will try the next authentication method on the list, since 
no more TACACS+ servers are configured on the NAS router, then the user will be 
denied access to the NAS in this case. 
3. This command builds an authorization mechod list, which allows exec access to the 
NAS router only if the user is authenticated and only if he belongs to the list of 
authorized users. 
4. This command is to specify the use of auth-proxy authorization to set the user Exec 
mode, through the use of TA CA CS+ AAA server. If the T ACACS+ server is 
unavailable, the user is denied access. 
5. This command is to create a method list to define AAA accounting on a per-line or per-
interface basis. In this example, TA CA CS+ is the AAA server that will monitor the 
accounting information, and the router will report these attributes as accounting records 
to be stored in accounting logs on the security server. 
6. This command enables the specification of a particular authentication method for the 
users reaching the HTTP server through the router. The auth-proxy uses the HTTP 
server to communicate with the client/host to authenticate the user. 
7. This command sets HTTP server authentication method to AAA. 
8. This conunand defines the auth-proxy policy as it allows authentication only to the 
remote HTTP connections allowed by the ACL named "check-http" mentioned in part # 
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9. 
9. This command is to create the ACL named "check-http", which is used only to allow 
HTTP traffic to access the NAS externat interface SO, in order to be authenticated. 
10. This command is to identify the TACACS+ TACACS+ server to be used with this NAS 
router: with IP address 10.1.1.1 , as well as its shared encryption keys to be used when 
they communicate with the NAS, respectively: secretl. 
Il. This command is to return traffic from the TACACS+ server to the NAS router. The 
source address is the AAA server ' s and the destination 10.10.10.10 is the IP address of 
the NAS EO nearest to the AAA server. 
12. This command is to switch the configuration mode from global configuration to 
interface configuration mode, as well as it identifies the specifie interface being 
configured, sO. That interface will be the access interface through with the user will 
access the N AS router. 
13 . This interface subcommand is to specify the IP address of sO interface as well as its 
subnet mask. 
14. This command is to apply the Jock-and-key ACL check-http configured in part # 9, 
inbound to sO interface, to filter ali incoming packets on that interface. 
15 . This command is to activate the auth-proxy check-out on the externat interface sO. 
16. This command is to switch the configuration mode from global configuration to 
interface configuration mode, as well as it identifies the specifie interface being 
configured, eO, which is the nearest NAS interface to T ACACS+ server. That interface 
will be the access interface to TA CA CS+ information retuned to the N AS router. 
17. This interface subcommand is to specify the ip address of eO interface as well as its 
subnet mask. 
18. This command is to apply the Jock-and-key ACL 102 configured in part # 6, to eO 
interface, to return information from TACACS+ AAA server into the NAS router. 
19. This comma nd is to exit the interface sub-command mode, getting back into the router 
global configuration. 
The authentication server configuration demonstrated, will help highlighting the detailed 
implementation of auth-proxy as an alternative solution that can substitute Dynamic ACLs, and 
______________________ ........... ..... 
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will represent an introduction to compare the implementation criterion of such a solution to 
Dynamic ACLs, as will follow in the chapter. 
5. 7.2 The rotary commandas another solution for the Dynamic ACLs' scalability issues 
In this section we address another aspect re!ated to the Dynamic ACLs' scalability and the 
availability of the VTY !ines to be used for other pm-poses like the NAS router administration. 
Dynamic ACLs use the VTY !ines to which the configuration is applied; however the number 
ofthese !ines on a router is only 16 (0 to 15), and using scalable AAA servers, like TACACS+, 
doesn't expand that number. 
However, VTY !ines are only used for Jock-and-Key user authentication, and once the 
authentication takes place, the VTY !ines are no longer needed for the user connection 
(through Jock-and-key) to continue, since the user no longer needs to be connected to the NAS 
router, as the dynamic ACL entry will connect him directly to the resource configured within 
that entry. Thus the VTY line connection is dropped once the user is authenticated. 
However, according to (E-Tutorials Lock-and-Key Configuration, 2012), the use ofVTY !ines 
for the user authentication part of Jock-and-key ACLs keeps these !ines busy during the 
authentication process, which prevents remote access to the NAS router to perforrn 
administration tasks. In arder to a!low remote administration access to the NAS router, a semi-
backdoor might be set up into the NAS router as a solution for such a problem. This will b 
done by creating one additional VTY line to be used for the remote administration. The 
number of that line wi ll follow the VTY line numbers . Thus, since the ordinary VTY numbers 
are using 0 to 15 (VTY 0 15), the additional number will be 16 (VTY 16), which liberates the 0 
to 15 VTY range for the regular VTY access, including Dynamic ACL authentication, on one 
hand; and adds to the scalabi lity of the Jock-and-key ACLs, by allowing administrative access 
on the new created line, on the other hand. 
This so lution can be done through the use of "rotary" command. The command will also 
remove the Telnet connection for the new created line from port # 23 , and will place it onto 
port # "3000 + the rotary number". Thus if we are adding only one new VTY line, the rotary 
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number will be 1, and the port number on which the remote administrator wi ll connect wi ll be 
3001 (instead of port # 23 that is specified for regular Telnet connections). This solution 
liberates the Telnet port and adds to Telnet scalability aspect according to (E-Tutorials Lock-
and-Key Configuration, 2012). 
A configuration syntax example for the rotary command, would be like the fo llowing: 
Router(config)# line vty last_line_#_plus_1 
Router(config-line)# login tacacs+l loca l 
Router(config-line)# rotary rotary_# 
In this configuration, the authentication method used is T ACACS+. An example would be like 
the following : 
Router(config)# line vty 16 
Router(config-line)# login tacacs+ 
Router(config-line)# rotary 1 
NAS(config)# interface sO 
NAS(config-if)# ip address 172.18.23.9 255.255.255.0 
NAS(config-if)# ip access-group 101 in port 3000 rotary 1 
According to this configuration, when the remote administrator needs to access the router, he 
would Telnet on port # 3001. Th us the router should allow access to this pmt number in the 
interface inbound ACL, as shown by the example. In practical world, the use of Telnet is not 
recommended with both Jock-and-key access, and remote administration access ; because in 
order to secure Telnet administration access, it is recommended to allow Telnet to only inner 
network interfaces, excluding outer network NAS interfaces, which cannat be applied wbile 
'6 lock-and-key access takes place) . 
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Now that we explained the security aspects of Dynamic ACLs, emphasizing its scalability 
issues and ways to overcome them. let's introduce the use of Dynamjc ACLs altogether with 
the AAA servers in order to perform the user authentication process. 
5.8 Dynamic ACLs combining different authentication method for recovery purposes 
Example 2 - RADIUS TA CA CS+ authentication combination 
In this example, we will show how to configure VTY !ines with a method list including three 
different authentication methods, how the Exec mode authorization process takes place 
depending the type of the authentication method and how the privilege mode authorization 
process takes place independently from the type of the authentication method applied by the 
NAS. The example will be foll<Jwed by sorne reflections about the AAA authentication 
methods used, comparing them in many aspects, in order to pinpoint their strength and 
weakness. 
Thus, in this example, we configure a dynamic ACL with a method list, « methlist », including 
local database authentication, RADIUS authentication server, and T ACACS+ authentication 
server. The different authenticati<Jn methods will be used in a peer recovery scenario, AAA 
security policy is used; and the authentication method list will be applied to the VTY !ines, to 
secure remote user access through them. 
The NAS will then authorize the user to reach the user Exec mode, according to the 
authentication method through which the user was authenticated: thus, for example, if the user 
enters a username/password at the user prompt, and gets authenticated, the Exec mode 
authorization method that the NAS will use is the local authorization method, not the RADIUS 
56 Creating additional lines for remote administrators can be modified to allow that access through an 
SSH connection, which is more secure than Telnet. ln this case, the port number to be used will be 
"2000 + the rotary number" . 
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or TACACS+, as none of these servers would have stored the user authentication data. 
Therefore the authentication server wi ll be the one responsible for perforrning the authorization 
as weil. 
Then if the user attempts to issue privileged commands, the NAS will attempt to authorize the 
user to reach the privileged mode, using a different AAA server, Kerberos. This authorization 
attempt will only take place if the user is successfully authenticated. 
NAS(config)# aaa new-mode! (1) 
NAS (con fig)# aaa authentication log in methlist local group radius ( 2) 
group tacacs+ 
NAS(config)# aaa authorization exec default local group radius (3) 
group tacacs+ 
NAS(config)# aaa authorization command 2 default krbS (4) 
if-authenticated 
NAS(config)# radius -server host 172.16. 71.146 auth-port 1645 (5) 
acct-port 1646 
NAS(config)# radius-server attribute 44 include-in-access-req (6) 
NAS(config)# radius-server attribute 8 include-in-access-req 
NAS(config)# tacacs - server host 10.1.1.1 single-connection (7) 
key secret! 
NAS(config)# tacacs-server host 10.1.1.2 single-connection 
key secret2 
NAS(config)# username user! password cisco4dacl (8 ) 
NAS(config)# access-list 101 permit tep any host 10.1.1.10 (9) 
eq telnet 
NAS (conf i g )# access-list 101 dynarnic testaccess tirneout 15 
permit ip any any 
NAS(config )# line vty 0 15 
NAS(config-l ine) # autocommand access-enable timeout 10 
NAS( c onfig-line) # logi n methlist 
NAS ( config )# i nterface sO 
NAS ( confi g- if)# i p address 172.1~.23 . 9 255 . 255.255 . 0 
NAS (config- if)# i p access-group 101 in 
The configuration numbers refer to the following: 
1- This comma nd ena bles AAA global! y on al! N AS interfaces. 
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(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
( 13) 
(14) 
(15) 
2- This command builds an authentication method list, methlist, to be applied on vty line or 
any other access method, and it contains three authentication methods : 
• The first authentication method (local) uses the local database usemame/secret 
password logins, specified within the username commands that are configured 
globally on the NAS (to involve ali NAS interfaces) in part # 8. Since the username 
local logins are configured on the NAS, then the local authentication method can 
take place. If there were no local logins configured on the NAS, the loca l 
authentication method would have returned an error, and the NAS would have 
attempted to use the next authentication method on the list to secure the remote user 
access. 
• The second authentication method: RADIUS authentication method (group radius) 
tries the only RADIUS sen-ers configured on the NAS router (in part# 6) to 
perform the authentication . Thus the NAS will first try 172.16.71.146, if an error is 
returned, then NAS will try the next authentication method on the list, since no 
more RADIUS servers are configured on the NAS router . 
.............. __________________ _ 
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• The third authentication method: TA CA CS+ authentication method (group tacacs+) 
tries both TACACS+ servers configured on the NAS router (in part# 7) to perform 
the authentication. Th us the NAS will first try 1 0.1.1.1 , if an error is returned, th en 
the NAS will try 1 0.1.1 .2, if an error is returned, th en NAS will try the next 
authentication method on the list, sin ce no more TA CA CS+ servers are configured 
on the NAS router. And since there are no more authentication methods configured 
on the default list, then the user will be denied access to the NAS in this case. 
3- This command is to specify the use of local authentication information to be used to set 
the user Exec mode if the user authenticates using the username thro11gh the local 
database, it also specifies that the RADIUS authentication information will be used to set 
the user Exec mode in case the user authenticates using RADIUS, as weil as the use of 
T ACACS+ authentication information to set the user Exec mode in case the user 
authenticates using TACACS+ server. 
4- This command specifies the use of Kerberos server to authorize the users reaching the 
privilege mode whenever they issue privilege mode leve! 2 commands, on ly after these 
users authentication successfully takes place . 
5- This comrnand is to identify the IP address of the RADIUS server to be used, as well as 
its UDP destination port for authentication requests received from the NAS router, UDP 
destination port for accounting requests received from the NAS router. 
6- These two commands are to send RADIUS attribute 44 (acct-Session-ID) and to send 
RADIUS attribute 8 (Framed-IP-Address) respectively, in access-request packets. 
7- These two commands are to identify the TACACS+ daemons to be used with this NAS 
router: 1 0.1.1.1 and 1 0.1.1.2 , as well as the ir shared encryption keys to be used wh en 
they communicate with the NAS, respectively: secret! and secret2. 
8- This command specifies the username and password to be used with the local 
authentication method. 
9- These two commands are to identify the lock and key ACL allowing on! y T elnet access 
ta the NAS router 10.1.1.10; and the dynamic entry, testaccess, that would permit ali 
access to the organization inner network once the autocommand, configured within the 
Telnet configuration in part # 10, is triggered by the user authentication pro cess. 
10- This command is to switch the configuration mode from global configuration to vty line 
--------------------------------------------------------------- ---
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configuration, as weil as it identifies the specifie !ines being configured. 
11- This command is to specify the autocommand that will place the dynamic ACL entry 
into the NAS router configuration, as shown in part # 9. The autocommand will allow 
user access by creating that dynamic entry only after the user authentication process is 
successfully performed. 
12- This command is to apply the authentication method "methlist" to the VTY !ines, 
specifying how authentication should be done to secure user access through the VTY 
line. 
13- This command is to switch the configuration mode from global configuration to interface 
configuration mode, as weil as it identifies the specifie interface being configured, sO. 
That interface will be the access interface through with the user will access the NAS 
router. 
14- This interface subcommand is to specify the ip address of sO interface as weil as its 
subnet mask. 
15- This command is to apply the lock-and-key ACL 101 configured m part # 4, to sO 
interface, to filter ali incoming packets on that interface. 
In this examp le, we can see that the AAA paradigm is apphed through command # (1) in order 
to differentiate , configuration and implementation wise, between the three AAA services. The 
peer recovery will take place between the Local authentication, RADIUS and T ACACS+; 
while the user attempts to authenticate reaching the user Exec access mode, as shown in 
command # (2). The authorization to reach that mode wi ll depend on the authentication method 
used. E.g., if the first authentication method is available, the user will be prompted to enter a 
local usemame/password in order to be authenticated through the local data base. If the user is 
successfully authenticated, the user will be authorized locally also , and according to the rules 
specified 1ocally on the NAS router. However if the local authentication method is not 
available, the peer recovery mechanism will lead the authentication process to follow the next 
method stated in the method list in command # (2), narnely RADIUS , and the user will be 
prompted to enter his credentials as specifi ed upon the RADIUS server. In this case, if the user 
becomes successfully authenticated by RADIUS serYer, the local authorization method 
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(specified in command # (3)) will fail, since no datais saved from the local authentication. The 
authentication will then be done through RADIUS server according the user profile policies 
associated with that user. The scenario will be applied following the same logic with the 
TA CA CS+ server, in case the other methods were not available. Th us we can see that, in order 
to allow access to the Exec mode, the authentication method will define the authorization 
method to be used. 
When we come to the user-Privileged mode, things will be different, since the user has to be 
successfully authenticated and authorized to access the Exec mode before he attempts to access 
the Privileged mode. Thus the authentication process already takes place before the user is 
allowed access to the user Exec mode, and since the user has already access to the network 
through the Exec mode, then no more authentications are needed. Therefore, in order to 
authorize the user to access the Privileged mode, it doesn ' t matter which authentication method 
was used to authenticate the user reaching the Exec mode. What really matters is whether the 
user is authenticated and authorized to access the user exec mode. Thus the authentication 
pro cess do ne in the Exec mode is separa te, and do es not defi ne the authorization pro cess of the 
Privileged mode. 
Thus if the a user is authenticated and authorized to use the Exec mode, and if he attempts to 
reach the Privileged mode in order to issue administrative commands, then the user will be 
authorized through the authorization method list "default" specified in command # ( 4) , bence 
through Kerberos server, regardless of the method that was used for the authentication. 
This example has explained the difference between the user Exec mode, and the user 
Privileged mode, in terms of defining the authentication and the authorization processes to be 
used in order to allow successful user access to the organization ' s resources. 
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5.9 Comparison of AAA servers 
Now that we introduced different AAA servers used for authenticating remote user access 
through the Dynamic ACL 's VTY !ines, let's compare theses servers in order to emphasize 
their strengths and weaknesses in terms of efficiency, scalability, reliability, interoperability, 
ease of configuration, and manageability. 
5.9.1 RADIUS versus TACACS+ 
Let's consider RADIUS, which is an lEIF standard, and TACACS+, which is described in 
RFC 927 and 1492 as an infol1llational standard only. Feature wise, TACACS+ can be 
considered as an extension for RADIUS as both give the same functiona lity, however 
TA CA CS+ changed RADIUS implementation to meet the needs of modem networks. Sorne 
key differences exist between T ACACS+ and RADIUS specially the transport reliability, the 
encryption, the separation of the authentication and the authorization functions , multiprotocol 
suppmt, interoperability, router management, performance impact and implementation 
priorities. Let's demonstrate each ofthese points of difference in the following : 
1- In tetms of reliability and scalability, TACACS+ uses TCP, white RADIUS uses UDP 
as a transport protocol that help transport datagrams between the client host and the 
AAA server, which affects performance and the reliability of the transport layer. TCP 
offers many advantages over UDP, since it is more reliable protocol, always using 
acknowledgment (ofreceived requests) and synchronization no matter how loaded the 
backend authentication mechanism is. Also TCP provides a connection-oriented 
transport of datagrams, while UDP only provides best-effort delivery, and is always 
susceptible to situations like network congestion and server crashes. Even with 
additional programmable variables that can be added to RADIUS, to overcome the 
UDP delivery drawbacks, RADIUS will always lack the built-in support that the TCP 
off ers . TCP can immediate! y detect if the server is down, slow or non-existent, and can 
maintain many simultaneous server connections only addressing the ones that are 
fu nctioning, white UDP cannat differentiate between server statuses. TCP is more 
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scalable to network growth and congestion (E-Tutorials RADIUS AND TACACS+ 
comparison, 2012) . 
2- In terms of security, T ACACS+ can encrypt the who le access request packet (the 
entire session) coming form the NAS to the AAA server, which happens during 
normal operation to ensure the packet security, though the packet can stay unencrypted 
for debugging purposes. RADIUS encrypts only the password, leaving other critical 
information like the username, authorized services and the accounting information 
unencrypted and subject to security attacks , according to Slaptijack (Slaptijack, 2012). 
3- In terms of flexibility, TA CA CS+ separa tes the three AAA functions , while the 
authentication (to allow the host/deviee access) and authorization (to allow the user 
access) functions have to be combined in RADIUS packets sent from the server to the 
N AS. TA CA CS+ separation for the three AAA functions can even allow the use of 
different servers to address each function (e.g. the combination of Kerberos 
authentication along with TACACS+ authorization and accounting.) This decoupling 
of the authentication function separately off the authorization and accounting allows 
the NAS control over the commands that can be executed by the user, as the NAS will 
frequently ask the TA CA CS+ server for additional authorization information in order 
to grant the user the permission to use a particular command on the NAS. 
4- In terms of flexibility , white TACACS+ provides multi-protocol support, RADIUS 
doesn ' t support AppleTalk Remote Access (ARA), NetBIOS Frame Protocol Control, 
Novel! Asynchronous Service Interface (NASI), or X.25 PAD connection protocol. 
5- In terms of interoperability, due to the Cisco proprietary nature of T ACACS+, 
interoperability cannot take place. Though it supports many protocols as previously 
mentioned, it is supported by a large number of vendors. RADIUS that is supported by 
ali vendors. Though different vendors implement RADIUS, RADIUS doesn't 
guarantee interoperability as interoperability will only exist when different vendors 
implement the same attributes, even though in real implementations, many vendors 
implement extensions that are proprietary attributes which interferes with the 
possibility of interoperability, however, in practice, RADIUS works well in a mix ed 
vendor environment. 
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6- In terms of manageability, TACACS+ allows a fine grain leve! of user commands, 
permitting more controlled access for a greater number of users on the network. 
Actually, TACACAS+ authorization of router commands (per-command-
authorization) can be do ne either on a per-user (as it supports 15 privilege modes) or 
per-group basis, thus it allows router management and flexible terminal services. Also 
TA CA CS+ that allows ali AAA functions to take place, where both exec and 
command contrais can be implemented. RADIUS has a limited control over the user 
privilege mode (E-Tutorials RADIUS AND TACACS+ comparison, 2012). Also, 
RADIUS doesn ' t allow command authorization or command accounting, though it 
allows exec authorization and exec accounting. 
7- In terms of router manageability and performance, due to the grea ter number of 
messages exchanges it uses between the NAS and the server allowing authentication, 
TACACS+ is heavier than RADIUS on the NAS router performance wise. TACACS+ 
exchanges both exec and command authorization as weil as both exec and command 
accounting57 . On the contrary, RADIUS has less performance impact on the router 
th an TA CA CS+ as it uses less memory and CPU cycles on the N AS router, due to the 
fewer number of commands and messages ex changes (on! y exec authorization and 
exec accounting messages) it uses between the NAS and the server on one hand, and 
the user on the other hand. 
In general, T ACACS+ should be used when the priority is security and flexibility, 
within a Cisco based network. Security is accomplished with TACACAS+ since the full 
session is encrypted, and since authorization and authentication are separate. The flexibility is 
through the use of TCP, which allows more router manageability in more advanced networks. 
Flexibility is through TA CA CS+ support for more enterprise protocols as weil as through the 
availability of fu ll 15 privilege classes to control router command prevention. RADIUS should 
57 TA CA CS+ allows both exec and command accounting as weil as both exec and command 
authorization to take place while the user tries to access an organization ' s inner resource. However 
RADI US only a llows exec authorization and exec accounting, which is one of the reasons why RADI US 
messages communicated between the server and the NAS are much less in number and size than 
TA CA CS+ messages communicated between the server and the NAS. 
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be used when the priority is availability, where RADIUS or a combination of RADIUS and 
T ACACS+ can be used on a mixed vendor network not supporting TA CA CS+ protocol. 
Now that we introduced the difference between TACACS+ and RADIUS , let's compare 
RADIUS with DIAMETER. 
5.9.2 RADIUS versus DIAMETER 
DIAMETER is an IETF standard, described in RFC 3588 ad 3589. DIAMETER is 
considered as an upgrade for RADIUS overcoming sorne of its limitations, though it is not 
compatible with it. 
As TA CA CS+ and RADIUS were developed to address dial-up Point-to-Point and 
terminal server access, DIAMETER was developed to address new access technologies like 
wireless, DSL, Mobi le IP, and Ethemet, as well as the increasing complexity of the NAS 
routers. Sorne of the improvements introduced by DIAMETER protocol as compared to 
RADIUS are as follows. 
l. Transport reliability mechanisms through the use of TCP or SCTP, as a transport 
protocol within the Transport layer of the OSI network architecture mode!; versus 
·s UDP used by RADIUS) . 
2. Transport security mechanisms through the use of mandatory IPSEC and optional 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) suppott are used in DIAMETER though TLS is not 
yet standardized for RADIUS . 
3. Application layer acknowledgements and failover algorithms. 
4. Server message acknowledgment (server-initiated messages) is supported so that the 
NAS would detect whether the server has received the request or whether the message 
was silently discarded as the server sends error messages, authentication and a session 
tetmination message. In case of RADIUS, the request status is unknown due to the 
lack of such messages. 
58 The IETF is in the process of standardizing The TCP transport protocol for RADIUS. 
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5. Both end-to-end as weil as hop-by-hop-security are supported, to guarantee the 
information remains unmodified throughout the session. RADIUS supports only hop-
by-hop securi ty, wl1ere every hop can modify information that cannat be traced to its 
ongm. 
6. Capability negotiario n between the client and the server. 
7. Better roaming support between Access points in case wireless technologies are used. 
8. Data abject security59 is supported but not mandatory. 
9. Eas ier to extended, adding new attributes and commands to be defined, as it supports 
both vendor-specific attributes (VSA) as weil as commands; while RADIUS supports 
VSAs only. 
10. The length of user data fields which contains the user information (like his SSN 
number) and are usuaily used in the accounting logs, is two bytes ailowing for a 
maximum of 16,.53 5, which ailows more detailed information about the user; whi le in 
RADIUS the length of data field is only 1 byte a ilowing for a maximum of 255, which 
implies Jess detajled user information. 
ll. Server inaccessibility prob1ems are so1ved much faster as weil as server status fai lover 
detection. RADIUS doesn't detect if the server is out of operation, and has to send 
many requests (3 of them) to the primary server, and if no rep ly, it has to reroute the 
request to peers. 
12. Dynamic peer discovery through Domain Name Server Service (DNS SRV) and the 
resource record Name Authority Pointer (NAPTR), as weil as peer configuration. 
13. Better traffic control within congested networks, thus this is where DIAMETER IS 
recommended, whi le RADIUS provides fast user Identification with fewer packages, 
however it is unable to control the traffic (Joad balancing and dealing with 
congestions) and its peers (in communication chains) in cases of overcrowded 
networks. 
14. In sorne implementation cases, session establishment using DIAMETER is 40 percent 
longer than session establishment using RADIUS. 
59 Data Object security uses OSI layer 7 data objects and function codes to determine remote acce s 
authorization, increas ing the securi ty fu nctions of other so lutions like fïrewa lls, encryption and 
authentication (Mander, Cheung, & Nabhani, 20 10). 
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Now that we have compared RADIUS with both TACACS+ and DIAMETER60, we 
can separately specify sorne of the comparison points related to Kerberos, since Kerberos 
functions in a slightly different way. 
5.9 .3 Kerberos 
Sorne of the Kerberos limitations are as fo llows: 
• Kerberos stores ali passwords encrypted with a single key. Actually, Kerberos 
authentication depends entirely on the knowledge of passwords that are encrypted with 
the server's master key, using conventional algorithms (usually DES). The passwords 
as weil as the master key are stored on the same server, so that the server can decrypt 
them when needed. This means that in case the Kerberos server or its redundant 
replicate get attacked, all the stored passwords have to be changed. 
Kerberos doesn't use public key cryptography. Users prove their identity by their 
knowledge of their password 's key. Thus, decrypted passwords can be accessed by the 
server, which is a disadvantage of Kerberos , since the server 's password can be stol en 
unless the server is both physically and computationally secure. However, public key 
cryptography can be integrated into Kerberos system through combining public key 
smart cards, as implemented in Microsoft's Kerberos. 
• Kerberos requires a secure server, as Kerberos servers are stateless, having permanent 
state while keeping user passwords in the Random Access Memory (RAM) rather than 
on disk, and doesn ' t need to be updated whi le the Kerberos transaction takes place. 
The server has to answer users authentication requests and issue granting tickets, 
which is a simple design that allows the creation of replicated servers for redundancy; 
however, each of the se servers needs a complete copy of the en tire Kerberos database, 
60 Note also thal severa! Diameter IETF drafts are currentl y in progress. 
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which also means the necessity of its physical and computational security as weil, 
which in turn, is an administrative and a financial burden. 
Kerberos requires a continuously available server, for the network to be usable . 
Without a redundant replicating server, if the main Kerberos server is down, no access 
will be allowed to the organization' s re sources. 
• Every network service/program must be modified in order to be used with Kerberos , 
an action called "Kerberizing the application", modifying its source code. 
Kerberos doesn ' t work weil in time-sharing environment where many users share a 
workstation, since Kerberos keeps the tickets in a temporary directory to overcome the 
difficulties of sharing the ticket between the different processes. And as one user might 
be granted a ticket, that ticket can easily be stolen by other users sharing the 
workstation, while they should not be allowed access to the organization's inner 
resources. 
• Kerberos doesn' t protect against Troj an horses attacks since many of the workstations 
contain local copies of the programs that they mn, even within a networked 
environment. Trojan horses are modifications made to the system's software (the 
workstation) so that the attacker can easily gain access to the system, modifying the 
user's files, denying access to the authentic user. And since the workstation doesn ' t 
authenticate itself to the user, the user could never tell in advance, if the computer 
became compromised in the firs t place. 
• Kerb ros authentication might go beyond its granted time, since the process involves 
many parameters specified by both the authentication server and the user 's 
workstation. The user is authenticated for the life-time of the ticket coming from 
Authentication Server, which is the minimum of either: the default time to use an inner 
service, or the remaining time of a TGT ticket already created for that user. So if the 
software on the workstation is modified by an attacker before the user attempts to 
authenticate to access the network, the user authentication might go beyond the ticket 
life-t ime, which would allow the user access for a longer time than this user is 
permitted to (Steiner, Neuman, & Schiller, 1988). 
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Kerberos use might lead to a cascading loss of trust, since once a user or server 
password is disclosed, it is possible for an attacker to use it, decrypting other tickets, 
and thus ga ining more access spoofing inner servers and users . 
Based upon the comparison made between the different authentication technologies 
that can be used within the context of Dynamic ACLs implementation, we introduce sorne 
suggestions that emphasize these differences in order to help the reader better choose, based 
upon certain criteria, one authentication technology suiting his organization ' s needs. 
5.10 Sorne authentication suggestions based upon the comparison 
In this section, we suggest sorne of the authentication technologies, combined with an 
access method, that can take place at one point at a time, once the authentication method list 
configured upon the NAS, gets to try an available authentication method. 
Certainly, our suggestions are not to be considered as a universal solution to meet ali 
Lock-and-Key authentication needs of every organization. However our suggested solutions 
might give a clearer emphasis to the reader, on the flexibility of choosing di fferent Jock-and-
Key authentication technologies, each having its own pros and cons, and the possibility of 
combining them with either Telnet or SSH as a connection method, where they can meet a 
certain organization 's security needs. 
The authentication methods/technologies suggested are Enable, T ACACS+, RADIUS, 
DIAMETER, and Kerberos. Also, though it is not introduced as a technology to be combined 
within the Dynamic ACLs authentication process, auth-server is included with our parameters 
as a suggested technology that can substitute Dynamic ACLs authentication altogether. Since 
Telnet as an authentication method has a considerable amount of drawbacks, as we explained 
at the beginning of this chapter, we will exclude it from the list of authentication methods to be 
compared. 
Implementing our suggested solutions will be according to the individual needs of each 
organization, taking into consideration the design of its own network topology, including ali 
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the criteria that might vary according to such a design. The criteria are security efficiency, 
flexibility of personalizing authentication process and interacting with other processes, 
scalability for network growth and avoiding congestions, reliability of transporting the 
authentication information, interoperability with other vendor deviees and protocols, 
manageability of the network resources including the NAS router and ease of implementation 
within a given network. 
The suggested so lutions are represented in a table scaled from 1 to 5 plus signs, where 
5 plus signs stand for the highest leve! of performance demanded for a certain parameter, and 
one plus sign stands for the !east. 
The table can be considered as a guideline to weigh the pros and cons of each 
authentication method regarding each criterion, on one hand, and to weigh the use of auth-
proxies as an alternative authentication technology that can replace the use of Dynamic ACLs 
(regarding each parameter), on the other hand. 
Tl 1e suggeste d l 0 h so uttons are as s own 111 ta bi 5 1 e -
Enable fACACS+ TA CA CS RADIUS )lAM ET ER Ker be ros Au th-
and and +and and and and pro x y 
Telnet Telnet SSH Telnet Tel net SSH 
Security ++ +++ +++++ ++ +++ + +++++ 
Flexibility + +++++ +++++ ++++ +++++ ++ +++++ 
Scalability + ++++ ++++ +++ ++++ ++++ +++++ 
Reliability +++++ +++++ +++++ + +++++ +++++ +++++ 
lnteroperability +++++ + + +++++ +++++ ++ +++++ 
Manageability +++++ ++++ ++++ +++ +++++ ++++ +++++ 
Ease of +++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ +++++ + +++++ 
implementation 
Table 5.1 SuggestiOns of authentlcatwn technolog1es 
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As we can see from table 5-l , the indications we can obtain considering the suggested 
technologies are as follows : 
1. The security criterion: 
• The use of Telnet with any of the authentication methods mentioned (including 
authentication servers and Enable method) degrades the performance of such 
combination when used to authenticate the Dynamic ACL's remote users , due to the 
Telnet drawbacks explained in this chapter. 
However the use of SSH increases such a performance leve! as we can see with 
TA CA CS+ when combined with SSH; which will give the same security performance 
as the one resulting from the use of an auth-proxy by itself. 
We can notice that the Enable and Telnet, as a combination, is almost as secure as 
RADIUS and Telnet combined, since Enable, which is the local authentication method 
perforrned locally on the NAS router, involves password hashing leaving the usemame 
as plain text, which is almost equivalent to RADIUS security nature, encrypting only 
the passwords while leaving the rest of the users information unencrypted. 
• Also the security performance of RADIUS and Telnet, as a combination, is Jess than 
any other authentication server when combined with Telnet; since RADIUS doesn ' t 
encrypt the full session when communicating with the NAS within the organizations ' 
inner network and doesn ' t separate the user authentication and the user authorization 
processes, which diminishes its security aspects . 
• And the security performance of Kerberos and SSH, as a combination, is Jess than any 
other authentication server when combined with SSH; since Kerberos doesn ' t use 
public Key encryption for the stored passwords, doesn' t protect against sorne security 
risks, uses an authentication that might go beyond the granted time needed for the user 
session, and can sometimes lead to cascading Joss of trust problems, which diminish its 
security aspects. 
This combination 's performance, though it uses the more secure SSH as a connection 
method, is even Jess secure than using Telnet combined with other authentication 
servers like DIAMETER or TACACS+, as the SSH's secure connection will not 
compensate for such security issues related with Kerberos authentication process. 
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2. The flexibility criterion: 
We can see from table 5-l that the flexibility performance of TACACS+ when 
combined with either Telnet or SSH, as a user access method, is weighing more than 
the RADIUS and Telnet suggested combina ti on, due to the fact that T ACACS+ 
supports many protocols like NASI, Net BIOS and AppleTalk commands, while 
RADIUS Jacks that aspect. Also the flexibility of T ACACS+ lies in the fact that it 
provides 15 privilege classes which allows a fine -grained control over the user 
commands to be performed on the NAS router. One more aspect is the use of TCP as 
the transport protocol in TACACS+ servers , which allows more router manageability 
in advanced networks. Such flexibility aspects are not provided by RADIUS. 
Also, the flexibility performance of ali AAA server combinations, as well as the auth-
proxy's is generally weighing more than for the other combination flexibility 
performance; sin ce they ali take into consideration the user ' s security privileges 
included within the user profile, which provides a great degree of flexibility , non 
existent in the other suggested combinations. 
W e can a iso see that the flexibility performance of Enable method wh en combined 
with either Telnet or SSH, as a user access method, is weighing Jess than any of the 
other suggested methods as Telnet doesn't take the user profile into consideration 
allowing access to each user according to his individual security privilege; thus we 
cannot consider the local authentication method (Enable) as a flexible suggestion. 
• When we come to Kerberos and SSH combination, we can see that their flexibility 
performance is Jess than any other authentication server; since Kerberos requires a 
source code modification (Kerberizing) for every network service/program, before 
integrating it within the system. A Iso because of its security nature, Kerberos doesn ' t 
work weil in time-sharing environment where many users share a workstation. These 
two aspects considerably degrade Kerberos flexibility performance. However, we 
know that Kerberos does take the user profile into consideration, thus its flexibility 
performance is a little higher than the local authentication (Enable) method. 
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3. The scalability criterion: 
• 
• 
We can distinguish that the scalability performance of ali AAA server combinations, 
as weil as the auth-proxy 's is generally weighing more than the Enable and Telnet 
combination 's, since they ali allow a great leve! of scalability, by nature . However, we 
can notice that the auth-proxy's performance in this aspect might be slightly higher. 
This is due to the nature of Dynamic ACLs in general, as they are not scalable, which 
diminishes the scalability performance of any of the authentication methods, when 
they are combined with the Enable method, which is not scalable. 
We can also note that TACACS+, DIAMETER, Kerberos and auth-proxy 
combinations are more scalable than RADIUS 's, since they ali use TCP protocol, 
which provides more scalability to network growth and congestion. 
• It is also worth mentioning that T ACACS+ leve! of scalability is not the maximum that 
TA CA CS+ combination can reach, since TA CA CS+ requires the exchange of a large 
number of messages (for both exec and command authorization, as weil as for both 
exec and command accounting) between the NAS and the server, which creates a big 
load on the NAS. The NAS router becomes even more overloaded when the number of 
the connected users, and the network services to be performed increase, since the 
number of the exchanged messages increases even more, affecting the NAS 
manageability and performance. 
4. The reliability criterion: 
• We can observe that the suggested combinations that include DIAMETER, Kerberos 
or TA CA CS+ weigh higher regarding the reliability aspect, since they use the reliable 
TCP transport protocol to communicate with the NAS and the other deviees involved 
in the authentication process; versus RADIUS that uses the best effort UDP protocol to 
perform such communications. 
• Though it replaces the use of Dynamic ACLs and cannot be combined with them, the 
auth-proxy is considered very reliable alternative, as it also uses TCP transport layer 
protocol. 
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• Since the local authentication method (Enable) doesn ' t communicate within other 
deviees during the user authentication processes and doesn't need to use any transport 
layer protocols, it is considered as a reliable authentication method. 
5. The interoperability criterion: 
• 
• 
• 
We can see that the suggested combinations that include TACACS+ weigh less than 
all the other AAA combinations (including the auth-proxy) regarding the 
interoperability aspect, since TACACS+ authentication method is Cisco proprietary, 
performing well only within Cisco environments. 
RADIUS should be used when the priority is availability/interoperability, where 
RADIUS or a combina ti on of RADIUS and T ACACS+ can be used on a mixed vendor 
network not supporting T ACACS+ protocol. Using such combination causes a 
splitting of references, assessments, designs, etc. Thus, this combination might be 
considered as a recommended approach when applied with sorne precautions. 
Since the local authentication method (Enable) doesn ' t communicate within other 
deviees during the user authentication processes and doesn ' t need to be interoperable, 
it is considered as an interoperable authentication method. 
We can distinguish that Kerberos ' s combination is not interoperable as well, since all 
deviees and programs have to be "Kerberized" before their integration within Kerberos 
authentication process, which is considered as an extra necessary step towards 
interop rability. This step places Kerberos combination as more interoperable than 
TACACS's . 
6. The manageability criterion: 
• We can see that TACACS+ combinations indicate a great level ofmanageability, since 
TACACS+ uses TCP, which can immediately detect if the server is down, slow or 
non-existent, and can simultaneously maintain connections with many servers. Also 
TACACAS+ provides full 15 privilege classes to control router command prevention, 
which allows more router manageability in more advanced networks. Besides, 
TA CA CS+ provides support for enterprise protocols like NetBIOS and AppleTalk, 
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which allows more manageability of the authentication processes throughout the 
organization ' s network. 
• We can also see that RADIUS combination does not provide a maximum leve! of 
manageability. RADIUS is lighter on the NAS router than TACACS+, since RADIUS 
uses Jess memmy and CPU cycles on the NAS router, due to the fewer number of 
commands and messages exchanges between the NAS and the server on one hand, and 
the user on the other hand. However, RADIUS doesn ' t use TCP neither supports a 
different range of enterprise protocols; which diminishes its manageabi lity weighing 
more than TACACS+ combination's . 
• 
• 
• 
Also Kerberos combination, though it uses TCP, it doesn' t support a different range of 
enterprise protocols; which increases its weighing more than RADIUS combination's, 
re garding that parameter. 
Also DIAMETR combination provides a great leve! of manageability, as DIAMETER 
was developed to address new access technologies like wireless, DSL, Mobile IP, and 
Ethemet, as weil as the increasing complexity of the NAS routers. Also DIAMETER 
uses TCP protocol , which allows more router manageability during the authentication 
pro cess. 
We can also observe that the Enable combination provides a great level of 
manageability, as ail the user passwords will be included within the router's local 
database, and there will be no need to communicate with other authentication deviees 
over the network; which eliminates possible issues and allows for even more router 
manageability. 
In case of the auth-proxy alternative, the manageability provided is at higher leve! 
since auth-proxy uses TCP, on one hand, and on the other hand, it supports a variety of 
network protocols as weil. 
7. The ease of implementation criterion: 
• We can distinguish that ail suggested combinations are very easy to implement and 
maintain, except for the combination that includes Kerberos, since Kerberos is a very 
demanding authentication system that relies on its own mies. Thus in arder for every 
deviee or software to join this system, it will be required to have his source code 
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modified in order to integrale successfully within. That kerberizing process makes it so 
hard to implement Kerberos within any environment; as it makes it hard to expand and 
main tain the hardware or the software of the Kerberos system. 
Now that we exp lained the differences between the types of AAA authentication servers, let's 
focus on the limitations occutTing whi le using Lock-and-Key ACLs in general, whi le 
emphasizing the different ways we can overcome them. 
5.11 Dynamic ACLs drawbacks 
1. Dynamic ACLs create a security opening in the border firewa ll /NAS, which makes 
that router susceptib le to Source Address Spoofing. This case happens when the 
router ' s interface gets temporarily configured to permit access to the legitimate remote 
user (source address) entered in the dynamic ACL entry, and thus the legitimate user is 
a llowed access to the organization inner network, and can exchange data through the 
firewa ll router. Then a malicious attacker might spoof that legitimate source address, 
and replace his rogue source address by a legitimate one, in arder to gain access to the 
organization 's inner network, even behind that firewall router. 
The source address-spoofing problem is a security problem common to the use of 
ACLs in general, whether the authentication method used by the ACLs is Telnet or 
AAA servers. An alternative so lution that may help address this drawback is to apply 
authentication pro xi es instead of Dynamic ACLs. 
2. The Lock-and-key has some security issues, as it specifies the source IP addresses of 
the hosts not the users, and the security issues can be addressed by the use of 
Authentication servers. 
3. The Lock-and-key has sorne flexibility issues as it specifies the destination IP address 
by a maximum of one dynamic entry, while authentication proxies permit many 
dynamic entries. The flexibility issues can be addressed by the use of Authentication 
servers. 
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4. The Lock-and-key has sorne scalability issues as it can secure only a limited number of 
user connections, versus multiusers connections (ex: broadband), the scalability issues 
can be addressed by the use of Authentication servers. 
5. The Lock-and-key dynamic entry is not automatically deleted once the user 's session 
is terminated as it remains within the Lock-and-key until the dynamic timeout (either 
idle or absolute timeout) is reached, until the network engineer manually clears it out, 
or until the NAS router reboots, whichever happens first61• Thus the possibili ty of 
having the dynamic entries remaining active on the NAS interface representa security 
hole that can be subject for malicious attacks, since an attacker can wait until the 
legitimate user !eaves the machine and use that same authenticated connection to reach 
the organization inner resources. 
6. Since Lock-and-key depends on Telnet in the majority of implementations, it is 
susceptible to IP spoofing, due to the Jack of encryption. As the user authenticates, the 
Lock-and-key opens up a temporary access ho le in the NAS, and if the attacker knows 
the user ' s source IP address, he canuse it for a spoofing attack. In order to avoid such 
attacks, encryption might be considered, through the use of SSH or Virtual private 
networks (VPN). 
7. The Lock-and-key connection starts by a Telnet session that serves the goal of user 
authentication process. This Telnet session keeps port #23 busy, and thus, in case ali 
16 VTY !ines are occupied simultaneously by different user connections, any other 
access for the router through VTY !ines would be prevented, including connections 
performed for remote router administration. The Rotary variable added to the VTY 
line configuration can address this problem, as it will represent a semi-backdoor into 
the router by shifting the !ines numbers assigned for Telnet connections, freeing the 
original VTY !ines as weil as port 23 , for other administrative connections. The rotary 
solution can also be applied in case of SSH to free NAS port #22, for remote 
administrative connections (Telnet administrative access is recommended to be 
61 If the NAS router configuration is saved, the Dynamic ACLs entries will not be saved, and will not 
still exist within the configuration once the router re boots again ( unless the user re-authenticates by 
then) . 
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prohibited on external interfaces , thus only allowed to the network mner 
devices/users) . 
8. Even when used with AAA server authentication, Lock-and-key ACLs are not scalable 
since "access enable" allows access to ali authenticated users, and there is no 
possibility to create per-user ACLs. Lock-and-key scalability issues can be addressed 
by the use of Auth-servers. 
9. The Lock-and-key allows ali authenticated users to access certain network resources as 
specified in the Dynamic entry of the Lock-and-key, since it defines only a limited 
number of user access policy statement per ACL, thus it is so restrictive in 
implementing personalized access to such allowed resources , according to each user 
policy, or according to a group policy, which limits its usefulness in a LAN 
environrnent. The use of auth-proxy addresses this issue, setting up per-user-access 
policies as it allows every per-user connection to be triggered independently, according 
to his own user profile, allowing the combina tian of a number of user policies within 
the same ACL. 
1 O. Another solution would be the use of Lock-and-key to restrict ac cess to a bastion host 
to which the external users can log in, in arder to access inner network resources. 
Since this solution is Jess practical and has sorne limitations, many companies prefer 
the implementation of the authentication pro x y solution. 
11 . A third solution would be the implementation of double authentication where remote 
users tatt their PPP connection authentication through CHAP then the only allowed 
privilege would be a Telnet connection where the user has to reenter different login 
information as a second authentication point. Through the Telnet connection, the AAA 
server would be triggered to allow users privilege according to the user's profile 
defined within the AAA server used. 
12. Lock-and-key impacts the NAS router performance in the following ways: 
• When the dynamic ACL entry is triggered, the Lock-and-key ACL is rebuilt 
(including that new temporary dynamic entry) on the silicon switching engine 
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(SSE)62 of the NAS , which causes the SSE switching path to slow down 
momentarily. 
• The dynamic ACL entry of the Lock-and-key ACL requires the use of the timeout 
fac ility, even if the timeout is set to its default value, and consequently, it cannat 
be SSE switched by the NAS router, and will be processed by the protocol fast-
switching path. 
• The temporary dynamic ACLs' entries are dynamically added to and removed 
from the Lock-and-key ACL that is configured on the NAS border interface, which 
will cause it to grow and shrink dynamically in return. This can degrade the packet 
switching performance of the NAS router, creating additional performance 
problems. In some cases, the network engineer should check for these dynamic 
entries and remove them in order to diminish such prob lems. 
Si nee auth-proxy seems to be a good so lution to address most of the Lock-and-key drawbacks, 
why do we favor Lock-and-key? Lock-and-key is usually used when authentication prox:ies 
are not available or when there is a small number of users to be connected to a bastion server 
where there is no need for an authentication proxy. 
S .12 Recommendations 
According to the research performed during this study, we can provide the reader with the 
recommendations that we have formed based upon the information acquired during ()Ur 
research. The recommendations include sorne general application guidelines and useful tips to 
be taken into consideration while configuring Lock-and-key onto an organization ' s NAS 
router. 
These recommendations will be fo llowed by more specifie implementation suggestions, that 
are given based on the general guidelines included within the recommendations. The 
recommendation can be summarized in the following points: 
62 SSE is the rou ting and switching mechanism that compares layer-2 or layer-3 headers of the incoming 
packets to a silicon switching cache located on the router, and determines the actions required to forward 
the packets out of the proper router interface (Cisco- lntemetworking Terms (SSE), 20 Il). 
-------~----
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• Only one dynamic entry can be specified in the Lock-and-key ACL. Any other 
dynamic entries will be ignored, or flagged as invalid, depending on the 
Internetworked Operating System (lOS) version. 
• This entry has to be placed towards the beginning of the ACL, so that it doesn' t get 
overridden by other entries preceding it; since this may cause access deniai to the 
users . 
A unique name m11St be used for the Lock-and-key ACL, specified with the dynamic 
parameter. 
• When specifying the destination within the dynamic ACL entry, it is recommended to 
• 
• 
use a specifie IF address rather than the key word (any), which will indicate the 
resources to be accessed by the authenticated users . 
One of the Lock-and-key static ACL entries should allow either Telnet or SSH, m 
arder for the users to get authenticated. 
At !east one timeout should be configured: either as an absolute timeout specified 
within the dynamic ACL entry, or as an idle timeout within the auto-command 
configuration. If neither timeouts is configured, the Dynamic entry will remain fo rever 
within the Lock-and-key ACL, representing a security hole, until manually removed 
by the network engineer. 
If both timeouts are present, the idle timeout must be less that the absolute timeout, 
otherwise the IOS might face issues while removing the dynamic ACL entry off the 
configuration. 
• The Lock-and-key ACL entries might be combined with timed entries, so that remote 
• 
users access for authentication would on! y take place within specifie times, which adds 
more preventio11 to possible security threats. 
The Lock-and-l<ey ACL can be app lied to restrict access coming from external remote 
users to inner resources, and to restrict access from internai users to outside resources. 
The configuration of the dynamic entry will remain the same in both cases. However, 
in the first case, the ACL will be applied inbound for the traffic entering the NAS 
seriai (border) interface, and the word "any" will be replaced by the remote 
user/device 's [p address accessing the destination inner host. And in the second case, 
the ACL wi ll be applied outbound for the traffic exiting that same NAS seriai (border) 
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• 
interface, and the word "any" will be replaced by the inner user/device ' s IP address 
accessing the destination external host to be denied access. 
The Telnet or SSH can be configured using the rotary number in order to avoid the 
overuse of the VTY lines; which will permit administration access to the NAS router 
using the VTY !ines. 
Both SSH and Telnet are supported as a line connection for the Lock-and-key ACL 
authentication process . However, since SSH is more secure63 than Telnet, it is 
recommended to configure the NAS router to use SSH in combination with the Lock-
and-key ACLs. 
• When configuring Lock-and-key ACL, it is recommended to install Cisco 
• 
Internetwork Operating System (lOS) version 12.1(3)T on the NAS router, in order to 
guarantee a client server SSH connection, also SSH version2, which is the latest 
version, is recomrnended to be used for such a connection. 
Setting value of the number of login attempts on the NAS router equal to 1, as it will 
make it more difficult for attackers to access the router, specially the ones performing 
brute-force password attack. 
If there is a suspicion that unauthorized users are trying to authenticate through Lock-
and-key ACLs, there is a possibility to capture their activity during logging. 
• When configuring AAA method lists on the NAS router, it is recommended never to 
use the key word (none) within the authentication method list for line access, even if 
it's preceded by multiple other methods while being mentioned as last on the list, since 
it will then create an unsecure back door into the NAS router allowing attackers to 
access the router, preventing communications between the router and the AAA server. 
• In order to guarantee a more secure authentication process of Lock-and-key ACLs, we 
recommend avoiding Telnet and using SSH or AAA servers instead. 
In order to guarantee a more flexible authentication process, taking the user profi le 
privi leges into consideration, we recommend the implantation of AAA servers 
combined with Lock-and-key ACLs, or the implementation of auth-proxy. 
63 SSH encrypts ali tra ffic sent from the remote user to the router including username and password, 
while that aspect is not available in case ofTelnet. 
209 
• In order to guarantee a more scalable authentication process, we recommend the use of 
TA CA CS+ as an AAA server, especially within a Cisco proprietary environment; 
however RADIUS and DIAMETER will work fine within a multi-vendor 
environment. 
• 
In order to guarantee a more reliable user connection to the AAA server through the 
NAS router, we recommend the implementation ofDIAMETER or TACACS+ as they 
depend on TCP as a transport layer protocol, rather than RADIUS, which depends on 
UDP. 
We don't recommend th.e implementation of Kerberos as an AAA server 
authenticating Lock-and-key ACLs' remote users , as though it guarantees a flexible 
authentication process, it demands special network as weil as NAS routers preparation, 
which interferes with its ease of application within an organization network. Also it 
offers Jess secure , scalable, reliable authentication process than AAA server options. 
Th us overall, we recomrnend the use of T ACACS+ within Cisco proprietary 
environment and the interoperable DIAMETER within multi-vendor environment to guarantee 
security, flexibility, scalability and the reliability of the Lock-and-key authentication process. 
Ali in ali , at the end of this recommendation list, we would like to add the act that our 
suggested codes that we have developed throughout the study, although thoroughly developed 
to support the concepts introduced and carefully designed according to the provided literature, 
were not verified on a real working network. Thus we recommend to the readers choosing to 
implement our configuration codes to verify the codes in a real networking environment before 
imp lementing them into an operating network in order to avo id unnecessa1y network 
complications. 
In general, chapter 5 can be considered a more in-depth explanation of the concepts 
introduced in chapter 4, while detai ling their application techniques along with the application 
of Dynamic ACLs. This explanation is done through a deep theoretic analysis as weil as 
through developing detailed configuration codes that will help alert he reader to the smallest 
details of the implementation and the operation methodology of the concepts introduced, as 
weil as the issues related to each. detail, which provide sorne leads to overcome them. Thus, the 
chapter introduces the Dynamic ACLs as a concept that includes the use ofTelnet, stressing on 
210 
the authentication options that can be applicable within, while comparing them to Telnet, on 
one hand, and in regards to their efficiency when used within dynamic ACLs, on the other 
hand. Also the chapter focuses on critiquing these authentication options in order to pinpoint 
their drawbacks and to provide ways to overcome them. 
The chapter starts by a detailed explanation of the authentication options related to 
Dynamic ACLs including their drawbacks, followed by a thorough explanation of the Dynamic 
ACLs mechanism using different authentication servers, while applying peer recovery 
mechanism (already explained in chapter 4), and finally , since choosing the right combination 
of authentication servers is crucial for the recovery mechanism, the chapter ends by presenting 
a thorough comparison of the authentication servers, as a necessity in order to complete the 
chapter. 
In details, the chapter tackles the mam problem of the research by studying the 
relation between Dynamic ACLs and the user authentication process as weil as the different 
authentication methods used with Dynamic ACLs including Telnet. This chapter also provides 
an in depth explanation of the security and scalability issues related to the application of the 
Dynamic ACLs concept, white suggesting sorne solutions to overcome such problems, like the 
auth-proxy and the rotary command. The application of peer recovery using Dynamic ACLs 
while combining different authentication methods is another main aspect studied in this 
chapter that clarifies the differences between the different authentication servers that might be 
used along with Dynamic ACLs through a detailed comparison that demonstrates the different 
mechanism of each server when considered according to every comparison criterion (security, 
flexibility, scalability, reliability, interoperability, manageability and ease of implementation). 
The chapter sums up by introducing sorne detailed suggestions regarding the implementation 
choices related to each server, by stating sorne of the Dynamic ACLs drawbacks that can result 
out of this in-depth research, as weil as by providing a list of recommendations that help the 
security decision makers of any organization to make weil rounded choices while applying 
Dynamic ACLs combined with any of the authentication servers/protocols introduced within 
the study. 
.----------------------
CONCLUSION 
The study's main concem is about securing the organization 's network resources 
against the untrusted connections established by the remote users that are located within the 
unsecure Internet. Thus the study's research belongs to the network security field. In 
particular, the research is intended to address Dynamic ACLs as a security solution that can 
guarantee a secure remote user connection, rather than researching ali the security solutions 
that can be implemented to address such issues. Also the study's main focus is about the 
authentication process that takes place as part of the Dynamic ACLs security solution, rather 
than address ing ali the security aspects related to such a solution. 
The study's need cornes from the urge to balance network security with network 
avai lability fo r a given organization, according to its security and business needs . Having 
Dynamic ACLs as a focal point, the research addresses their security aspects that allow the 
dynamically changing users IP addresses to securely reach the organization network 
resources, hence supporting the organization's business perspectives. The study addresses 
the imperfections of Dynamic ACLs, which usually relies on Telnet as a connection method 
in order to initiate the Dynamic ACL security mechanism, regardless of the existing range of 
securi ty risks that the Telnet connection offers, which consequently affects the security of 
the user authentication process. The contribution of this research lies in the elaboration on 
the Dynamic ACLs authentication process, specifying the main details that would help a 
better implementation for such process, by giving the decision maker or the engmeer a 
variety of authentication solutions to sec ure the Dynamic ACLs mechanism. 
Even though a number of academie, as weil as professional papers, explain the 
authentication process as weil as the different authentication methods to implement it, none 
of them related such process to the use of Telnet as a connection method involved within the 
Dynamic ACLs mechanism, nor compared such a connection, while combined with such 
methods, with other alternate connection!methods combination. Such a deep level of 
description, configuration and comparison emphasizes the importance of the organizations ' 
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emergmg needs to find and implement alternative connection methods. Also the study 
provides suggestions for these altemate methods to be used in order to avoid the drawbacks 
ofTelnet as a connection, as weil as an authentication method. 
Thus the research context was based upon existing facts as weil as acquired ones, 
through research, about the already existing authentication methods and the corresponding 
security solutions, classifying and comparing them in different ways in order to provide 
cohesive guidelines for their implementation. These guidelines represent the results of the 
research study, and their main role is to provide a number of potential authentication choices 
in order to efficiently and individually address specifie organizations ' needs. The guidelines 
may also help to address the research problem, and may offer new teclmological insights that 
deserve to be considered for future implementations. The study follows a top-down 
deductive reasoning, where the results are developed based upon the well-known network 
security concepts that were studied and analyzed throughout the research, as weil as the 
configuration codes that have been developed specifically for the study in order to help 
deduce more security issues that can be further analyzed aU along the research. 
The thesis is built on introducing the important subjects that lead one to another, 
starting by the more general into the more specifie ones, in order to build a solid base to 
introduce the research problem. Thus the research started by introducing the network 
connectivity concept which is the first step to be achieved when setting up a network, 
including the explanation of the OSI and TCP/IP network architecture models, which helps 
the reader to visualize the location of the authentication process, since it is the main subject 
of our study. We followed by the explanation of ACLs in general, stating their different 
types, including Dynamic ACLs. The study then introduced the different user authentication 
methods that exist on the market, as weil as ways to combine them in arder to create 
recovery peers using method lists . The information gathered during the previous parts helped 
the researcher tackle the problem of the research. Thus the research problem was introduced 
explaining the reasons why Telnet is not recommended for Dynamic ACLs as an 
authentication method nor as a connection method. The problem was followed by 
suggestions to overcome Telnet vulnerability. The information and measures gathered during 
the previous parts of the research helped the researcher to detect regularities as weil as 
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itTegularities of the authentication methods used, as combined with a VTY connection 
method. Such information helped the researcher to get to sorne results representing the 
study ' s conclusion. As a conclusion, the study ended by providing implementation 
recommendations and guidelines, comparing a nurnber of connection and authentication 
combinations as suggested solutions, in terms of security, flexibility, reliability, 
interoperability, manageability, as weil as ease of implementation, to help the decision 
makers decide up<m the best solution to implement according to the needs of their network 
design. 
The research in general, can be considered as a technical configuration guide for the 
concepts and security solutions introduced. lt is important to note that suggestions and 
recommendations provided by the research only concem the specifie security solution 
mentioned in the research. Though they cover most of the aspects of concern upon which a 
network designer might pick his choice amongst different network security solutions, these 
recommendations and suggestions only cover the authentication function out of ali three 
AAA security functions. Likewise, these recommendations and suggestions only cover the 
Dynamic ACLs as security solution, versus other security solutions like IPsec or VPNs. 
Finally, they are restricted to VTY user's access method, and do not consider other remote 
connection methods that might be established by the user. Also the research in general, can 
be considered as a technical configuration guide for the concepts and security solutions 
introduced. 
lt is very important to specify that, though the research include a large number of 
configuration çode that the researcher found essential, in order to better explain the 
mechanism of a number of introduced concepts and to help facilitate the ir implementation in 
the future , there was no means to test the validation of the code in a real operating 
environment. This difficulty is one of the challenges that this type of researches usually 
faces , where validating a code requires the availability of an already operating organization 
network, comprising a large number of hardware, software, equipment as well as remote 
users . Even with the hypothetical existence of such a network, a thorough code validation 
demands its testing within an operational environment, which represents a challenge to 
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create; since creating such an environment requires an organization to either stop or alter the 
operation of its working network, which may be impractical and considerably costly. 
As a continuation for the work accomplished within the research, it might be 
interesting to see future researches that can be considered as complementing guidelines 
about the implementation of the different authentication methods to secure other types of 
security solutions (different than Dynamic ACLs), or to secure other type of access than 
VTY access method, or even as guides for the authorization and the accounting functions for 
Dynamic ACLs as weiL Such researches would complement the study offered hereby, and 
altogether can serve as a complete configuration and implementation reference for Dynamic 
ACL security solution, or for a number of inclusive alternative security solutions. 
APPENDIXA 
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO OVERCOME 
TELNET SECURITY ISSUES 
Telnet drawbacks can be improved by one of the following solutions: 
A.l Telnet extensions 
Telnet can be extended using sorne extensions to overcome sorne of its security 
issues; where extensions like Transport Layer Security (TLS), its predecessor Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL) and Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) can be added to 
the Telnet configuration. Actually, SSL and TLS are usually used by web browsers to secure 
the connection. Web browsers decide when to switch from a regular unsecure HTTP 
connection to a web server, into a secure SSL/TLS one using TCP port 443, encrypting data 
and authenticating users. 
In this section, we will describe TLS and SSL in details, in order to explain how 
their integration can help overcome Telnet 's vulnerability. 
According to Wilcipedia (Wikipedia Secure Sockets Layer, 2012), TLS and SSL are 
commonly used in Web Browsers and VoiP communications providing an encryption for the 
segments of network that are located above the Transport Layer, using asymmetric 
cryptography for key exchange, symmetric encryption for privacy, and message 
authentication codes for message integrity. 
Another Wikipedia topic (Wikipedia Public key Cryptography), the asymmetric 
cryptography uses two keys, one is for locking or encrypting the plain text and the second, 
which is the only mathematically match for the first key, is for unlocking or decrypting the 
encrypted text through an algorithm. Either key should be public to everyone, so the other 
key should be private. 
216 
If the lock/encryption key is publicly published, then the system enables private 
communication from the public to the owner of the unlocking key (the private key). If the 
unlock/decryption key is the one publicly published then the system serves as a signature 
verifier (authenticator) of documents locked by the owner of the private key. ( (Wikipedia 
Secure Sockets Layer, 2012) 
Symmetric encryption uses the same key for both the encryption and the decryption 
processes and are called "shared secret", as they 're shared between the sender and the 
receiver in order to insure secure communication. 
Message authentication codes for message integrity help assure the message 1s 
written by the intended source and wasn't altered on its way to the destination. 
According to Wikipedia (Wikipedia SASL, 2012), "Simple Authentication and 
Security Layer (SASL) is a framework used within Internet protocols for authentication and 
data security." SASL separates the authentication mechanisms from application protocols, 
thus allowing any authentication mechanism supported by SASL to be used within any 
application protocol that uses SASL. 
Now that we introduced ILS, SSL and SASL extensions as potential solutions to 
eliminate Telnet 's security drawbacks, it is important to mention that these extensions are 
not used very often as they're rare ly supported by Telnet implementations; whereas SSH is 
considered more reliable and favorable security protocol. Also, one more reason to avoid 
Tenet relies on the fact that in most implementations, firewalls are usually configured to 
reject Telnet connections, which makes Telnet implementation impractical for many 
organizations. 
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A.2 VPNs 
Another way that might help to avoid the vulnerabilities of Telnet authentication is 
to conduct the Dynamic ACL authentication and connection through a Virtual Private 
Network (VPN), which provides privacy of the message contents, authentication of the 
sending deviee (which is the main concem of our study), data integrity and anti-replay 
( copying messages and resending them from a rogue deviee so they appear as if they come 
from legitimate deviee) , which sounds like a promising solution to be considered as an 
alternative for Telnet and/or SSH as weil. 
In the following section, we will introduce VPN tunnels , in general, focusing on the 
encryption, which will introduce us to VPN's peer authentication, in order to compare it with 
Telnet' s authentication process. 
Figure 6.1 
Internet 
A user accessing 
the organization's Organizations ' lnner network 
VPN implementation between the NAS and the user' s router 
As shown by the figure , VPNs require the establishment of a VPN tunnel between 
the sender and the receiver where the packets get encrypted and decrypted by both parties' 
roulers , while being encapsulated by a new IP header specifying these routers as well as by a 
VPN header. 
VPNs depend on encryption, such as provided by IPsec encryption, where one pair 
of algorithms is used, one algorithm is for the encryption, and the other for decryption where 
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each needs a shared session key (symmetric keys) in order to produce results. This key is the 
same for both processes: the encryption and the decryption, and has to be preconfigured 
before any of the processes takes place (Odom, CCNA ICND2, Official Exam Certification 
Guide. , 2009). 
Sending a message through VPN tunnel happen in a number of steps, as follows : 
1- The sending router encrypts the message, by feeding it, ali together with the 
shared key into the encryption algorithm. 
2- The sending router encapsulates the encrypted message into a packet, with a VPN 
header followed by an IP header indication the new source and destination 
(presented by the sending and receiving routers) 
3- The message is sent through the tunnel to the receiving router. 
4- The receiving router feeds the message, all together with the shared key into the 
corresponding encryption algorithm, and gets the data message unencrypted. 
VPN tunnels are considered as very secure, because if the attacker was able to 
intercept the encrypted message during transmission over the tunnel, he won ' t decrypt it 
without knowing the session key. And even if the attacker succeeds decrypting one packet, 
this won't give him any indication for how to decrypt consecutive ones. The longer the 
session key, the more complicated the computation the VPN tunneled message would need 
to get decrypted (Odom, CCNA ICND2, Official Exam Certification Guide., 2009). 
Encryption algorithms include Data Encryption Standard (DES), which has a key 
length of only 56 bits; Triple DES, which has a key length of (56 * 3) bits; and Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES), which has a key length of 128 and 256 bits. Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) is the most secure and best practice with Jess computation than 
Triple DES and the strongest session key of all three encryption algorithms (Odom, CCNA 
ICND2, Offi cial Exam Certification Guide., 2009). 
The previous paragraphs will lead us to understand the VPN's user authentication 
process, since it is similar to the DH key exchange. This process depends on the sender 
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public/priva te key concept where the sender encrypts a value using his priva te key, and puts 
it in the VPN header. 
In order to decrypt this transmitted value, the receiver will use the sender's public 
key, then compares it to the value in the header of the message. If both values match, then 
the sender is authentic. The public/private key user authentication process is also known as 
Rivest, Shamir and Adelman (RSA) (Wikipedia - Public Key Cryptography, 2012). The 
authentication can also be made through pre-shared keys concept. 
So far we introduced site-to-site VPN connection mode!, where two branches of the 
same organization try to connect securely. This mode! helped us understand the VPN 
concept in general, however, when comparing VPN authentication to Dynamic ACLs' usual 
Telnet authentication, we need to consider remote access VPN mode! , where only one user 
tries to access the resources of the organiz:ation, and which is more similar to the Dynamic 
ACLs' connection mode!. 
Remo te ac cess VPN user doesn 't need a Router or a special sen ding deviee in order 
to encrypt the data sent over the VPN tunnel. Instead, he needs to install VPN Client 
Software which implements IPSec on the PC and thus allows VPN encryption support. 
In this section we will introduce another alternative for VPNs, WEB VPN, which is 
also sometimes called SSL VPN. 
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A.3 WEB VPN 
Another alternative for VPNs according to Odom (Odom, 2009) is Web VPNs, which ailow 
only web traffic from a remote user ' s web browser into the organization resources . The need 
for Web VPNs depends on nowadays applications web-enabled nature, so that most users 
would be allowed to access their organization's web server or email server. 
The remote user ' s connection is secured then by SSL for ali communications 
between the user host and the organization's web VPN server, which is usually the 
organization peer/connection deviee. Opposed to only using SSL, web VPNs secure ail 
communications between the remote user and the organization resources, which completely 
enforces security. SSL, as discussed above, enforces security only when sensitive 
information (like credentials and financial information) are to be exchanged over a web 
browser. 
A user accessing 
the organization's 
Web server 
SSH Encrypted 
Figure 6.2 Web VPN implementation 
VPN 
server 
server 
Actually as we can see from the figure , first the remote user connects to the host 
name of the Web VPN server ( 1 ). The latter lists ail available web applications to the remo te 
user(!) . When the user selects one application(!) , the web VPN server communicates with 
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the internai web server (2), intemally, either by SSL or HTTP depending on the application, 
however when passing that traffic externally towards the remote user, SSH is only used to 
secure ali connections through the internet. 
So the client doesn't have to install a specifie software to go for that web VPN 
option, the only drawback is that he's always limited to only web enabled applications. 
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